

## The intifada of Genoa \*

Give a horse to the man who has told the truth:  
he will need it to save himself (Popular Italian  
dictum).

### Riassunto. - L'intifada di Genova

La città di Genova, afflitta da lungo tempo da numerosi problemi non risolti, ha avuto il dubbio onore di ospitare la riunione del G8, presentata dalla giunta comunale e dal governo dell'epoca, entrambi di sinistra, come un'occasione per ravvivare un'economia e una società decisamente stagnanti. Tuttavia, la città è stata vittima di gravi devastazioni da parte di folle di estrema sinistra sia locali sia convenute da ogni parte del ricco e annoiato mondo occidentale per contestare la riunione, potendo anche contare sull'appoggio della sinistra locale e della sconsiderata compiacenza di taluni ecclesiastici. Risulta assolutamente impossibile, sulla base di osservazioni dirette sul terreno, distinguere i violenti dai "pacifisti", sia per le dichiarazioni incendiarie dei leader sia per l'effettivo comportamento dei dimostranti. Messaggi su Internet di contestatori avvertivano loro conoscenze femminili di non venire perché sapevano bene che si sarebbe scatenata la violenza: vi era dunque premeditazione. Anche coloro che si sono astenuti dal compiere direttamente atti di violenza li hanno comunque favoriti, sia perché non li hanno né isolati né denunciati, sia perché ingombrando le strade hanno posto le forze dell'ordine nel dilemma di intervenire coinvolgendo i cosiddetti "pacifisti" ed esponendosi a critiche per questo, o non fare nulla ed essere accusate di inerzia. Ottima è stata invece la decisione del governo di centro-destra di chiudere lo spazio aereo intorno alla città, ciò che ha probabilmente scongiurato un attentato

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to analogo a quello contro le Torri Gemelle; è infatti accertato che un fratello di Bin Laden (certo non in visita turistica) era presente a Genova durante il G8. Lo stress causato dai disordini ha portato pure un decremento del tasso di natalità.

### Introduction

Meetings among heads of State and government leaders are rather common, but when these involve the greatest economic powers they obviously attract greater attention and involve serious law and order and terrorism problems. The annual G8 meeting is an occasion of high visibility not only for political leaders and the host city, but also for antagonist groups.

The meeting of 20th-22nd July 2001 in Genoa might have been an occasion for revitalizing a city suffering from serious decay: Liguria and its capital have the primacy in Italy for abortion and suicides, especially among the youth. Genoa is a city humiliated by long neglect and incompetent political leadership, marked by showy cultural initiatives having scanty economic impact. During the last thirty years, no significant public works have been built. The population is heavily declining and aging (average age is 46), and this generates poor economic dynamism and stagnation of ideas in politics and other walks of life. The brain drain to Milan and other Italian cities is massive. Foregone opportunities are legions, as shown for instance by the huge delays in tackling transport problems, exemplified, for instance, by the saga of the Underground Railway, fruitlessly discussed for



more than a century, eventually started, but the most expensive and slowest to build, and by the fabled "third railway route" over the Apennines, absolutely necessary for swift links with Milan. As a result, Genoa has been all but cut out of the "Golden Triangle" (Milan, Turin, Genoa). Add to this the devastation of the nuclear industry, in the Sixties and Seventies, just when the early projects for intrinsically secure nuclear reactors were being developed. A highly significant case is that of the gigantic floating drydock, built at great expense, left lying useless for many years, and the object of long fruitless discussions (it was even mooted to turn it into a theatre, to be allocated, of course, to the Left-wing self-styled "intelligenza"), and eventually sold for a song to Turkey, which is operating it with high profits.

### **A clumsy organization**

As is well known, until the political elections of 13th May 2001, Italy has been nearly uninterruptedly ruled by Centre-Left coalitions, while the municipality of Genoa is still governed by the Left. In 1998 the Centre-Left government, evidently pursuing the goal to aid its own candidates in the imminent regional elections, decided to hold the G8 meeting in Genoa, allotting several million euros for cosmetic embellishments of the city. However, the impending political elections boded ill for the Left, and this fact was known long in advance thanks to many pre-election surveys.

Left-wing parties reacted unleashing a furious personal campaign, in the State television network RAI and in the largely Left-controlled press, against Mr Berlusconi (Vespa 2001), a campaign still running unabated. At the same time, the Centre-Left government ceased to busy itself actively of the problem of law and order in Genoa in order to leave the hot potato entirely to the forthcoming Centre-Right government (Vespa 2001). The latter government took up power just a month before the G8 meeting, when it was no longer possible to do anything to remedy the preparations made (or mismanaged) by the previous government.

Similar cases had previously shown how dangerous it was to hold a meeting of that kind in a large city. The choice of Genoa, moreover, was singularly unfortunate, due to the extreme difficulty to keep under control the maze of lanes of the city centre, and also because "red" Genoa (called by some "the Italian Stalingrad") traditionally has strong bases of extremist extraparlimentary

groups. Also the decision to block all entries to the seat of the meeting in Palazzo Ducale, was taken by the previous government and implemented by officials who owed their posts exclusively to previous Left-wing governments.

These officials were later harshly attacked in Parliament for alleged incompetence by the very same Left-wing opposition, implying, of course, that the Centre-Right government was the sole responsible for what had happened, i.e. for the fact that the G8 meeting in Genoa, from 20th to 22nd July 2001, had been used by Leftist extremists as an excuse to unleash a spate of arson, devastations and aggressions to the police forces. Banks, shops, care hire firms, private cars, bus stops, petrol stations were gutted. The mobs set garbage containers afire and used them to build barricades. Unrest and devastation were by far the worst since the Second World War.

### **A previous case of left-wing engineered civil unrest**

A comparison can be made with the unrest of 30th June 1960, in Genoa, also unleashed by Left-wing extremists, aiming at overturning the Centre-Right government headed by Mr Tambroni. In that occasion, mob intimidation against a democratically elected government was highly successful. Mr Tambroni resigned and a historical turning point in Italian politics took place.

The votes of the Right were "frozen" on the basis of the debatable ideology of the so-called "costituzional arc", making it unavoidable an alliance between Marxists and alleged "Christian Democrats" based on the infamous "Cencelli handbook" (a blueprint for the apportionment of all key posts in public administration, the media, the banks, the publishing industry, and in all other vital sectors of national life, which became a coveted booty to be shared among the Centre-Left parties).

This arrangement brought considerable advantages, in terms of power, prestige and money to the party bureaucracies involved (occasions for personal enrichment for Christian Democrats and their table cronies, while the more "austere" Communists used the money to finance the party). Benefits to Italy as a whole were at best dubious. While the "Christian Democrat" ruling clique (nomenklatura) was busy taking over most ministerial posts and key posts in the economy, the Left-wing nomenklatura, and particularly that of the Communist Party, was able to occupy a huge



number of key posts in the Law Courts, the media, the schools, the universities, where entire faculties are invariably of one colour, and non-communists are sometimes afraid to express their opinions.

Another adverse consequence was that the ensuing lack of political turnover inevitably brought forth corruption: governments lasted just a few months (so very little real government activity took place after 1960), but the people in power were invariably the same (unless they died), so that opportunities for squeezing money out of the State were very promising, and the probability of discovery appeared low. "Tangentopoli" (bribe-town) ensued, when the Communists thought to be able to destroy judicially all other parties and take over. However, the unrest of that fateful 30th June – in spite of having brought forth such drastic changes – took place in one day only, was confined to the central De Ferrari Square and did not involve the common citizens and the production structures to any considerable extent.

The unrest of the 30th of June was obviously engineered by the Communist Party. On the contrary, the three days of true "intifada" of 2001 defy a single ideological label. Due to the deep ideological and political coma of the Left at worldwide level, the ideological hues of the various antagonist movements have become extremely diversified. They also seem far more vital than the organized parties of the left. The latter appear rather inclined to side with the movements (sometimes passively, occasionally with doubts and criticism), rather than being able to shape and control them.

### The "official" Left in a quandary

In order to put such weakness and confusion of the "official" Left into proper focus, it is useful to consider some remarks coming just from men by no means belonging to the Right. On the *Espresso*, a journal well known for its relentless attacks and coarse mockeries against Berlusconi and his family, as well as totally bent on sanctify the judges of the Milan pool, Giampaolo Pansa commented at the time: "When the history of the chaotic days of Genoa will be written, someone will have to remember that the last political event immediately before that, has been the utterly grotesque news that the leading politicians of the "Democratici di sinistra" (the post-communist party), on the evening of Tuesday July 17, had decided to take part of the demonstrations against the "Empire of Evil" called G8. And they invited to march not only the heads of the party, ie themselves, but also their

followers. Why do I say this is grotesque? Because, when they had Italy under their sway and Massimo D'Alema was the premier, the "Democratici di sinistra" were precisely those who offered to host the meeting in "a left-wing city", that's to say Genoa. Because if the leaders of the "Oak" (the symbol of the post-communist party), had won the elections on May 13, they would now be sitting in the very heart of the "red zone", close to Emperor Bush and the other vice-Emperors. Because now the post-communist bosses, on tow of people like Agnolotto and Casarini, are putting under siege their comrades of the European left, Blair, Jospin, Schroeder. What happened at the Botteghino of via Nazionale (the Roman headquarters of the post-communists) was explained by someone who knows very well the twisted post-communist physiology: Armando Cossutta. He said to the journalists: 'No wonder, my boys, the congress is at hand. The Left wing of the party does not want to be overtaken by the environmentalists. The rest of the party does not want to be overtaken by its Left wing'. Hence the slogan: *en masse* to Genoa! To pick up a few votes to the Left. And above all, if we wish to recall the curse of an old slogan, in order not to have any enemies on the Left." (Vespa 2001: 406-407).

On the special issue of *Limes* dedicated to the facts of Genoa, Antonio Pennacchi, an old revolutionary of "*Servire il popolo*", today a supporter of the post-communists, wrote: "The support of the former communists to "no global" protests cries revenge before God: it is simply a *pendant* of September 8 and the flight of the Savoia, is a breach of the social pact, is the dissolution of the sense of the State. We have organized G8, and have wanted it in Genoa to satisfy comrade Burlando. Had we won the elections, Rutelli would have gone there instead of Berlusconi. If Bertinotti had not broken the unity of the Left, D'Alema would have been there. And you dare to protest? The Head of the police and the commander of the Carabinieri had been appointed by us. They were our people. As – for instance – Zaccaria and Fabio Fazio. And you talk of Pinochet? But had there been the dictatorship of the proletariat I wanted, you would have been the first to be sent to Siberia ..." (Vespa 2001, p. 407).

### The antagonist movements

In spite of their extreme diversification, all movements, from the more "pacifist" to the openly violent ones, concur to form a synergic self-rein-



forcing system. More or less “peaceful” protests have nevertheless a constantly radical character. Utterances are invariably in an incendiary language, providing a basis (or an ideological screen) to the activities of other less “peaceful” groups. Moreover, the very presence of more “quiet” antagonists in the streets creates the *material condition* (mobs, confusion, slogans, noise, emotional tension) for the action of the violent. The general term whereby “antagonists” are known, “people of Seattle”, hides a multiplicity of groups, associations and so-called *centri sociali* (communes of youngsters often given over to drug consumption and various illegal activities, and most probably recruiting ground of terrorists, but nevertheless studiously protected and financed by Left-wing municipalities). All these groupings are united to form blocks (Tab. 1), whose ideology is always confused but constantly loudly screamed. Every demonstration is invariably an occasion for destruction, both before and after the Genoa intifada. The graffiti left on the walls after the horde has withdrawn make instructive reading: “Ten, hundred, thousand Nassiryas”, was more than once scribbled by the “pacifists” after the sacrifice of our soldiers in Irak. A raw threatening sketch of a fire extinguisher has entered the limited range of iconographic imagination of these vandals after the death of Carlo Giuliani during Genoa’s intifada.

The Genoa Social Forum (GSF) adopted the Porto Alegre statement: “We are men and women: farmers and workers, professionals, students, unemployed, indigenous and black peoples, we come from the South and the North, we are engaged to fight for the right of the peoples, for freedom, security, work and education. We are against the hegemony of capital, the destruction of our cultures, the devastation of nature and the decay of the quality of life by transnational enterprises

and by undemocratic policies. The experience of participative democracy, as in Porto Alegre, shows that realistic alternatives are possible. We reaffirm the supremacy of human, environmental and social rights over the exigencies of capital and investments”. These are evidently stereotyped formulas overfilled with words of assured demagogic impact, exceedingly vague as to possibly practicable programmes of action, but filled of echoes of two different ideological strains: a vague but violent anticapitalism which mirrors a distinct revanchist will after the dismal failure of communist regimes, and a likewise vague but extremely determined and violent environmentalist ideology.

Shortly before the Genoa meeting, the GSF sent a letter to the President of the Republic denouncing “the serious situation which has arisen concerning the unfolding of the G8 meeting of next July, with confidence in your intervention to re-establish a climate of free and serene confrontation between institutions and civil society”. What kind of situation is meant is far from clear, but it is perhaps legitimate to presume that the claimed “right” may be that to agitate without limitations or controls, and that by “civil society” the GSF leaders wish to indicate themselves, invested (by whom?) of the mission to speak for “society”. In another letter, to the Presidents of the Chamber of Representatives and of the Senate, the GSF calls for “a defense of the basic and intangible rights of the citizens of the world of work, to health, to the protection of the environment, to freedom of expression and a correct information” and a “definition of the common non disposable goods of mankind (such as biodiversity, the gene pool, the water resources ...)” (cit. in Acciari 2001).

Beyond resounding words, a simple scrutiny of these expressions makes their emptiness plain. Few remarks suffice in this regard. The “right to

Tab. 1. Anti-G8 movements and groups.

Movements	Acronyms & components	Of which foreigners	Programme platform
Genoa Social Forum (GSF)	ca. 300	64	Porto Alegre Appeal
“White overalls”		35	56 Letter to the President of the Republic
“Black overalls”		-	- Anarcho-Insurreccionalism, in practice destruction
“Pink-black”	“Anti-G8 network”, “Lilliput”		- Presumably similar to the GSF
“Yellow-black”	Mainly “Social centres” (youth Communes)		- Presumably similar to the “white overalls”
“Blue black”	“Social centres” from Central and Southern Italy		- Presumably similar to the “white overalls”
Various	Soccer teams’ supporters, “Punk beasts”, etc.		- None, merely destruction lust

health” seems more than anything else a warning to the Father above: who can guarantee to anyone a “right” to escape sickness and death? And what does it mean to regard the gene pool (of whom? of what?) as a “common unavailable good”? And should water resources become “unavailable”? Should it be prohibited to draw water? Above all, it is highly problematic to apply the expression “citizen of the world” indifferently to the Christian inhabitants of southern Sudan (whose chief problem is to escape the massacres, tortures and slavery imposed by the Islamic government of that country) and the computer programmer of Bangalore (who has, plausibly, quite different aspirations and problems). But the tragedy of persecuted Christians is of no interest whatsoever to the nomenclature of the GSF or to its ill-advised supporters belonging to the Catholic hierarchy.

The manifesto of the “white overalls” utterly ignores the problem to explain and even less to justify its behaviour. Holding fast the axiomatic that all those holding different opinions are, by definition, delegitimized, the worrying document declares: “Our opposition to G8 is radical: we do not acknowledge to the leaders of the eight industrialized powers the right to come to agreements having consequences for the whole of mankind; in fact, although G8 has no decisional and executive power, but merely a consultative one, the strategic agreements taken there soon become effective, through supranational organizations such as International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Commerce Organization, which are all integral parts of the same mechanism ...”. And it reiterates: “... we will not obey the prohibition imposed by the authorities which, through the plenipotentiary minister for G8, have assured that already in the week prior to the meeting no demonstration will be allowed. We will not obey the prohibition to overstep the border of what has been defined ‘red zone’, ...”. The upshot is to deny heads of State and government leaders democratically elected and representing many hundred million electors, the right to gather and deliberate upon topics of common interest. And upon whom does, then, legitimation depend? From the pleasure of a hundred thousand demonstrators, making up roughly the 0.0016% of mankind, many of whom have shown their love to mankind smashing anything on their way?

As to the ideology of the “black overalls”, it is defined “anarcho-insurreccionalist”, but has little to do with the historical anarchic movement, which certainly has a long tradition of violent and bloody actions, but since at least twenty years, in

Italy, has ceased to operate in illegal fashion. No one actually knows how many the “black overalls” are: they are certainly neither a party nor an organized movement. Their rough ideological utterances (“The police is the violent face of capitalism, policemen are the watchdogs of the rich ... they hinder our march and want to interfere with our class struggle against the rich”, cit. in Morelli 2001) express openly their longing for violence, a longing satisfied with a ruthlessness supported by a paramilitary training obtained, it seems, from the ETA terrorists (Morelli 2001).

The movement, born in the Seventies in Germany, developed mainly in the USA, especially in sleepy Oregon, during the Eighties, had its baptism of fire in the unrest against the Gulf War, held violent demonstrations in Philadelphia for the liberation of Mumia Abu-Jamal, a Muslim anarchic criminal, and a few months later devastated Seattle to “give expression to their rejection of globalization”. Since those days of the 1998, the Black Bloc have not missed a single occasion of anti-global protest, from Sydney to Praha, from Ottawa to Nice, from Göteborg to Genoa, moving from one end to the other of the planet with the utmost ease. Evidently, these idle and brutal sons of an affluent society have plenty of money to travel, or else they are financially supported by some interested pressure group.

In the booklet *Il popolo di Seattle: chi siamo, cosa vogliamo?*, ie “The people of Seattle: who are we, what do we want?” (Velena 2001), “black overalls” and “white overalls” appear to be faces of one medal: “The Black overalls are mostly anarchists, so-called “self-standing groups” (*autonomi*), i.e. the oldest rebels of the strongest stock of anti-system radicals, resistant to uprooting. Theirs is the *trait d’union* with the archaic Sixty-eight, with the mythical Seventy-seven (...). Their tactics and strategies have deep roots. They are based upon the swiftness, the elusivity, the boldness of the small group of cronies well acquainted with each other, because they live day by day their own anti-system choice” (Velena 2001, p. 139). “The White overalls descend directly from “Autonomia Operaia” and the “Social centres”. In Milan they attended evening courses on resistance, on smashing of police lines, on *hiding into crowds of demonstrators*, and more besides, at the ‘Leoncavallo’ social centre” (Velena 2001, p. 133, italics added). “The clash, the street guerrilla, the disruptive act, even plundering, if it happens, we certainly will not repent of it, neither will we attempt to moralize and to awaken guilt complexes in the other components of this multifarious People.



May they decide to use this form of struggle and of destructuring of passive and indifferent quiet. It is our, your, their right" (Velena 2001, p. 130).

A few days before the G8, Luca Casarini threatened: "We will be the multitude of Genoa. The Empire is weak. A public mass illegality will flourish, a deeply rooted craving for rebellion" (*La Repubblica*, 16/7/2001), and further: "We will be there, and will be wicked". José Bovè, the leader of peasant ecologism sang the same tune: "We are going to make a quality leap". Open and repeated "war declarations" by Casarini took away any doubt as to the real intentions of the antiglobal mob to anyone who did not wish keep his eyes shut. The assault on Genoa was planned and organized in headquarters close to Lugano, using Internet a great deal. Internet messages by protesters warned their girlfriends suggesting them to stay at home, since they knew that violence was expected: there was therefore clear premeditation.

The spirit of devastation, accompanied by drug taking (documented by an amateurial video made during the unrest), which has characterized the unprovoked violence against the G8 in Genoa is the same which primed the Sixty-eight and its terror outcomes such as the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof gang. Toni Negri, leader of "Autonomia operaia", condemned for armed insurrection against the powers of the State, "true engine of revolutionary plots" according to the final sentence of 1988, has publicly praised the Seattle movement and Porto Alegre as a "volcanic eruption, a kermesse of liberty, perhaps a new Sixty-eight" (*Corriere della Sera*, 10/7/2001). If Toni Negri is exiled in Paris to escape jail, many of the leaders of Sixty-eight sit today in the European Parliament, like Josef Fischer, Foreign minister of the German Left-wing government: in the early Seventies this individual was head of a "cleaning group" (*Putzgruppe*), specialized in attacks against the police. Daniel Cohn-Bendit, also an European MP, was ringleader of the Sixty-eight in Paris, and in 1976 wrote a book, *Le Grand Bazar*, in which he described acts of pedophily he perpetrated on children of the Frankfurt kindergarten where he "worked" as a "teacher".

Neither are these isolated phenomena: the subversion of morals is a fundamental element of revolution to destroy society. We should not forget that the age of the French Revolution, produced not only Danton, Robespierre and Marat, but also Lançlos (author of *Les Liasons dangereuses*, one of the most tragic manuals for the corruption of youth) and the infamous De Sade. Identical prop-

aganda techniques were also used, in the Sixty-eight and anti G8 unrest events, in attempting to criminalize the police, systematically accused of being responsible of any violence.

### The "intifada" of Genoa (July 20-22, 2001)

It was obvious to anyone that a serious hazards for law and order existed in Genoa, on account of violence and devastations that had occurred elsewhere and the often repeated threats by antagonist groups. In order to keep the difficult territory of Genoa under control, it had been decided to surround entirely with heavy barriers a central zone including the whole historical port and the streets surrounding it, the areas of the "Palazzo Ducale" (Doges' Palace), De Ferrari Square, Venticinque Aprile Street, Fontane Marose Square, Corvetto Square and the whole Venti Settembre Street: this was the "red zone", surrounded by a broader "yellow zone" (Fig. 1). While it was possible to enter the red zone only through narrow openings rigorously controlled, the yellow zone was to all purposes merely on paper, where police forces intervened only when called by the citizens. The Security Department of the Department of the Interior ordered the deployment of thousands of men (Tab. 2).

A serious mistake of the government has been attempting to open a dialogue, which has yielded counterproductive results. As remarked by Angelo Panebianco in an editorial entitled "Western world disease among the Catholics. The G8 and the mistake of a part of the Church" on the *Corriere della Sera* July 30, 2001, "The Italian government has been induced to fall into the mistake of seeking an impossible dialogue with the 'Genoa Social Forum'. Probably, the government would have never attempted anything of the kind if the Catholic world had not been so heavily biased in favour of the antagonists. However, a dialogue is possible only with pragmatic movements, interested to the solution of practical problems, not with ideological movements aiming at fighting the enemy. What kind of dialogue is possible with someone who denies legitimacy to your very existence?" (cit. by Vespa 2001, 397).

In fact, the heads of State and government leaders were branded by *all* antiglobal ringleaders as "representing only themselves", while the antagonists styled themselves as defenders and saviours of mankind and the planet. Among the Catholic groups more gravely responsible for this mindless demonization are the activists of the *Lilliput Net-*






Fig. 1. The space of the unrest in Genoa.



Tab. 2. Strength of Law and Order forces employed.

Law and order forces	Nos. men
Territorial Police forces	5000
Land army forces	1300
Navy and air forces	1450
Prison wardens	250
Forestry Police	40
Police reinforcements	4500
Military Police (Carabinieri) reinforcements	4500
Revenue officers	1000
Total	18040

work, including such politically correct organizations as *Beati i costruttori di pace*, *Mani tese*, *Nigrizia*, *Pax Christi*, *Gruppo Abele* and WWF, with the open support of the local Catholic hierarchies, at the very highest level, a support expressed by means of words and facts. No disciplinary action has been taken against many priests mongers of class hatred, and demonstrators have found a friendly

haven for their guerrilla training exercises prior to the wrecking of Genoa in the square facing St. Lawrence Cathedral.

Former cardinal archbishop of Genoa Dionigi Tettamanzi by no means aided a serious analysis when he wrote that globalization “not governed by ethical principles of justice and solidarity leads to a worsening of the gap between rich and poor peoples, between the concentration of wealth in the hands of few debauchee and the marginalization of the many Lazarus of the Earth” (Tettamanzi & Musso 2001). Some days before the devastation of Genoa, in a speech held on July 7, the same archbishop had stressed “the decisive role of voluntary organizations and political engagement of the youth, which recalls the cultural season of Sixty-eight, fruitful of vehemence and passion” (sic!), and had gone so far as to claim the existence of a “red thread” between the anti-global movement and the prayer vigil of the two million Catholic youngsters at Tor Vergata during the Jubilee of the




Fig. 2. Choreme of the relations among the different actors of the conflict.



year 2000. The Pope, though directly called in question, has obviously avoided to provide any support to utterances of this kind. A quite different interpretation is that of a high prelate steeped into Third World realities, the cardinal archbishop of Ciudad de Mexico, Rivera Carrera (2001). He widely acknowledges the advantages of globalization: the broadened spaces of freedom, the liberalization of exchanges which has greatly favoured economic growth (the 15 commercially more dynamic countries between 1980 and 1994 are all developing countries, the share of emerging countries in the export of manufactured goods has grown from a twentieth to one fourth of the total since 1973, to which must be added the progresses in uprooting illiteracy, diffusion of schooling, eradication of poliomyelitis), and the far from negligible fact that the introduction of the market economy in China has halved poverty. Disadvantages, according to Rivera Carrera, are caused rather by the fact that not all countries have made it to negotiate the entrance into globalization: to be left out is the true problem, it is what prevents a redress of economic and social imbalances.

The Catholic electorate is an important, perhaps dominating part of the popular support to the Centre-Right coalition, the *Casa delle Libertà* (House of Liberty), and therefore the irresponsible utterances by meaningful segments of the Catholic world, up to the top of the Genoese *Curia*, caused a useless and counterproductive dialogue to be sought, not only by the government, as stressed above, but also, secretly, by the police authorities responsible of law and order. A high police official, who requested not to be quoted by name, revealed to the author of these pages the existence of an agreement with the Genoa Social Forum, whereby demonstrators would be allowed to break through at the margin of the red zone “thus obtaining some visibility”. All those responsible of law and order seemed to have been in the know, but the demonstrators did not keep their word: between Gastaldi Avenue and Tolemaide Street they attacked with extreme violence and determination, throwing Molotov cocktails and stones. “The truth is that Luca Casarini, the head of the White Overalls, did not admit to anyone that he was losing control” (Vespa 2001, p. 414). A choreme, i.e. a model of a single process (Fig. 2), can be used to show the relationships among the different actors of the conflict. Simplifying, the antagonist forces can be conceptualized in three main categories: (i) *rioters bent on destruction* (not only the Black Blocs but also the “white overalls”

and many other individuals from the local “social centres”, punk-animals, and even the “ultras”, fans of the two local soccer teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, usually bitter enemies but united for the occasion); (ii) *demonstrators* officially “peaceful” (among whom were left-wing politicians and some judges of the Attorney Office of Genoa); (iii) *supporters* who, though abstaining to take part to the processions, aided the demonstrators in various ways. Such help took various forms, providing logistic support and information, and upholding a vicious propaganda against the police forces.

The rest of the population was largely passive, though not entirely, at first largely indifferent or frightened, then angered by the wanton devastation of propriety and productive structures. Many citizens had taken early holidays before the usual “August exodus” to avoid to be in town, as everybody, beginning from the authorities, foresaw unrest and had advised the citizens to leave the city before the G8. The terror threat against the “red zone” was by no means a joke, and this justifies the order to shoot in case of a break of the barriers (besides a plan for a harmless “stage effect” by the “pacifists” which, as we shall see, did not take place), an order which did not concern the demonstrators, but only attacks by terrorists. There were warnings from the German secret services on the possibility of infected blood being thrown into the “red zone”. Serious warnings were issued also by the Israeli Mossad and by the Egyptian president Mubarak about plans for terror attacks by Islamic cells of Al Qaeda. During the G8, a brother of the infamous Osama Bin Laden is known to have been in Genoa: it seems utterly unlikely that he was there for mere tourism. All this points to a high probability that, without the strict security measures to protect the “red zone”, the catastrophe of the Twin Towers, which occurred only one month and a half later, would have hit the international leaders present in Genoa.

An Islamic terror cell must have been in place: it remained dormant thanks to the providential closure of the air space and the deployment of a battery of anti-aircraft missiles in the port area. The battery attracted a shower of sarcastic comments from the Left, of course. Had the Left been in power, it is highly unlikely that such “ridiculous” measure would be adopted: its leaders might have been seen in television strutting beside the major world leaders, up to an instant before the crash of the “martyrs” of Al Qaeda turning them into ashes, together with Bush (who was in all probability the target of the fourth plane of September 11,



fallen in Pennsylvania, destined to the White House by the “warriors of Allah”), as well as with Blair, Schröder, Jospin, Aznar and Putin (a hated target of the Tchechenyan Islamic terrorists).

The whole central city, along with thousands of innocents, would have been turned into ashes. Luckily, the “red zone”, isolated as it was by heavy iron barriers up to 5 metres high, with a concrete base, in spite of being the focus of the hot days from 20 to 22 July 2001, impenetrable from land and sky, remained totally aloof from the conflict. This allowed the unfolding of the meeting and sheltered the 36,000 people living there and also the decorative improvements recently made there. The rest of the city, instead, suffered a great deal. In the aftermath of the devastations, a significant drop in birthrate took place, precisely nine months after the unrest, worsening the already serious demographic crisis even further. This has been attributed by Prof. Aldo De Rose to a decline in sexual activity linked to the psychological stress (*Il Giornale Nuovo*, May 13, 2004).

After such a havoc, one would have expected the Left to be defeated at the following elections in Genoa. Surprisingly, that was not the case. The 2002 local elections saw a stunning local success of the Left, which has subsequently turned the city into a sort of capital of nonglobal movements. This can be explained bearing in mind the historical left-wing extremism of the city, widespread in all social layers, within an ageing population inclined to reject change. Not surprisingly, this is linked to a growing loss of dynamism and a disintegration of a once flourishing entrepreneurial culture: the scions of traditional entrepreneurial families have turned into high profile bureaucrats well connected with the post-communist establishment. It must also be borne in mind that Genoa was the nest of the “Red brigades” which caused so much bloodshed in Liguria and the rest of Italy during the Seventies.

### **Guerrilla techniques and responses by law and order forces**

An analysis of the guerrilla techniques employed reveals the high level of preparedness of the destroyers and the complicities they enjoyed. Guerrilla (from the Spanish *small war*) is the fighting method of those devoid of sufficient force to face the enemy in open war. It is confined to local terror actions aimed at spreading panic and forcing the government to come to terms, or else to control sufficient slices of territory to be able to move

on to open war. Guerrilla can be total, or exclusively urban. Ordinary guerrilla is fought with firearms and other highly destructive weapons, with the objective to replace the ruling élite, or it may also aim at the defense or restoration of a previous order against a revolutionary intrusion (eg the Vandée insurrection, and the heroic Spanish and Italian “Insorgenze” against the Napoleonic occupation).

The Vietnam war and the Afghan struggle against the Soviets have shown that guerrilla forces can even beat a superpower, if political factors prevent the same superpower from using all available force. If guerrilla is victorious, the conflict typically unfolds in three stages: (i) the formation of war zones, operation theatres of insurgent bands; (ii) organization of “sanctuaries” controlled by the insurgents; (iii) overthrow of the government (Barnard 1982). War zones can only be formed with the support, either spontaneous or obtained by intimidation, of at least a part of the population providing logistic support and shelter to the insurgents. The physical environment is important: wooded mountains are highly favourable to guerrilla, a flat desert is most unfavourable. In an urban territory, the guerrilla can enjoy good prospects thanks to the opportunity to find hideouts, especially if the centre has narrow streets, while cities dominated by broad avenues are less favourable. The drastic restructuring of the urban layout of Paris planned by Baron Haussman under Napoleon III, was an application of this principle by the State actor for defensive purposes.

Ordinary guerrilla is widespread in poor countries having a fragile or non-existent democratic tradition. Not surprisingly, the continent *par excellence* of guerrilla movements is the poorest, Africa, where tribal or family struggles are the rule. In a not too remote past, from the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Asia and Latin America were theatres of serious guerrilla movements. On the contrary, comparatively wealthy countries with a well established democracy, where prospects to overthrow the government by force of arms are practically nil, urban guerrilla has become important. Though this is a quite different kind of conflict, it can preserve some of the features in common with the former, for example in the size of fighting groups. The weapons employed are quite different. Urban guerrilla fighters use weapons such as stones, Molotov cocktails, crowbars, etc., hoping to lure the forces of Law and Order to shoot, causing victims which the supporting propaganda will be able to exploit. The unrest of 30 June 1960 in Genoa, the demon-



strations against the Vietnam war, as well as the so-called "Sixty-eight" started in France, in Germany and Italy, were the early attempts of such a kind of guerrilla.

A mass of noglobals which gathers everywhere a G8 meeting takes place, implies the movement of whole armies from one continent to another. Although costs may be partially covered by local authorities anxious to show themselves "open to dialogue", by the hospitality offered by the so-called "social centres", notorious breeding and recruiting ground for urban guerrilla fighters and terrorists, the cost to move around tens or hundreds of people must be huge. For travel expenses only, moving 50,000 persons (a far lower number than that present in Genoa, but there were thousands of locals whose travel costs were non-existent) an average of € 50 for a round trip, at an approximate average between bus and air trips, yields a total of € 25,000: an extremely conservative estimate, which does not include countless other items of expense of long range travel and support in the field. Neither is it to be forgotten the acquisition of microvideocameras, far more expensive than common videocameras, and the equipment to edit the recorded material (such as that used to manipulate the video showing the incident of Carlo Giuliani, of which the antagonists offered the Attorney Office a "modified" version, from which the brick which deviated the fatal bullet, originally aimed upwards, had disappeared). Even if it is impossible to obtain exact figures, one can assume that the mobilization of the antiglobals in Genova must have cost several tens of million euros. There must be therefore some kind of financial support by interest groups hoping to obtain economic and/or political advantages.

Another feature of the unrest is premeditation. It is hardly necessary to stress that truly peaceful demonstrations, such as the processions against the sliding scale or against the disastrous economic monopoly of the *Compagnia Unica Merci Varie* (the organization of port hands) in the port of Genoa have been held without any of the marchers carrying weapons of any kind and with no thought given to medical assistance. Neither any attention had been paid to whether there was much or little police. The irresponsible statement that a strong presence of the police is a "provocation", is just an excuse for violence. Police aggressions (ad Army attacks) to peaceful gatherings take place under dictatorships: we have seen them in the Tiananmen Square, or in Ceausescu's Rumania. Evidence of the fact that clashes with the police and devastations were by no means chance

occurrences, but on the contrary were actively pursued, is brought forth by: (i) the repeated and serious threats made through the mass media; (ii) the repeated warning of foreign intelligence services on the forthcoming violence; (iii) the infiltration of a considerable number of street fighters many weeks before the G8 event in order to reconnoitre the topography of the city and establish links with local supporters, especially with those of the so-called "social centres"; (iv) the really enlightening fact that noglobals brought along whole medical teams (who paid for them?), evidently foreseeing the high probability of police counter-attack and a number of injured among their own fighters; (v) the use of micro video cameras for recording clashes in a partisan way in order to throw a negative light on the police; (vi) the systematic use of true uniforms and of a vast array of weapons of various kind (iron bars, crow bars, sling throwers, Molotov cocktails, etc.) to which must be added the use of other material found on the spot (stones wrenched from pavements and garbage containers used for building barricades after setting fire to them).

In spite of the repeated statements proclaiming pacifism and "non-violence", the so-called "white overalls" never actually took distance from the Black Bloc hooligans, neither have they isolated, and least of all, denounced them. It was on the contrary extremely difficult to distinguish the "peaceful" from the violent ones. Changes from white to black overall, or undressing the overalls altogether in order to pass for common onlookers, have been widely observed by many observers, including the present writer. Sometimes the rioters, to avoid being seen, went to change their overalls in the solitary peripheral streets of upper Genoa, above "Circonvallazione a Monte" (the upper "corniche" artery), but sometimes they changed openly in the central city. A typical guerrilla tactic is to avoid strongly held strongholds, such as the "red zone", but hitting the "enemy" where he is not entrenched, in this case in the "yellow zone". This was precisely the behaviour of the Black Blocs, who have entirely avoided the "red zone" and a direct clash with the police. However, they managed to create such a confusion that, in the streets clogged both by violent and "peaceful" demonstrators, the police have ended up throwing tear gas on the "pacifists" too. This has been particularly useful to anti-global propaganda, which thus could accuse the agents of attacks to the "pacifists". The "white overalls", not the black ones attacked the police.

Particularly subtle has been the technique of



scattered attacks at different points, which shows that every group operated in coordination with the others. The obvious objective was to compel the police to disperse in their turn to contain the hooligans. The latter could therefore concentrate all of a sudden, with pincer attacks, on isolated police cars, destroying them and attempting to lynch the agents. By sheer luck there have been no casualties among the police. A statement by Carlo Casarini, the leader of the "white overalls" is extremely significant: in the tragic event of Alimonda Square which ended up in the death of Carlo Giuliani (hit when he was about to throw a fire extinguisher at the Land Rover Defender, with no small danger of an explosion, which would have caused a massacre involving not only the Carabinieri, but also himself and other attackers as well), the attackers of the Defender (not armoured), isolated and blocked, with three wounded Carabinieri on board, "were our comrades" (Vespa 2001, 416). The head of Digos (anti terrorist unit) in Genoa, Spartaco Mortola describes their warfare technique thus: the head of the procession of 20 July formed a wall of plexiglass shields, the men in the second line carried water buckets for protection against tear gas, the third line was formed by throwers of porphyry cubes wrenched from the street pavement and of stones picked up on the beach (Vespa 2001, 414). These mass attacks were quite different from the vandalic incursions of the Black Blocs.

The latter formed true guerrilla units, made up by 15 to 30 youths masked and equipped with helmets, cudgels, crowbars, Molotov cocktails, and cellular phones to coordinate their action. Though bearing in mind the vastly different conditions of the conflict in Ireland, there is a certain similarity, in size, of Black Bloc units with IRA "flying columns". This may not be due to mere chance, since such an order of magnitude allows wholesale visual control over the small unit, which can therefore operate in a highly coherent fashion, in spite of the turmoil. As a result, many streets in Genoa were devastated and soiled with graffiti. Banks and cars were typical targets of envy and class hatred, but the hooligans raged against targets with a low ideological profile, such as hire-purchase agencies, shops, even bus stops. For instance, in "Circonvallazione a Monte" (the upper residential artery perched on a Pleistocene glaciomarine terrace), far from the "red zone", a gang in black overalls smashed the glasses of the Ponte Caffaro bus stop, and tried to wreck the scaffolding erected for maintenance purposes around a high rise apartment building, evidently to pro-

vide themselves with an additional supply of iron bars; they also tried to open a locked gate leading to a garden, probably to destroy a car parked there. No police was to be seen in the area. These activities, however, were abruptly interrupted when the news spread about the first and only fatality of the unrest. Informed by cell phone, the gang hurried away, speeding towards the city centre.

The earlier information on vandalic activities so decentralised in various parts of the city were given by private television stations which were broadcasting the unrest live and received telephone calls from the public. The action of the police against such activities was quite ineffective. One explanation given for this was that operations were directed by officials who had shortly been sent to Genoa for the occasion and had little knowledge of the territory. On the other hand, both the commanders and the men engaged on the ground had to operate in extremely difficult conditions, due to the determination of the attackers, their sheer numbers, their efficient organisation and weaponry, and also on account of the encumbrance of the streets by the "pacifists" (Tab. 3), so it is hard to say whether a more local force might have done better. Also, the clumsy attack to the headquarters of the Genoa Social Forum in the school "Armando Diaz" was carried out in such a way as just to fuel nonglobal propaganda, as some of the Molotov cocktails "found" in the school seem to have been seized earlier outside the school itself. The professional level of at least some of the police forces employed for the occasion was evidently not as high as might have been wished. It should be borne in mind that the police normally operates in Italy under heavy disadvantages, practically under orders to react as "softly" as possible, and constantly under danger of been charged by the magistrates, often openly politicised to the Left, for "excessive" use of force. It is therefore not surprising if recruitment in the police forces is by no means attractive to anyone who has better prospects of employment.

"If the Genoese had remained to 'garrison' their own city, perhaps all that happened might not have occurred", was the opinion of the mayor of Genoa, Giuseppe Pericu. This is a highly debatable statement, since it is evident that the winning card of the hooligans has been precisely the extreme overcrowding. If they had had to face the Black Blocs only, even a police force of no particular ability would doubtless have been able to control the situation. A more massive presence of citizens might only given rise to worse law and

Tab. 3. Main episodes of the anti-G8 guerrilla in Genoa.

DATE	HOUR	THE INTIFADA OF GENOA: ESSENTIAL EVENTS
21-7	10.54	Failed attempt of Greenpeace ecoguerrillas to invade red zone from above
	12.20	Demonstrators' procession; early damages in Torino Avenue
	13.17	Stoning and Molotov cocktail attacks against Law and Order forces
	13.36	Casarini disowns the perpetrators of damages
	14.13	Black Blocs surround GSF headquarters in the "Diaz" and attack jail of Marassi
	15.34	"White overalls" put red zone under siege in Dante Square; riots go on unabated
	15.43	Violent attack against Law and Order forces in Tolemaide Street
	17.04	Agnoletto announces GSF will abandon red zone; Tommaseo Square devastated
	17.36	Guerrilla in Tolemaide Street; Police armoured car set ablaze
	17.37	Carlo Giuliani killed by a bullet deviated by a flying brick, while about to hit a wounded Carabinieri with a fire extinguisher
	18.16	Another Carabinieri hit by home made bomb (smashed eye socket, serious cranic trauma)
	19.17	Casarini accused the agents and demands the calling off of G8 meeting
20.30	Unabated devastations of cars, banks and shops	
20.30	Agnoletto, Casarini e Bertinotti confirm demonstration of next day	
22-7	11.30	Attempted breaking through barrier of Palazzo Ducale, cries of "murderers"
	12.17	Shops damaged by in Marassi and Quarto; agents called in
	12.28	Thousands of rioters in Sturla supplied whit iron cudgels by a wagon
	12.30	Sonia Fede, Tv operator of "Studio Aperto", attacked (fractured knee)
	13.12	Devastations in the Albaro area
	13.37	Wagon full of knives and crow bars found in midst of "pacifist" demonstration
	13.54	Attack by "pacifist" demonstrators on Carabinieri barracks in Italia Avenue
	14.25	Barricades and Molotov cocktails in areas of Torino Ave. and Sardegna Avenue
	16.00	Harsh battle in Torino Avenue; Post Office devastated
	16.30	Citizens beginning to lose patience: improvised meeting in Torino Avenue
	17.00	Flower pots hurled at rioters by exasperated citizens in Casoni Street
	17.30	Rioters set on several fires
	17.38	Incidents in the "tail" of the "pacifist" procession in eastern Genoa
	17.46	Renewed clashes in Torino Avenue
	18.03	Cars ablaze close to the railway line in Torino Avenue; firemen action impeded
	18.09	More car fires in Sardegna Avenue
	18.13	Fire close petrol station; firemen obliged to operate under Police protection
18.37	Fires extinguished, agents attack	
18.45	Rioters withdraw from central Genoa, devastations in Marassi area	
19.52	Wagon containing 5 iron cudgels in a camp "white overalls"	

order problems. The rising resentment of people for the senseless vandalism, in fact, would have engaged the agents on a new front in the attempt to stem the violent reactions of the citizens. People was initially conditioned by a widespread left-wing ideological orientation, and perhaps also by the wishful thinking that the demonstrations would be peaceful, but rapidly changed their mind from the second day. Spontaneous reactions against the demonstrators arose: flower pots were hurled at them from windows, and many noglobal youths, caught isolated or in small groups after the demonstrations, were attacked and soundly beaten.

The inflow of noglobals grew constantly, until, on July 21, it soared to such a size as to make it

increasingly hard to contain them, and this in spite of attempts to block potentially violent demonstrators at the frontiers (Tab. 4). The frontiers, however, could not be closed altogether, and, besides those who had infiltrated the future theatre of operation many days before, there were many local individuals ready to support the vandals coming from many other parts of the opulent and bored Western world. Even the "ultras" supporters of the two local football teams, Genoa and Sampdoria, were quite eager to "join in the feast". In comparison with the large number of "pacifists" engaged in acts of violence, the number of arrests has been extremely small; in particular have escaped arrest all Greek hooligans, who, from infor-



Tab. 4. Numbers of demonstrators and arrests made.

Demonstrators	Nos.	NOTES
Demonstrators July 19	30.000	
Demonstrators July 20	70.000	
Demonstrators July 21	100.000	
Blac Blocks	2.000	
Infiltered before G8	not available	
Turned down at the frontiers	2093	of which 298 on the basis of information by foreign police intelligence concerning individuals belonging to known violent fringes
Italians arrested	134	
Foreigners arrested	168	40% Germans, 10% Austrians and Spaniards, 5% Frenchmen, Swiss, Americans, British and Swedish
Total arrested	302	all immediately released by the judges bent especially on investigating alleged misbehaviour of the Law and Order forces

mation gathered by the present writer at the “Direzioe Centrale della Polizia di Prevenzione” in Rome, seem to have been the most numerous, but evidently also the most difficult to catch, while is has proved comparatively far easier to catch the Germans. Very low has also been the number of injured rioters, far below that of the police, except in the last day, when some agents have perhaps begun to “lose patience” (Tab. 5, Fig. 3).

On August 12, 2001, applications for refund of damages received by the *Sportello indennizzi* (Refund counter) of the municipality of Genoa peaked at 13.6 billion liras (€ 26.3 million), corresponding to the following properties damaged or destroyed: 249 cars, 27 high rise apartments, 120 shops, 11 gas pumps and 8 banks. One must also add the damages to proprieties of the municipality and the provincial administration put at the disposal of the “pacifists” and left in conditions of total wreckage. Reliable estimates of damages run to over 40 billion liras (€ 77.5 million) (Tab. 6).

Summing up, the elements to evaluate the unrest against against the G8 in Genoa appear to be the following: (i) it was utterly impossible to distinguish the different, “peaceful” and not so peaceful, components in the crowd during the unrest; (ii) violence was preordained and absolutely not limited to the Black Blocs; (iii) the numbers of youths was huge and their violence systematic and unrelenting; (iv) law and order was upheld in no particularly efficient way (except the excellent decision by the then minister of the Interior Scajola to close the air space, which almost certainly averted a massacre); (v) after losing the elections, the Left was seeking, abetted by a sizeable part of the “Catholic” world, a revanche by extraparliamentary means.

Regarding the first point, as already pointed out, the violent ones hid among the “non violent”,

the “non violent” suddenly started to throw porphyry cubes and to wield iron bars. A survey by the journal *Il Mulino* (2001), entitled *Protesta e globalizzazione* (Protest and globalization) shoots wildly an estimate of “a few thousand hooligans (perhaps no more than two thousand)”. But, on the contrary, the utter impossibility to distinguish hooligans from “pacifists” is confirmed by all who witnessed the unrest, and this disallows any attempt to estimate the actual numbers of those responsible of violent actions. It is worth stressing once more that even the demonstrators who were not directly responsible of aggressions and damages, did favour them by clogging the streets, thereby posing the police the dilemma of laying themselves open to criticism in any case: if they restrained themselves from acting they would be charged for leaving “the hooligans do whatever they liked”, if they acted because they lay themselves open to the charge of attacking “peaceful demonstrators”. The fact that “pacifists” did not raise one finger against the alleged “few” hooligans, and that they did not denounce even one of them, and finally that they took occasion, through their spokesmen, to criticise the police in the harshest possible terms, legitimises the suspicion of a far from occasional convergence of goals and interests between “peaceful”

Tab. 5. People injured during the unrest.

	Injured	
	Demonstrators	Law & order forces
20 July	64	73
21 July	88	298
22 July	62	17
Aggregate	214	388






Fig. 3. People injured during the unrest.

and “not-so-peaceful” opponents of globalization. As to the “estrangement from the traditional methods of political action” by the noglobals, hinted at by the cit. report of *Il Mulino*, this only shows a surprising lack of historical perspective. Violent demonstrations have often been practised by the extreme Left which is a minority in the country. These are the well known “extraparliamentary methods”, frequently adopted when the democratic elections have failed to give access to power. We have seen that to cause the hated Berlusconi government to cut a poor figure in front of the

international guests, by compelling it to dismiss the G8 meeting, was precisely the outcome hoped for by the parties defeated in the elections a few months earlier.

A publication of the Young Communists (Ferretti, Bruschi & Chiarlo, s.d.) confirms the close ideological links between the opposition parties and the incendiary utterances of the noglobal leaders (and the attendant violent behaviour), including the attempt to accuse the other side for any mishap. The Young Communists support the demonstrators with the usual slogans and with an

Tab. 6. Estimates of material damages to the city of Genoa.

Damages	Liras
To structures of the Municipality put at the disposal of the GSF	1.935.000.000
To structures of the Provincial administration at the disposal of the GFS	760.639.320
Compensation for damages demanded by private citizens	40.000.000.000
Total	42.695.639.320



incendiary language closely akin to that of the Red Brigades: “the immorality (...) the barbarity of capitalism”; “the certitude that on the road of liberalism one can only find misery and wars”. Worthy of note is the flattering definition of Genoa: “that spit of land locked between Sampierdarena, the river Bisagno and the sea”. Noticeable also the bombast for “the cultural hegemony conquered on the newspapers and in television”, obviously the result of many years of infiltration in the vital nodes of mass media power, especially if allegedly “independent”.

As to the Black Blocs, the communist pamphlet does not openly take any position, but talks by innuendos of a phantomatic “right-wing” matrix of theirs, naming them “black nazis”, or hinting at a suspicion they might have been “agents provocateurs of the police”. In fact, it is impossible to deny that the unrest did have the government as its main target and that it was painstakingly organised. In this regard, one must bear in mind the testimony of the President of the Genoa Chamber of Commerce, Paolo Odone (cit. by Vespa 2001, p. 413): “It is impossible that outsiders might have caused this disaster without local leadership”. The antiglobals, as we have seen, attacked with iron bars, with sling throwers, with Molotov cocktails which broke on the pavement or against a wall causing the burning liquid to shower the agents, with the frequent risk of burning them alive (a part of the cops had to work full time with fire extinguishers to save their colleagues, instead of fighting back the attackers). There was an evident attempt to wound, to lynch, possibly to kill, policemen.

### Disquieting questions

A member of the police, who has obviously withdrawn his name, has voiced a number of rather disquieting questions: (i) why 80% of the police forces were positioned inside the “red zone” where the demonstrators had no chance to penetrate? (ii) why were the policemen so scantily equipped? (iii) why the local police superintendent Colucci and the provincial commander of the Carabinieri were repeatedly overruled by the central command in Rome? (iv) why did the government, after a phony punishment (the only man actually dismissed was superintendent Colucci, who was at the end of his career anyhow) give back their posts, and even promote the officials (especially those who did not belong to the Genoese police forces), since they were men of the previous

Centre-Left government? (v) why the “idiocy in the Diaz school”? The present writer does not claim to know the answers to these different and important questions, but they are not all equally difficult. As to the concentration of the four fifths of the forces inside the “red zone” it is not hard to find an explanation. It doubtless had adverse effects on law and order outside, but there is at least one good reason: it was imperative to protect the important guests although they were seemingly “safe” inside the “red zone”. There was in fact no guarantee that some terror group had not infiltrated earlier the area, among the 36,000 local inhabitants, and the strong police concentration insured that any criminal act could be timely uncovered and effectively prevented.

Regarding the equipment, the answer is not as easy. The State Police and the Carabinieri do have some good equipment, but they were not supplied with rubber bullets and with weapons capable of stopping an attacker without bloodshed, the gas masks were inefficient, and the Land Rover Defenders, being devoid of armour, were true traps (but the demonstrators, by means of Molotov cocktails, were even able to destroy at least one armoured vehicle). No doubt it was possible to provide the forces with far better equipment. Why this was not done is unclear, although the political transition, with the previous government aware of the high probability to lose the elections, and therefore inclined to leave the problem to the opposing political side, probably points to at least one of the possible explanations.

The problem of the relationships between national and local police headquarters and of the attendant pretended “punishments” after the G8 meeting (points 3 and 4) is a harder nut to crack. According to the anonymous informer, the local police had a deeper knowledge of the problem and the territory, but internal rivalries at the top of the chains of command might have made themselves felt. The search of a scapegoat is a common occurrence under any government, while a wish to restrain from dismissing officers promoted by the previous government in order to avoid abrupt changes could be a further significant factor. Anyway, beyond these general and rather obvious comments it does not seem possible to go.

As to the raid to the school “Diaz”, general headquarters of the Genoa Social Forum, Police commander De Gennaro (2001) has stressed the extreme violence of the noglobals even in that occasion: in that operation only there were seventeen injured among the police officers. However, the anonymous informer judges the operation “an



extremely clumsy police action”, and moreover that “it was a politically self-defeating action, but perhaps it was precisely what was sought (...)”. What goal, then, was being sought? Is it possible that such an operation might have been ordered by someone who owed his post to the Centre-Left government, and has acted on the (correct) assumption that all blame would have fallen upon the ruling Centre-Right government? To Centre-Left parties it was doubtless important to show that the Centre-Right was incapable of managing an international meeting and thereby ruin the image of the new government, abroad as well as on the domestic front, by sending a clear message to the main industrial entrepreneurs, who are accustomed to make lavish use of the so-called “cassa integrazione guadagni” (whereby redundant workers are not fired but dismissed for long periods at public expenses). These tycoons, long accustomed to pocket profits and have their losses made up by the taxpayers, have long been in close touch with the Left, which they regard as being better able to keep extraparliamentary groups and the trade unions under control.

Two main concluding remarks are in order, bearing in mind both the dismal experience of Genoa and the Twin Towers tragedy. First of all, it must be stressed once more the *excellent decision to close and control the air space*, which almost certainly prevented Genoa to be hit by a catastrophe such as that of New York and Washington a few weeks lat-

er. Secondly, *to hold top level meetings in large cities means courting trouble*. Out of the way localities whose access is particularly easy to control, or, better still, warships, do not offer mass media visibility to hooligans self-styled saviours of the world, and can be more easily defended both against hooligans and terrorists. It is no matter of fear, but merely of prudence and common sense.

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