

21ST CENTURY MIGRATIONS: FLUXES, POLICIES AND POLITICS

EDITED BY
SILVIA CAVASOLA AND RAFFAELE DE MUCCI

LUISS ACADEMY

21st Century Migrations: Fluxes, Policies and Politics

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AFRICAN AND ASIAN MIGRATION IN ITALY: FEATURES, FLOWS AND ROUTES

ANTONIETTA PAGANO AND GIUSEPPE TERRANOVA³²

POPULATION MOVEMENTS AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN XXI CENTURY

Decades between XX and XXI has been characterized by deep transformations at global level, that produced several repercussions on international migration processes. From the political point of view, for example, the end of decolonization and real socialism – which gave rise to new States and, in some cases, to the outbreak of conflicts, especially on ethnic grounds - as well as the increased free movement of persons in regional contexts such as Europe, played a propulsive function on migration flows. On the economic side, instead, the globalization process, whose most evident effects are the progressive markets integration and the growing international division of labor, is affecting the demand and supply of labor, including foreigners. As a matter of fact, in the international labor market can be observed a strong labor mobility, both qualified and unskilled, aiming at filling employment gaps in destination countries.

In this regard, international demographic trends are fundamental, particularly when differences in population growth rates between advanced and developing areas are taken into account. A large number of industrialized countries is experiencing a “demographic deficit”, meaning an increasing share of older persons (65 years old and over) interacting with a fertility rates reduction³³ (Giordano, 2015). By contrast, emerging and developing countries are facing positive demographic trends, as observed in the working age population, which between 1995-2015 grew by 45%, while more developed countries achieved a 5.6% increase (United Nations, 2016).

32. Although this article is the result of the authors' shared ideas, the following paragraph is attributable to Antonietta Pagano: “Population movements and demographic trends in XXI century” and “The migration of Asian origin in Italy: features and flows”, while the paragraph “The migration of African origin in Italy: features, flows and routes” is attributable to Giuseppe Terranova. Conclusions can be considered the work of both authors.
33. The replacement fertility rate is 2.1 children per family, however many societies are experiencing far lower levels, such as the European Union (where the fertility rate is equal to 1.5) and in Japan (1.4) (World Bank, 2016b).

TAB. I - WORKING AGE POPULATION (THOUSANDS)³⁴

YEAR	WORLD POPULATION	SUM OF WORKING AGE POPULATION		
		WORLD	MORE DEVELOPED	LESS DEVELOPED
1975	4,061,399	2,336,316	681,181	1,655,135
1995	5,735,123	3,537,108	782,038	2,755,069
2015	7,349,472	4,825,484	825,886	3,999,599

Source: United Nations, 2016

International migration is, therefore, a useful tool for rebalancing international labor markets, especially in reality such as the Italian one, where without foreigners there would be a contraction in local population (ISTAT, 2011), with severe consequent at economic and welfare level. For example, during the Nineties, despite the 745,000 foreigners, Italian workforce decreased, on the contrary between 2001-2011 with 2.1 million migrants it grew by 0.12% (Bonifazi, 2013).

Beside to unbalance into the labor market, many advanced economies are suffering from high old-age dependency ratio, which rose from 16.6% in 1975 to 26% in 2015 (World Bank, 2016a), although some countries stood around 32%, as Finland Germany, or even beyond 34% as in Italy (ISTAT, 2016a), in other words three working age people for every person aged 65 or over.

The Italian migration scenario is quite complex, however for the purpose of this paper, it can be divided in two groups: the first arrived during the Eighties and Nineties with the first immigration waves and currently are well established and have a balanced gender composition; the second one correspond to the recent migration flow and, therefore, has a strong gender polarization.

THE MIGRATION OF ASIAN ORIGIN IN ITALY: FEATURES AND FLOWS


The Italian geography of non-European migration has some well-defined characteristics, with a minimal prevalence of Africans (31%), followed by Europeans (29.3%) and, finally, Asians (29%) (ISTAT, 2016a).

In last ten years, Asian migratory trend has been particularly active considering the average annual growth rate of 10%, in the same period Bangladeshi group distinguished with a 16% average annual growth, compared with the 13% of China, Philippines and India (ISTAT, 2016a).

The majority (almost 96%) of the Asian community in Italy comes from Central, Southern and Eastern Asia, among which emerge migrants from China (29.27%), India (14.85%), Philippines (14.65%), Bangladesh (12.48%) and Pakistan (10.77%) (ISTAT, 2016b).

	% VARIATION		PERCENTAGE OF WORKING AGE POPULATION		
	WORLD	MORE DEVELOPED	LESS DEVELOPED	MORE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES	LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
				29.2%	70.8%
	51.4%	14.8%	66.5%	22.1%	77.9%
	36.4%	5.6%	45.2%	17.1%	82.9%

Currently is not possible to identify a sort of homogeneity within this group, as it results quite diverse, especially on gender composition. China, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Iran have a balanced structure in terms of female and male community; while Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan present a strong male polarization, as well Georgians that, instead, gave a wide share of female migrants. Such a difference is due to segmentation in the labor market, as well as, the distinctive migration patterns of each community. As a matter of fact, Philippines – one of the first non-EU groups to settle, as a result of migratory networks and religious factors as well – and Chinese currently have a family based migration system; while the remaining groups are characterized by a strong labor specialization, which is one of the explanation for the differences in their internal composition.



Graph. 1 – Breakdown of main Asian communities by gender (2016). Source: ISTAT, 2016

According to 2014 data concerning the employees of the nine considered nationalities, the majority works in the tertiary and industrial sectors (65%), followed by the house and family care sector (27%) and, finally, just 7% in the agricultural sector. More than two-thirds of domestic workers are Filipino and Sri Lankan (respectively 55% and 21%), however, the Georgians, who in this area represent a small percentage, are concentrated for 90% in the household service. A similar specialization characterizes the Indian community but in the agricultural sector, where they represent 76% of employed workforce from the nine analyzed nationalities. This two information can help in understanding the gender polarization characterizing the Georgian and Indian migration scheme in Italy (INPS, 2016).

The industrial sector is the least representative³⁵, unlike the service sector where the majority of Asian workforce is employed. Except for house service, in the tertiary works 91% of Sri Lankan, more than two-thirds of Chinese and Bangladeshi, more than half of Pakistanis and 35.5% of Indians, with a strong specialization in the receptive, hotel and restaurant areas, as well as, in trade. In this latter sector, moreover, ethnic entrepreneurship is particularly dynamic, especially in Chinese, Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2015b). In relation to 2014 non-European enterprises is interesting to note that most of Asian ones ranked among the top ten countries. Indeed, Chinese companies were second, followed by Bangladesh (fourth), Pakistani (none) and finally, the Indian (twelfth) (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2015a).

Migrant contribution to Italian economy is, therefore, significant, although Asian community represents only 1.9% of resident population. However, inflow is increasing over the years, despite the negative economic trends. Not only the numbers are growing, but most importantly, former communities are becoming permanent, as proven by the increasing visas released for long permanence (at the expense of short-term ones). In this regard, family reunification and study visas are rising as well (ISTAT, 2016b).

TAB. 2A – SHORT-TERM VISA VARIATION (2012-2016)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BANGLADESH	-4%	5%	16%	12%	-3%
CHINA	-10%	10%	3%	0%	-6%
PHILIPPINES	2%	0%	1%	-1%	-8%
INDIA	-10%	1%	8%	3%	-5%
PAKISTAN	-16%	10%	14%	19%	7%
SRI LANKA	-5%	1%	4%	0%	-3%

Source: ISTAT, 2016

35. In 2014 Pakistani, Indian and Chinese employed workforce represented respectively 43.2%, 32.5% and 28% of each ethnic group (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2015).

TAB. 2B – LONG-TERM VISA VARIATION (2012-2016)

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
BANGLADESH	11%	8%	10%	6%	8%
CHINA	27%	9%	10%	9%	10%
PHILIPPINES	25%	8%	8%	5%	5%
INDIA	17%	6%	5%	5%	8%
PAKISTAN	14%	8%	5%	2%	5%
SRI LANKA	21%	7%	7%	5%	7%

Source: ISTAT, 2016

Family and study visas have been the main tools to access regularly in Italy, but recently have increased the number of requests for political asylum, especially from Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrants³⁶ (in 2015 this latter has more than doubled).

In addition, several are the Asian migrants trying to enter irregularly in Italy. Unfortunately, the system lacks of reliable and detailed information. According to Frontex (2016), three are the main Asian migratory routes. Some of them arrives through the Eastern borders of the Schengen area - trying to cross the Baltic or Scandinavia countries, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The second route is the Eastern Mediterranean, once arrived in Turkey, migrants attempt to arrive in Greece, Balkan countries or Apulia. The third one is the Western Balkan routes, particularly used by Afghan and Pakistani which, rather than staying in Greece, prefer to achieve the Balkans, cross non-Schengen countries, such as Macedonia and Serbia, and get as fast as possible in Hungary and Croatia. However, these countries represent just a transit route fundamental to access to Western Europe.

THE MIGRATION OF AFRICAN ORIGIN IN ITALY: FEATURES, FLOWS AND ROUTES

Among the top ten countries hosting the largest number of refugees in the world, five are African: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The last mentioned is on the top of the world ranking of the countries that in accordance with the size of the national economy shelter more refugees: 471 for each dollar of the GDP per capita measured at purchasing power parity (UNHCR, 2016). If we pass from forced migration to voluntary migration we notice that in 2015,

36. Besides from political and religious issues, is increasing the number of migrants escaping from Southern Asia, especially Bangladesh, due to environmental crisis and hazards. Although the environmental refugee status has not been receipted under the International Law, this type of emergency might help understanding the growing exodus from Asia. (Giordano, Pagano, 2013).

244 million global migrants came mostly from 10 countries, none of which are African. The preferred destination of 75% of the original immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa is still Sub-Saharan Africa. Only 25% actually decide to leave their homeland to move out of boundaries of Africa (OECD-AFD, 2015).

Perhaps, these numbers are useful to analyze with greater scientific clarity the migration routes, the data and the composition of African immigration to Europe, and Italy in particular.

According to Frontex (which since October 6, 2016 has been replaced with a mandate and wider powers of the European Border and Coast Guard), there are eight “highways” trodden by illegal immigrants and asylum seekers to reach the Old World (Frontex, 2016). Three following ways are connecting Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean.

The first, Western Mediterranean Route: a route between Morocco and Spain, separated by 14km of sea in the Strait of Gibraltar. This route, together with the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Moroccan territory, has been for a long time, the subject of a strong migratory pressure. This route has been utilized much less by migrants in recent years for at least two reasons: efficiency of Madrid-Rabat bilateral agreements against illegal immigration and geopolitical revolution of the Maghreb as a result of the Arab Spring that from the point of view of human traffickers has left Libya without the most desirable Government of Morocco (where, on the contrary to the Gaddafi regime, the monarchy of Mohammed VI has withstood the shocks to the popular movements) as the point of departure of their “clients”. For these reasons, only 6,090 migrants have taken this path in the first nine months of 2016 – mostly coming from Guinea (1,403), Ivory Coast (1,137) and Algeria (909).

The second, Central Mediterranean Route: the most direct route from Libya and Tunisia to Malta and Italy, an area of 400 km that has never been trodden so much in the history of modern international migration. In 2014, 170,760 migrants have arrived by this route – 153,946 throughout 2015 and 127,599 in the first nine months of 2016.

The third, Eastern Mediterranean Route. The Turkey-Greece route, a maritime border of about ten kilometers, which after recording the transit of 50,830 migrants in 2014, 2015 marked a record of 885,386 people and in the first 9 months of 2016 has stopped at 172,982 migrants. This drastic fall compared with the previous year is justified by the achievement of an agreement between the EU and Turkey. In March 2016, Brussels agreed to pay Ankara with a guarantee of more strict controls of the border with Syria and an additional responsibility of the reception of Syrian asylum seekers from Athens (Terranova, 2016).

If it is true that the western route, thanks to the political stability of Morocco and the partnership with Spain, has little traffic; the eastern route is even less likely to be a successful journey because of the euro-Turkish agreement; for the potential African migrants – and especially for the crime that manages the traffic – the Central Mediterranean Route is not only the last option, but the preferable one. Because it is quite evident, the fact that Libya is the “*plaque tournante de l’émigration dans le Nord de l’Afrique*” (Melki, 2016). It is now a transit land, which until a few years ago was, in

fact, a welcoming destination for significant migration flows. In the second half of the '90s, Muammar Gaddafi, in the name of his Pan-Africanism (Terranova, 2010), had promoted an open-door policy towards economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, primarily Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, to be used in the rich and prolific oil sector. A scenario that had changed radically and permanently in October 2011 with the fall of the Colonel, his regime and 42 years of absolute power. Since that time, Libya has progressively transformed into a free zone for international human traffickers and a springboard for African population movements towards the European fortress, through the Italian door.

We must ask what are the main migratory routes from southern-central Africa that lead in the former kingdom of Gaddafi? We will try to answer this question before to dwell on the composition and the main nationalities of the newcomers to Italy.

Comparing information that is already known (Reitano, 2014) with those that have emerged from a recent study presented in Rome on September 13, 2016 by the organization "Medici per i Diritti Umani" (MEDU), it is possible to trace five migratory routes from the African continent that lead to our country. Of all that are crossing the Sahara, many of them pass by the "Carrefour d'Agadez" (Denninger, 2015), a town in the heart of Niger, before arriving in Libyan territory.

The first migration route is Western-West route that is used only by a minor amount of the candidates for immigration from Western and Central Africa. After reaching important transit cities in Mali (Gao) and Nigeria (Agadez), they move to Algeria passing through Tamanrasset. The next step in Libya is going through the towns of Deb Deb and Ghadames near the border that unites Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

The second is Western-East route that is among the most trodden by candidates from Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Ivory Coast. The people begin the first part of their journey from the motherland in Bamako, Mali, and travel directly east, crossing through Ouagadougou to reach Niger. An alternative route goes from Bamako to Gao in Mali, and then to Niamey in Niger. It must be said, that many Nigerians prefer to reach the Niger through Kano, while Cameroonians cross Chad to reach Madama in Niger. In the end all come together in Niger, mostly in Agadez, from where a part of the journey in the desert called "the road to hell" begins, leading to Sabah in the heart of Libya. Here migrants are waiting to be transferred in the major ports of departure, first Zuwara, not far from Tripoli.

The third is Eastern-Center route: in order to follow it, a part of future migrants from the Horn of Africa chooses to reach Libya through Sudan and Chad.

The fourth is Eastern-Center route: The most widely travelled route by immigrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa. Migrants along this route arrive in the Libyan oasis in Kufra via Khartoum, Sudan from Kassal, Sudan or the refugee camp of Shagrab, Sudan or Mai Aini, Ethiopia. There is also a shorter path from the Sudanese city of Dongola instead of Khartoum that allows migrants to reach Kufra or the Libyan city of Al Uweinat. In any case, once they arrive on Libyan territory, the majority of migrants wait to be transferred to the North, to Ajdabiya. From there, a minority try to sail towards Italy through the port of Benghazi in the North-East but the majority continue their journey through the ports of Zuwara and Sabratha (west of Tripoli).

The fifth is East-East route and is the least use route for EU immigration candidates. To follow it, a small residual minority of migrants from the Horn of Africa that arrive in Kharthoum instead of taking the more common routes through Libya, opt going to Egypt through Aswan, and Cairo is the chosen location to embark from the port of Alexandria to Italy. This is the longest and the most dangerous route across water that lasts for an average of 8-10 days of sailing.

Regardless of the route, the country of origin, and the destination country, migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, with rare exceptions, have to deal with the racket of traffickers. It is they, who dictate the time, the route, and of course the costs of a journey. A journey paved with unforeseen, abuses of power and countless violations of basic human rights.

To prove that this network of international criminals is successful in their enterprises, it is appropriate to recall that in 2015 over one million men, women and children crossed the Mediterranean (mainly using routes defined in this paper as Central and Eastern Mediterranean Route) into southern Europe. Staggering figures such as these have never been recorded. In 2014, there were around 216 thousand people, 2013 brought around 60 thousand, and in 2012 there were only around 22 thousand who decided to make the dangerous journey from Africa to Europe across the Mediterranean.

Looking closely at the number of newcomers in 2015 we see that 885,386 of them have come through Turkey to Greece. Among these, 90% of people came from three countries: Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. The geographic provenance of migrants is completely different in Italy, in fact, approximately 153,946 migrants landed in the same year in Italy: Eritrea (26%), Nigeria (14%), Somalia (8%), Sudan, Gambia, Syria (just 7,500 people), Mali and Senegal (F. Colombo, 2015). Summing up, Greece received a major proportion of potential asylum seekers from three major international wars of recent years. Italy has more complex and diverse African audience, which is composed of candidates with refugee status or humanitarian protection status, but also includes illegal immigrants. A panorama of newcomers, almost exclusively Africans, is also confirmed by data analysis of the first nine months of 2016. Out of more than 127,000 arrivals in 2016, 15% are from Nigeria, 10% from Gambia, 9% from Somalia, 8% from Guinea, Eritrea and Ivory Coast, the remaining 58% originate from Senegal and Mali. Numbers like these only certify an extraordinary humanitarian commitment of Italy in the reception of African migrants. Moreover, in 2015 the number of permits for asylum and humanitarian protection submitted in Italy has come to represent 28.2% of new entries (compared to 19.3% in 2014 and 7.5% in 2013), 43.8% of which are given to citizens of Nigeria, Pakistan and Gambia (ISTAT, 2016). Providing analysis of the types of residence permits given by Italy, there is a decisive and progressive increase in forced migration and, at the same time, decrease in the voluntary migration caused by economic reasons. According to the latest ISTAT figures we find that in 2015, in comparison with the previous year, the number of residence permits for work decreased by 35,312 (-62%). Among the total number of residence permits granted for different reasons, those for reasons of work have gone down to 9% compared with 23% in 2014.

At this point, a clarification is obligatory. The decline of economic immigration to Italy in favor of humanitarian immigration has prompted some observers to a different interpretation of the facts. In their view, many economic migrants, therefore illegal, have used, with the decisive role of international human traffickers, the general atmosphere of emergency and welcoming of Syrian refugees as a “Trojan horse” to get into Europe, but especially in Italy, asking for asylum or humanitarian protection. This idea is confirmed further by the fact that even after signing the agreement between Turkey and Greece last spring, a majority of Syrians still not prefer the Central Mediterranean Route. As we have seen, especially in the last three years, citizens of African states with different levels of political and social stability keep coming to Italy and not always aim to justify the recognition of refugee status (or humanitarian protection status) in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951.

In any case, if we stick to the official data of the Ministry of Interior in Italy, it is possible to argue that there is a revolution in the composition of migration flows to Italy (the more sub-Saharan Africans, the more asylum and humanitarian protection seekers). As a consequence, it intends to alter the composition of the stock of immigrants in Italy in the medium to longer term. Until a short time ago was noticed a predominance of economic immigrants from African community, consisted of a distinct presence of individuals from Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia, not sub-Saharan Africa. Out of 3,931,133 non-EU citizens resident in Italy on January 1, 2016 (ISTAT, 2016), the largest community³⁷ with over half a million admissions is, in fact, Moroccan. Arrived since the second half of the '70s of the last century in the South Italy, today they are geographically concentrated (approximately 70%) in the North, concentrated mostly in Lombardia. Most are employed in retail trade sectors (many are hawkers), industry, construction and agriculture. The unemployment rate is close to 30% (www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it, 2016), also due to the fact that the participation of Moroccan women in the Italian labor market is very low. Their incidence among employed is just 22%, almost twenty percentage points less than figures recorded on average between foreigners employed in Italy (40%).

The second largest African community in Italy with more than 140 thousand visitors is Egyptian. Even more than the Moroccan community, it is geographically concentrated in the regions of Northern Italy (80%), mostly located in Lombardy. Three out of four Egyptian workers are employed in the tertiary sector. A feature of this community is the high employment in the hotel and restaurant industry, where 33.4% of the Egyptian labor is occupied, against an average of 10% among the non-EU foreigners residing in Italy. Among Egyptian workers, contrary to the Moroccans, the unemployment rate, according to the latest available data, went down from 22% in 2013 to 19.4% in 2014, the lowest value among all other African migrants. Note that from 2008 to 2015, the number of Egyptian citizens that are legally residing in Italy has doubled from 70,000 to more than 140,000 that are today in Italy. A boom that

37 To this number should be added 1.5 million of EU citizens (more than a million are Romanians).

may be at least partly explained by the fact that, contrary to Morocco, Egypt, as result of the fall of Mubarak's regime due to the Arab Spring, is in a complex phase of political instability that prompted a part (also residual) of the population to leave their homeland.

In third place, finally we find the Tunisian community with about 120 thousand members. Compared to other foreign communities, Tunisian Maghreb in particular, recorded one of the most homogeneous geographical distribution on the peninsula. That proof the fact, if it's true that about 61% of this community is living in the North and is equitably distributed between Emilia-Romagna and Lombardy here is a significant presence in the South, peaking at 13% in Sicily, where the first generations settled since 1972. Many have found employment in the fishery sector, especially in Mazara del Vallo. Today, on the national level, the primary sector for job placement of Tunisian Workers is industry, with an incidence of 42% against 28% of the same sector of the whole non-EU labor's market. In particular, 23% of Tunisian workers are employed in the construction sector, while 19% are employed in industry in particular. The unemployment rate is actually around 24%.

CONCLUSION

Italy within few decades has turned into an important immigration country, due to the synergy produced by several national and international factors – i.e. aging society, mismatch in the labor market, refugee crisis – but currently appears unprepared to wisely manage recent immigration phenomena. Considering the Italian structural difficulties, immigration can represent an opportunity to rebalance both the demographical and economic system, particularly in a long run perspective. To this end, Italy should implement policies aiming at valorizing and promoting the integration of migrant communities, not only with regard to economic migrants but asylum seekers too, as in most cases these are skilled foreigners that can actively contribute to the economic development of the receiving country (Pagano, 2016). Therefore, authorities should focus on how to benefit from migration flow rather than preventing it, especially when comparing the Italian scenario with other European countries. For example, while foreigners in Italy represent 9.7% of total population, Germany, Austria and Belgium has larger migrant communities (respectively 14.9%, 17.5% and 12.3%) (World Bank, 2016c). A discrepancy confirmed by the refugee issue as well, since Italy is far from having the numbers characterizing the other UE member States (Giordano, 2015), for example, Italy registers an average of 1.9 refugees per thousand inhabitants, against 3.9 in Germany, 4.1 in France, 5.2 in Holland, 8.4 in Austria and 17.4 in Sweden.

Asylum seekers represent one of the biggest challenge for Italian authorities, as is the only country in EU that lacks a ordinary law on asylum. A political and legal anomaly that among its few contraindications it has also spoiled terms, manner and quality of the refugee reception system in our country and even the geography and the distribution of centers for refugees on national territory.

A *vacatio legis* that is more difficult to understand and justify because it represents a failure to implement the art. 10, paragraph 3, of the Italian Constitution, which since 1948 declaim: “A foreigner who is denied the effective exercise of the democratic liberties guaranteed by the Italian Constitution in his or her own country has the right of asylum in the territory of the Italian Republic, in accordance with the conditions established by law” (Senato della Repubblica, 2016) . That statute has never been approved and is the original sin of Italy's asylum policies – perhaps not the only one. However, one sins leads to another; in 1954, because of ratification of the Geneva Convention on refugee status, Italy invokes so-called geographical reservation. It should guarantee refugee status in accordance with the guidelines of the Convention, but only for women, children and men of European origin, excluding those of the other continents. It gives the right of reception to a limited range of subjects, like those who many years ago were escaping the communist regimes of the Soviet Union. This narrow filter has been in force for almost forty years until 1990 when it was abolished by law n. 39/1990, better known as Martelli, named after the Vice-President of the Council. He was the one who signed and promoted the first regulation about the migratory phenomenon in Italy. It had the merit of overcoming the principle of “geographical limitation”, but the failure of this law comes from not implementing article 10 paragraph 3 of the Constitution on the right of asylum. So today, operating conditions depend on myriad of legal provisions and decisions of courts.

Legislative chaos has begun, with the suddenness and violence of an earthquake. In 2011, following years of international emergencies, beginning with Albanian and then Yugoslavian refugees, then with the explosion of the Arab Spring, Italy becomes a permanent land of asylum and immigration. For example, it is enough to remember that only in that year the number of asylum requests in Italy had reached 38 thousand. That is a threefold increase of the annual average of 13,000 that was recorded in the previous twenty years. Italy turned out to be unprepared to this revolution of geography and migration of asylum seekers on a global level. That is happening for a reason of a regulatory and domestic policy deficit in Italy that is enlarged with similar deficits of other EU's countries. The EU in this particular and delicate international situation had stimulated movements of population but was not been able to regulate them (Giordano, 2015) because of nationalistic impulses that some EU's states have (Bolaffi, Terranova, 2014).

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