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**L'apporto della Geografia
tra rivoluzioni e riforme**

Roma, 7-10 Giugno 2017

a cura di
Franco Salvatori

A.Ge.I. - Roma

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PROCESSI DI EUROPEANIZZAZIONE
DEI SISTEMI DI PIANIFICAZIONE

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INTRODUCTION

1. Some issues in Europeanisation of spatial planning systems. Introduction to the session

The effects of European integration on the Member states are at the heart of the research which focuses on the Europeanisation of national systems, a research agenda which has flourished since the nineties in political science and considers European integration as the independent variable which influences the politics of the Member States. Essentially the term Europeanisation is used to signify the transformation of a variable at the national level, which adapts to a European model logic or constraint. The term is now widespread in different fields but, in general, the word Europeanisation describes all the transformations related to European integration process. Radaelli (2000, p.2) refers to: «Processes of construction diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, "ways of doing things" and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies». In particular many studies and debates focus on the extent to which EU discourses have created a catalytic environment resulting in the so called 'Europeanisation' of domestic spatial planning systems.

Notwithstanding the fact that there are no legally EU binding tools for a European spatial development policy, a wide variety of EU policies are relevant for spatial planning at national and sub-national level (CAP, ESIF, Nature 2000, Territorial cooperation...), while EU Directives, are mandatory and indirectly influence territorial and spatial governance, as showcased by the Habitats Directive, Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive or Water Framework Directive (Evers *et al.*, 2016). Many countries and regions in Europe are gradually adapting their territorial governance and spatial planning systems in order to reflect the continuing advancements and complexities of macro-level EU cohesion and growth policies. «The concrete question of how European policies can be adjusted to the concrete settings of spatial planning and territorial governance systems appears as a pragmatic way to deal with the issue of a relevant and efficient use of European funding. In that sense, cross-fertilization is needed and can be considered as a multifaceted and heuristic (uploading and downloading process but also horizontal cross-fertilisation between European territories) asset»³.

The aim of the thematic session *Europeanisation of spatial planning systems*, organized in the context of the *XXXII Italian Geographical Congress*⁴ was to explore this question, thus investigating, on the one hand, the effects that European 'support' for domestic policies may have on policy development at state and regional level and, on the other hand, how EU-wide policies are influenced by feedback from implementation process at local level. Scholars from different fields were invited to present

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³ Frédéric Santamaria, 2016, not published document, confidential communication.

⁴ Responsible of the session proposal Angelo D'Orazio, University of Rome "Tor Vergata" with Maria Coronato, University of Rome "Tor Vergata". Discussant Matei Cochechi, "Ion Mincu" University of Architecture and Urban Planning Bucharest. Invited speaker: David Evers, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency

research contributions both theoretical and empirical on Europeanization of national and regional planning systems, regional development policies, sector policies, territorial governance in cross borders or macroregional contexts.

This topic proposed for the XXXII Congress is based on two circumstances. Firstly, the organizers have been involved since 2010 in Italian ESPON Contact Point (ECP) work, under the coordination of Professor Maria Prezioso at University of Rome "Tor Vergata". ESPON (European Spatial Planning Observatory Network) is an applied research programme providing data, concepts and techniques, which can be used in the development of effective place-based policy. Many geographers are involved in this action, as well as many planners and policy-makers, first of many the DG Region and the same EU Commission. «ESPON provides territorial development concepts that can be adapted to specific situations in each participating state. It allows comparison against European regions and can therefore act as a platform for developing policies aimed at territorial cohesion». As Andreas Faludi said ESPON «is an important element in the "learning machine" of European spatial planning» (Faludi, 2009, p. 21).

During the past programming period (2007-2013) the Italian ECP team worked in Transnational Networks Activities, i.e. special projects focused on capitalization processes of the ESPON findings⁵.

This experience implied an active focus on the relationship among European policy development and the national and sub-national dynamics, and by means of a reflexive action in the dialogue with national and sub-national policy makers, as well as scholars and academics. In partnership with the colleagues from the other National contact points, the following elements have been explored: the use of European key concepts (CaDEC project); the building of an 'objet' as the Integrated Territorial Development Strategy for investigating the planning development in many European countries (with INTERSTRAT project); the way to teach and to learn the main research results and policy recommendations provided by ESPON, in order to apply them to different territorial context (ESPON Train project). In facing all these themes, the participants shared and merged their geographical background and interacted with policy-makers of all European countries (ESPON On the road). In addition ESPON programme developed specific applied research on this issue.

The second circumstance that generated the idea for the session was a warm suggestion by David Evers, with the occasion of the Amsterdam ESPON open Seminar on the Urban Agenda (the Pact of Amsterdam) – a document which promised to have great influence on the spatial planning systems in Europe and was presented few days before. During his presentation, David invited to activate research on the topic, both on the national ground and with a European feeling. This session welcomed his invitation. For this reason David Evers (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency) was invited as key note speaker talking about «Governance in the shadow of hierarchy: A quest to detect the effects of European integration in domestic spatial policymaking».

The session hosted 13 contributions from Italy and abroad and has been developed during three slots. The contributors were scholars working in applied research, as well as researchers directly involved both in spatial planning process and in European policy implementation in different national contexts.

Many papers questioned the Europeanization concept adopting different theoretical approaches. However, we can consider that, implicitly or explicitly, they all agree with Santamaria's view as quoted: «crossfertilisation understood as a multifaceted process of uploading, downloading and crossfertilisation is needed» (Faludi, 2009). For understanding this process, the 'Stone Guest' is the concept of territory (Gottmann, 1973) – the multifaceted subject which is in the same time the target and the 'actor' in spatial planning. The territory issue emerges when we face the theoretical

⁵ For information about these activities, see the devoted web page on ESPON platform. <https://www.espon.eu/programme/projects/espon-2013/transnational-networking-activities>.

dichotomy between hard space and soft space (Elissalde and Santamaria) but also when we challenged the 'persistent territorialism of the modern state system' (Faludi, 2009).

Starting from the awareness on the complex nature of these processes, some contributions explored the way in which the EU construct could influence spatial planning systems in Europe. In this regard some contributions adopted comparative approach between both member states (Cocheci and D'Orazio) and non member states (Berisha, Cotella and Solly; Allkja and Marjankovic) – considering however their spatial planning systems as indirectly influenced by Europeanization –, thus trying to illustrate the actual dynamics of changes.

Considering the importance of the domain in the Italian spatial planning system, the case of cultural heritage legislation and regulation (Mangano and Ugolini) is useful to illustrate the mechanism of uploading, downloading and cross fertilization in building an integrated European policy.

In order to understand these diverse influences, other contributions focused on multilevel governance. The case of the EUSAIR macroregional strategy (Grandi and Sacco) shows the transnational cooperation levier as the powerful driver of Europeanization. On the other hand the same topic is useful to analyze the effect of cohesion policy process (elaboration and implementation) on the ground, at different level: metropolitan (Rivière), national/regional (Giannone). The urban level is explored by means of the 'Cities network' subject, analysing the cross-sectoral environmental policies (Coronato).

In investigating the spatial planning systems through a multiple dimension – which always involves, beyond fixed structure and tools, evolving practice and discourse – and in developing these analyses (as showcased also during the session discussion), a common issue emerged. Which is the role of diverse actors (spatial planners and scholars as well as officials acting in implementation of policies, researchers acting in European applied research program as ESPON) in «penetrating cultural exchange that generated those principles which are the basis of urban and territorial management in/of European cities [and territories]?» The risk is of a flattening around stereotypical themes that have no evidence in the real problems of territories and cities (Elisei). We need to overcome the current rhetoric ruling.

We can consider that the main actors in this Europeanization game are these subjects: the producers of both discourses and actions with direct effects on the territories.

On this basis, the research on Europeanization of spatial planning systems also implies an exercise of thinking about the reason and the context of praxis – in all the fields of action for all the Europeanization actors involved. Previously, an instrumental rationality appeared to be the basis of the scientific legitimacy of the planning activity. This activity was the product of "applied" research aimed at supporting decision-making and action, as in the evidence-based rhetoric (Davoudi, 2006). Now, after the so-called critical turning point, the hermeneutic turning or the linguistic turning, the planning related domains, first of all economic geography, should be interested in implementing a reflexive research programme.

The Europeanization research in spatial planning can thus be regarded as part of this larger movement by introducing a reflexive analysis of the corresponding knowledge tools and knowledge creation in spatial planning. We hope the results of this session (illustrated through the publication of the 12 papers) could stimulate this necessary task.

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DAVID EVER¹

DOWNLOADING EU POLICIES INTO DUTCH SPATIAL PLANNING

1. Introduction

This is an inopportune time to be writing about the impact of the European Union (EU) on the governance of spatial planning. If we are to believe the media, the European project is imploding as members leave and anti-EU sentiment mounts. The EU seems to skirt from one crisis to the next, incapable of providing any leadership or vision. And yet, for the most part, life goes on as far as governing the EU goes. The EU has been described aptly as an oil tanker-bulky, unwieldy and difficult to change course. The same checks and balances and complex procedures that make European policymaking so infuriating to some, also serve to give the European project a degree of stability, even in the wake of multiple, overlapping crises. This is also something to bear in mind with respect to Brexit. Even if the UK were to divorce itself completely via the most extreme Brexit imaginable, the tens of thousands of regulations it adopted over the decades while inside the European Union will not disappear overnight, if ever, and will continue to influence governance in that country for generations – including the quintessentially British practice of Town and Country Planning. In my country of residence, The Netherlands, where talk of a 'Nexit' is not really taken very seriously, this applies even more.

So where does this power of the EU over spatial planning come from and where does it reside? Of course, one can point to EU institutions that resemble those of a nation state (executive, legislative, judicial), but appearances can deceive. The EU is a unique political construction in that it does not claim sovereignty over its subjects and rule over them like a nation state, but instead exists by virtue of the fact that nation states have opted to pool various powers and resources in a collective entity and share decision-making (Rob, 2013). So, who governs? Looking at EU politics does not necessarily help: loyalties are complex and ambiguous with tensions between affiliations with political ideology, member states and collective interests across and within institutions. This ambiguity is perceptible even at the heart of the EU, the European Commission: officials there are often seconded national experts, but with weak relationships and little contact with their national governments (Trondal, Peters, 2012). The EU has been likened to Kafka's *Das Schloß* in this regard: a mysterious authority overseeing the village from the castle not as a monarch, but as a bureaucracy drawn in part from the villagers themselves (Hissink Muller, 2016, pp. 88-89).

The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the effects of this obscure entity on something very tangible: spatial planning. It does so by reporting on an investigation on the flows of power between policy areas (*horizontal governance*), between tiers of government (*vertical governance*) and evolving rules of the game (*metagovernance*) when incorporating (*downloading*) EU policies into domestic planning. To do so, it uses the Netherlands as a case study.

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2. Literature review

Political science and public administration scholars have long sought to make sense of the ambiguous power relations of the EU. The legal framework for cooperation is of course the EU Treaty. This is an evolving document, which lays out ground rules for collective policymaking and specifies the domains where the EU has authority over member states, either in full or in part. However, the Treaty does not explain what the EU is as a political entity. On the one extreme, it has been likened to an emerging post-hegemonic empire, conglomerate state, or embryonic (federal) super-state and, on the other extreme, as a neo-medieval political patchwork or a unique and novel form of network governance mostly exerting soft power (see Jessop, 2016, p. 12 for references). In the past this debate was couched in terms of supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism. The reality obviously lies somewhere between these two extremes, but it is difficult to say exactly where, given the EU's multifaceted, multiscalar and multilevel aspect. For example, the power of the EU varies greatly from one policy area to another: the European Commission may seem like a superstate when enforcing competition regulations, but its powers are weak to non-existent in matters like social welfare and education. If we are to understand the power the EU wields, we will have to delve deeper and more methodically into the different kinds of governance relationships the EU affects.

2.1. Metagovernance

In the public administration literature, the institutional arena that has developed at the EU level is often referred to as the European Administrative Space (EAS). Studies on how the EAS develops over time usually focus on the evolving role of the European Commission. Rarely does the European Commission engage itself directly in domestic land-use issues, for instance, but instead EU policies cast a 'shadow of hierarchy' (Börzel, 2010) over the way in which land-use issues are resolved (e.g. regarding state aid, environmental impact assessments, cohesion policy). I have argued elsewhere that this 'shadow' generally goes unnoticed by planners on the ground, making the influence of the EU 'unseen' in everyday practice (Van Ravesteyn, Evers, 2004).

As far as our discussion about impact on governance is concerned, the EAS is said to have a homogenizing effect on national institutions as they are all affected by the same or similar rules, and because they all participate in the decision-making process. Some scholars have found that this has led to a convergence of governance systems (Knill, 2001) and the emergence of a network of public-sector bodies at various levels cooperating in various policy domains (Hofmann, Turk, 2006 cited in Trondal, Peters, 2012). Consequently, the EAS affects spatial planning governance because it structures the way governance is and can be performed, in other words: it exercises metagovernance (Jessop, 2016). The EU is of course not alone in this as many governments, particularly national governments and supranational bodies, create ground rules for interaction with and within the public realm, but this is a core characteristic of how the EU operates.

2.2. Horizontal governance

In addition to metagovernance and its shadowy hierarchy, there are cases where the effects of the EAS for spatial planning governance is more readily discernible. Since no EU Directorate-General exists for spatial planning, the origins of EU impact are scattered across the EAS and are by no means unified. Fragmentation is endemic even within the 'most European' of EU all institutions, the European Commission. Trondal and Peters note that, «[a] portfolio logic seems to be overwhelmingly present in the policy Directorate Generals. [...] This observation echoes images of the Commission administration as fragmented with weak capacities for hierarchical steering, accompanying inter-service 'turf wars' that is marginally compensated by presidential control and administrative integration» (2012, pp. 6-7). This so-called 'silo thinking' extends to the expert contributions from member states,

as these are drawn along sectoral lines (Geuijen *et al.*, 2008). Cohesiveness is no better at the European Council or European Parliament, which also divide up work in various committees and subcommittees. A clear and present risk is a lack of coordination between objectives and even outright conflict between them (Trondal, Peters, 2012, p. 8; Geerlings, Stead, 2003, p. 194).

The need for better coordination across policy domains, something I call 'horizontal governance', has not escaped the attention of the European Commission. At the turn of the millennium, it commissioned a report called *The Costs of Non-Coordination* (Robert *et al.*, 2001). Later, the *Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion* argued: «Progress is needed to coordinate sectoral and territorial policies, even if the different policies remain autonomous» (CEC, 2008, p. 8), and the *Territorial Agenda 2020* argues that: «Efficient interplay of sectoral policies can be supported by their coordination at each territorial level» (Hungarian Presidency, 2011, p. 10). More recently, the Committee of the Regions has called for «the development of a new Common Strategic Framework covering all EU policies and funds having a territorial dimension» (CoR, 2017).

Given that spatial planning is a very broad policy area without its own EU Directorate-General, there is a real danger that the continued non-coordination of policies devised in specialized sector departments at the European will lead to contradictory goals, instruments and activities on the ground. When these conflicts manifest themselves in a particular area, this can become especially problematic for spatial planning, at least in theory. I will return to this point later.

2.3. Vertical governance

Another kind of governance regards how power moves up and down tiers of government or spatial/territorial scales, namely multilevel governance – or in my terminology, 'vertical governance'. Even in a vastly simplified form (see fig. 1), many potential vertical relationships can be identified. A wide body of literature on multilevel governance has been built up over the past thirty years, much of it with the EU as its focus. Gary Marks, one of the founders of this perspective defined multilevel governance as «a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers» (Marks, 1993, cited in Jessop, 2016 who then goes on to critique it, in his view, narrow focus). While acknowledging the limitations of this definition and appreciating the infinite complexity of the world, I still feel that this is useful as an analytical starting point to understand vertical governance as a complement to horizontal governance.

There has been a revival of scholarly interest on multilevel governance over the past decade, due to the geographic expansion of the EU, decentralisation within member states and the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty (Ladrech, 2010; Mandrino, 2008) specifically as regards the policy concept 'territorial cohesion' (Faludi, 2010; Dühr *et al.*, 2010). These studies add nuance to the original top-down oriented literature on multilevel governance by showing that the impact of the EU depends very much on the evolving institutional context in member states (Featherstone, Radaelli, 2003; Pitschel, Bauer, 2009). Indeed, the awareness that governance at one level of scale or governmental tier affects relations with other levels is essential for understanding how the EU impacts domestic spatial planning.

3. Research design

This investigation into the influence of EU policies on spatial planning governance in the Netherlands builds on previous work by Evers and Tennekes (2016a). That concerned desk research which sought to map out different sector policies affecting spatial planning in the member states by evaluating EU policy areas according to nine different 'impact types' and depicting these, as far as possible, cartographically. This resulted in the production of a composite map of EU policies in the Netherlands. The analysis was essentially static and made no real attempt to explain in any depth how, or how much, these policies affected planning over time.




Figure 1. Scales and levels of governance in Europe. Source: Rli, 2016, p. 16.

This study starts where the previous one left off. It also takes a broad view towards impact because, as the previous study demonstrated, spatial planning is affected by a wide range of uncoordinated EU policies simultaneously (horizontal governance). With respect to vertical governance, the way EU policies are administered in the Netherlands potentially affects planning. To investigate this, a survey was carried out of the policies being drafted and implemented by EU institutions and how these are evolving. In addition, it attempted to identify the locus of power within the downwards policy flows to determine the probable conduits for influencing policy bottom-up. This was performed as desk research using publicly available sources (e.g. EU and domestic websites). Some of these results have been published in more detail by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Evers, Tennekes, 2016b).

This analysis was supplemented by information obtained from interviews with 43 local land-use

planners who were asked about which EU policies they considered most relevant for their daily work (this data was obtained as part of a wider study on spatial planning in the Netherlands).

4. Results

How do the continuous negotiations, myriad political maneuverings, bottom-up lobbying and expert consultations, top-down legislation and enforcement proceedings all combine to affect spatial planning in the member states? In order to explore this, an analytical distinction was made between *downloading* of policy (how power flows from the EAS – either through member states or directly – to the regional or local level) and *uploading* of policy (how power flows from organizations or local/regional interests (sometimes via member states) to the EAS). The emphasis here will be on downloading. For the sake of simplicity, the many and certainly significant interactions between regions, organizations and member states (as depicted in figure 1) will be excluded from analysis.

4.1. Downloading policy

Over time, EU policies relevant to planning are drawn up and implemented, influencing domestic governance structures, policies, procedures and project decisions in the process. Sometimes compliance is mandatory, but in other cases domestic agents voluntary choose to align their activities to the European framework. The effect is however identical: policy is ‘downloaded’ from the European level to the national, regional and/or local levels. In this section, I will examine a few instances of downloading in the Netherlands, making an analytical distinction between policies that act as ‘sticks’ (regulations with sanctions for noncompliance) and those that act as ‘carrots’ (subsidies or other incentives).

4.1.1. Governance and regulation

Many ‘sticks’ created at the EU level influence planning. Regulations, because they apply to all member states directly, are particularly top-down in nature and leave little room for interpretation. In cases of potential non-compliance, a local government can find itself in direct conflict with the European Commission, which may open an investigation and even bring the case before the European Court of Justice. There are various instances where local planning decisions in the Netherlands – generally concerning competition policy (state aid) – created tension between these two relatively distant levels of government.

More interesting from a governance point of view are directives, especially framework directives, because they grant more scope for multilevel negotiation and bargaining. Directives typically set standards or targets, but do not necessarily regulate how they are to be achieved. National governments negotiate with the European Commission about the way directives are translated (or ‘transposed’ in EU jargon) into domestic legislation and policy. They also negotiate with lower tiers of government about implementation of these directives. The Netherlands has no standard operating procedure for transposing directives. Sometimes a new law is enacted, sometimes an existing law is adapted, and sometimes directives are transposed via ministerial decree (Order in Council). In sharp contrast to its positive self-image, the track record of the Netherlands is only about average on implementation. Orders in Council are, on average, swifter than laws in transposition (Haverland *et al.*, 2011), and the national government has repeatedly proposed implementing all EU directives this way – and have been repeatedly rebuked by the Dutch Parliament, which would be cut out of the loop.

Although transposition is usually too late in the game to affect the policy substantively, as the targets have already been set in stone, there is still a great deal of latitude when it comes to devising the means to reach these targets. More specifically, the national government makes several important de-

cisions during transposition which affect spatial planning governance. One regards whether to attach additional national objectives (goldplating) to the EU policy, giving it additional legal force. Another regards the degree to which the EU policy is linked to – or ‘coupled with’ – the planning system (Evers, Tennekes, 2016b). Sometimes coupling is stipulated in the directive (e.g. Natura 2000, Seveso, Floods), but frequently the member state can decide how the EU policies pass through the state structure and/or planning system. Since these decisions are powerfully influenced by the position spatial planning occupies within the member state, the effects of implementation decisions vary widely from country to country. So in the Netherlands, the influence of EU policies on Dutch spatial planning governance will be largely determined by extant and evolving domestic governmental structures and governance relationships. This is significant because Dutch planning has undergone major changes since 2000. Broadly speaking, there have been political changes which have affected the stature of planning, policy/administrative changes which have redistributed responsibilities and legislative changes which have altered the planning powers and instruments of public authorities. All of these affect the way EU policies enter the system and how planning bodies interact to deal with them.

To deal with the last point first, the new Spatial Planning Act entered into force in 2008, which overhauled the statutory planning system. It abolished the planning hierarchy and introduced the concepts of ‘self-interest’ (each planning authority determines its own interests and acts accordingly to protect them) and ‘proactive legislation’ (general rules are drawn up in advance instead of evaluating development proposals retroactively). The law also introduced a strict separation between self-binding policy (vision) and legally binding rules. A couple years later, the Crisis and Recovery Act sought to streamline the system to facilitate development. The Environment and Planning Act, slated to take effect in 2021, integrates a large number of laws in order to simplify and streamline the system. Importantly, the Environment and Planning Act takes the European system as its point of departure, defining planning instruments in the Netherlands in conformance with EU concepts, such as the ‘programme’ which consists of a package of policy measures over time to achieve a particular objective. This change in domestic metagovernance was specifically designed to reduce conflicts with EU policies.

Domestic politics also affects governance, and with it, how EU policies affect planning. To reduce a perceived administrative burden, two noteworthy governance principles were introduced in the 2010 Government Agreement. The first relates to the idea of self-interest as formulated in the 2008 Spatial Planning Act: authorities should not interfere in matters where they have no defined interest. Despite the superficial political appeal, this principle is clearly unfit for broad policy areas like spatial planning that seek to coordinate and combine disparate policy goals (i.e. horizontal governance). The second principle, based on the same philosophy, is more specific: decision-making must not involve more than two tiers of government. As the Dutch planning system is three-tiered, one level of government – or two if the EU is counted – must be necessarily excluded. Obviously, faithful application of this principle will make it more difficult to coordinate and garner support for the implementation of EU directives (i.e. vertical governance) in a planning system that strives to be inclusive and seek consensus. Never really popular in practice, these principles have been widely ignored.

Downloading of EU policy is also affected by institutional changes in domestic planning. At the national level, the position of planning vis-à-vis other policy areas and actors (horizontal governance) has changed significantly. Planning’s longstanding ally, housing, has become more distant following the privatization of housing associations, the resolution of the post-war housing shortage and the transferral of the Department of Housing to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. National planning has increasingly oriented itself to economic development, but this is also in a different ministry. Since 2010, planning shared a department with water management at the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, a clear loss of status. It also lost most of its in-house expertise and capacity after the research division was transferred to an independent agency. Finally, successive inter-

nal reorganizations have taken their toll on the department, making it now a pale shadow of the National Planning Agency of yesteryear (Roodbol-Mekkes *et al.*, 2012). At present, the department is drawing up a national strategy to accompany the Environment and Planning Act, but so far, the efforts seem lacklustre compared to the grand national planning documents of the previous century. Consequently, one can call into question the capacity, or willingness, of the national government to spatially coordinate the downloading of EU policies.

Downloading of EU policy is also affected by changes in domestic planning governance. Since 2000, a gradual decentralization and deregulation of planning has taken place, accelerating since 2010 with the National Policy Strategy on Infrastructure and Spatial Planning (SVIR), the current national policy. The SVIR takes a hands-off approach, slashing the number of 'national interests' and abolishing the enforcement agency. In its own terminology, the national government only assumes 'system responsibility' – it will ensure that a functioning planning system exists, but will not plan itself. This means that much, if not most, of national spatial policy is now determined by EU sectoral policy, and should be carried out by the provinces.

The vacuum created at the national level has strained governance relationships. Vertical tensions were heightened by the passing of the 2012 Compliance with EU Law by Public Entities Act (in Dutch: NERpe). This Act stipulates *inter alia* that any fines imposed by the EU on the Netherlands may be passed on to the sub-national authorities responsible for implementation. In their reaction to the NERpe Act, the Association of Provincial Authorities (IPO) and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) called for a legal means to hold the national government accountable if it fails to transpose European rules into Dutch legislation properly (in Rob, 2013, p. 12). Clearly, EU policy cannot be seen in isolation from domestic governance relationships. As a final example, the national government announced in 2010 that it would strip all its goldplating from EU policies. This also has consequences for planning governance. Setting preservation targets that go beyond the EU minimum in Natura2000 areas provides a buffer against non-compliance (Backes *et al.*, 2011). Removing goldplating also removes this buffer, making sub-national authorities more vulnerable to fines being passed downwards pursuant to the NERpe Act. A logical response for provinces would be to impose their own goldplating, or ensure that they can also pass down fines to noncompliant municipalities.

Regardless of whatever political manoeuvrings have occurred in policymaking, at some point EU policy reaches the local level and the messy everyday business of making land-use plans. By this time, the European aspect is usually obscured, and the policy regarded as national or provincial (Fleurke, Willemse, 2007). To explore this further, in the spring of 2016, 43 municipal officers were asked to reflect on whether certain EU policies affected local land-use planning and whether or not the EU had become more important than the national government. The responses were evaluated on a Likert scale to gauge relative impact. The result is presented in figure 2. In addition, responses with a normative orientation (positive/negative) were noted. In order to protect anonymity, code numbers for municipalities are given rather than names.

As far as EU policy 'sticks' is concerned, respondents were familiar with most of the five policies mentioned. Of all EU policies, Natura 2000 was deemed the most relevant for local planning, also eliciting the most extensive responses (with the bias that this was the first policy area mentioned). The majority of normative expressions were negative ($n=11$), generally due to the limitations imposed on development (respondent 36) and the stringent conditions placed on research (respondents 12, 3, 17, 39) which can slow down the process (respondent 6). One officer commented «Why this should be dealt with at the European level is beyond me, each country has its own ideas about what's worth preserving» (respondent 9), while others disparagingly recalled how certain species (swallows, bats) hold up plans (respondents 30, 14, 24). Natura 2000 was followed by air quality and water quality, the first of which was overwhelmingly seen as negative and the second generally as positive. Competition policy was also found to have an impact on local land-use planning and, in the opinion of most

respondents, a negative one due to the risks created. Several municipalities indicated that Seveso had no impact due to the lack of installations falling under the directive. Finally, and recalling the earlier discussion about vertical governance, one respondent complained that: «We are the ones who actually have to zone the land and deal with the objections and lawsuits. We are expected to defend the policy and carry it out even though it wasn't our decision» (respondent 34). The same respondent went on to lament that higher tiers of government are difficult to reach, particularly the national government (*ibid.*).




Figure 2. Estimated levels of impact on local planning. Source: author, on the basis of 43 interviews.

4.1.2. Governance and subsidies

Of course, EU policy does not merely rely on 'sticks' but also on 'carrots', which take the form of investments, funds, loans and subsidies. These policies establish different implementation regimes, which in turn have different effects on governance (Rob, 2013). In some cases, the EU determines the general framework, eligibility and even recipients, while other policies allow far-reaching local interpretation. These differences have consequences for the relationships between actors involved in spatial development and planning. Dutch provinces can be both administrators and beneficiaries for structural funds (e.g. the European Regional Development Fund, ERDF), for instance. The co-financing requirement also affects relationships between government authorities, causing, for example, municipalities to lobby the national government or provinces for assistance. International cooperation is sometimes required for eligibility (e.g. Horizon 2020, Interreg), which may also affect governance by bringing in new actors. In some cases, administrative structures are altered to facilitate the flow of EU funds, but in other cases, this is incorporated into the existing organizational structure (Yesilkagit, Blom-Hansen, 2007).

The divergent governance impacts can be illustrated by comparing how the two largest EU budgetary expenditures are administered (i.e. Pillar 1 of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the ERDF within regional policy). The former entails direct payments to farmers on the basis of farmland area. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs mainly acts as a conduit and provinces and municipali-

ties play almost no role whatsoever. The ERDF produces a very different kind of governance. Although these subsidies are also provided via a regulation, it is much broader in scope, both in terms of content and potential beneficiaries. The main objectives of the ERDF are set out in a National Strategic Reference Framework, but policy is implemented at the 'regional' level (the Netherlands has been divided in four regions consisting of provincial partnerships specifically for this purpose). These partnerships draw up the vitally important multiannual operational programmes used to evaluate individual subsidy requests. All kinds of organizations can apply for ERDF funding (e.g. businesses, universities, NGOs, municipalities and provinces). Projects can vary from million-euro investments in innovation or infrastructure to modest support for small initiatives like a neighbourhood centre. Compared to the CAP (pillar 1), ERDF governance is much more inclusive and diffuse.




Figure 3. Policy downloading and uploading in the Netherlands. Source: Evers, Tennekes 2016, p. 30.

Figure 3 presents a vastly simplified version of power flows for a handful of EU policies relevant to spatial planning in the Netherlands. Here, the aforementioned difference between the complex and diffuse regional funding and more direct agricultural subsidies becomes immediately apparent (although pillar 2 of CAP, much smaller in terms of funding, is mediated by provinces). The figure also includes some 'stick' policies. State aid is very direct and top-down since the European Commission can contact municipalities directly about non-compliance, whereas power within the Water Framework Directive is mediated at the cross-border river basin level. One of the conclusions that should be drawn by this figure is that, even for a small number of policy areas relevant to spatial planning, the

governance relationships are multifarious and heterogeneous. Moreover, these policies involve ad hoc bodies outside the established three-tier state structure. An unfortunate conclusion for planners, as generalists, is that knowledge about how one European policy works is not necessarily useful for another.

As with the 'sticks', changes in domestic governance also affect how planning bodies regard EU subsidies. Planning is just one policy area experiencing decentralization. Under the assumption that municipalities operate more efficiently than the national government, they have been assigned more tasks and fewer resources. At the same time, subnational governments frequently maintain national policies that have been abandoned (i.e. for which there is no longer national financing), but are constrained in how much of the difference they can pay themselves. This constraint has a European dimension. The Dutch implementation of the Fiscal Compact on budgetary discipline, carried out via the Sustainable Public Finances Act and the Treasury Banking Act (in Dutch: *Wet Hof*), powerfully limits municipal and provincial overspending (Dutch Council of State, 2013, p. 56). These factors, combined with the economic crisis and budget cuts, can make EU funding alluring. This sentiment was confirmed during provincial focus group meetings conducted in 2013 (Evers, Tennekes, 2016b). So far, there is little evidence of this happening however. In the spring of 2013, Dutch municipalities under financial disciplinary control were asked whether their situation had made them more interested in obtaining European subsidies for planning objectives. Most responded that they did not have the capacity to even consider this option (de Vos, 2013).

Still, there is a definite tension in vertical governance about EU subsidies in the Netherlands. The association of provinces (IPO) has, for example, protested the national government's position that cohesion funds should only be used for the poorest EU regions (and therefore not for Dutch regions) in exchange for a national rebate. Conversely, accepting EU funds may require a change in policy priorities as they generally come with strings attached such as co-financing. If these funds play a greater role in the budgets of sub-national authorities, the influence of 'Brussels' could increase vis-à-vis 'The Hague', further altering vertical governance relations. To explore this matter further, I again turn to the 43 interviews with local planners carried out in 2016 (fig. 2). According to the respondents, the 'carrots' have less impact on land-use planning than the 'sticks'. Despite the large amount of money devoted to agricultural policy and its obvious land-use implications, this is deemed irrelevant. It is also interesting to note that cohesion policy (ERDF), generally considered one of the most relevant policies for planning in the international literature, was still seen as having a minimal impact.

4.2. Uploading policy

Until now I have focused on how EU policies work their way downwards into the governance of spatial planning. Of course, there are also noteworthy domestic efforts to change EU policy. Uploading can be desirable for a variety of reasons. Sometimes policy goals, such as flood protection or climate change, require concerted international action (Waterhout, Jansen-Janssen, 2006). It can be advantageous set one's own policy as the European norm; it provides a competitive advantage and simplifies downloading (the goodness-of-fit thesis). Sometimes the European level can be used by lower tiers of government to circumvent or place pressure on their national government. In any case, 'uploading' is a highly politicized multilevel activity: «Not only does an increasing share of matters formally decided at the national level have a European dimension, but also debates on EU laws or European level processes can be dominated by domestic issues» (Raunio, Wiberg, 2010, p. 89).

Official channels exist to upload policy. Items can be placed on the EU agenda during the so-called 'expert group stage' of European policymaking. This is an opportune time for planners to voice their concerns, because once a concrete legislative proposal is drafted, the process becomes more formal, political and sectoral. At present, most Dutch municipalities do not seem especially interested in uploading. On the website designed as an interface between municipalities and the EU (*europeadecen-*

traal.nl), for example, most questions posed by local officials concern compliance with EU policies or funding opportunities. Changing EU policy seems a bridge too far.

The Dutch have had multiple successes uploading planning-relevant policy. In fact, the most disparaged of all EU policies for local land-use planning according to the 2016 survey, Natura 2000, was based on the Dutch 'ecological network' policy. The complaints stem from the fact that the EU policy is more far-reaching and stringent than the national variant and, more importantly, that domestic political priorities have changed. In other words, the inconvenience experienced by Dutch planners now is largely the product of conscious lobby efforts of Dutch environmentalists in the 1990s. Another success is the floods directive, which has had no impact on planning in the Netherlands whatsoever, precisely because it fit domestic policy. Finally, Dutch national planners were very influential in discussions of European spatial planning and the production of a non-binding policy document called the European Spatial Development Perspective (Faludi, 2010), but this has not been very influential domestically. In the end, however, downloading, not uploading, affects local planning the most. In the words of one local planner: «these EU policies are all dreamt up at a sector department with the best of intentions, but they don't carry them out themselves. Instead, it arrives at the spatial planners' desk and they have to figure everything out. And when the policy was decided, planners were not at the table» (respondent 24).

Conclusion

Governance relationships are intertwined both horizontally and vertically and spatial planning, as a cross-cutting multi-scalar activity is strongly affected by both. Downloading EU policies affects planning in many ways. Overall, however, the balance of power between EU and domestic policy is notoriously difficult to quantify. When asked directly about whether EU policies had become more significant than national policy, local Dutch planners were clearly divided. Confirming earlier research (e.g. Evers, Ravesteyn, 2004; Fleurke, Willemse, 2007), many respondents struggled with the question. More felt that the national government ($n=9$) still had more influence than the EU than vice versa ($n=5$), but an even larger number argued that the influence of the EU was increasing (primarily due to domestic deregulation). Very few felt it was stable and not one respondent said it was diminishing.

With respect to upwards versus downwards flows of power, downloading seems by far the most important direction with respect to planning; there is little 'uploading' of Dutch planning interests of note, at least since the turn of the millennium. This does not mean that domestic planning is dictated 'from above' however: evolving domestic spatial planning governance greatly affects how EU policies are downloaded into the system. In this, the national government plays a critical role: it is responsible for transposing EU directives into national legislation and is held accountable, as the member state representative, for non-compliance (Rob, 2013, pp. 9–10). Although provinces and municipalities are also responsible (and since the NERpe Act, liable) for implementation, they were not directly involved in EU policymaking like the national government was, resulting in a lack of ownership. Moreover, since the national government has become less involved in spatial planning, it may become less conscious of transposition decisions that problematically impact it and less interested in 'uploading' policy amenable to planning. All this seems to suggest that the manifold governance tensions with respect to downloading EU policies are to a large extent the product of domestic decisions, particularly with respect to decentralization, rather than inherent to the EU policy itself.

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ANDREAS FALUDI¹

PERSPECTIVES ON THE EUROPEANISATION AND EUROPEANISATION OF PLANNING

1. *Introduction*

The exemplary case study by Evers and Tennekes documents the impact of European spatial or territorial policies in the Netherlands. The authors show that there is practically not an inch of Dutch soil unaffected. This type of Europeanisation, also called the 'downloading' of European policies, they distinguish from two other meanings of the term: the 'uploading' of policies from the national to the European level and what one might call 'horizontal' Europeanisation – my words. This refers to mutual learning taking place thanks to increasingly frequent contacts between experts and policy makers leading to the «shared understanding between planners and like-minded professionals in Europe» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 2). The latter two meanings I discuss as the EUropeanisation, respectively the Europeanisation of planning (Faludi, 2014). In so doing, I take a leaf out of the book of Clark and Jones (2008) distinguishing between 'EUrope' – the European Union construct – and 'Europe,' being a longstanding, historical and cultural process and its outcome. EUropeanisation of planning stands for its becoming part of the EU 'policy-making state' (Richardson, 2012) and its Europeanisation for mutual learning about ideas and practices.

In these terms, much of my past work has been on the EUropeanisation of planning. Saying that this has not been particularly successful is an understatement. But the Lisbon Treaty would at least allow the EU to pursue a territorial cohesion policy, in practice strategic spatial planning. Nonetheless, the Commission takes no relevant initiatives. My 2014 paper expressed at least modest faith, though, in the Europeanisation of planning. In the fullness of time, this might prepare the ground for its EUropeanisation, was my hope. Unfortunately, present prospects are poor. European integration as such is under threat, making the EUropeanisation of planning seem less urgent. Securing the Union takes centre stage.

The paper starts with Evers and Tennekes on Europeanisation. Then it explains the distinction between the EUropeanisation and Europeanisation of planning, followed by a discussion of the persistent failure of the former. The root cause is the insistence of EU member states on their sovereign control over their territories. The conclusions point out the dark sides of this, what I call territorialism.

2. *Mapping the Impacts of EU Policies*

Evers and Tennekes document the disparate impacts of EU policies on Dutch planning. Inconsistencies between such policies were one reason for the making of the European Spatial Development Perspective, or ESDP. That document stated that the «spatial effects of Community policies do not automatically complement each other... Nor do they automatically correspond to the development concepts of regions and cities. Without a reciprocal fine-tuning process, they can unintentionally aggra-

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vate disparities in regional development if they are exclusively geared towards specific sectoral objectives» (ESDP, 1999, p. 19). Which the, initially twelve and later fifteen member states represented on the intergovernmental Committee on Spatial Development preparing the ESDP gave as one rationale for their research.

This is a case of what Evers and Tennekes call the downloading EU policies to member states leading to the demand for the EU itself to consider their cross-impacts. The literature discusses bottom-up initiatives for the EU to become active as uploading. But their own study, which can easily serve – in fact is intended to serve – as a model for other member states to follow, is about the impacts of downloading EU policies on spatial planning in the member states.

Our authors identify downloading as the first of three Europeanisation strands in the literature where it examines «how policies at the European level affect policies and practices within member states (top-down impact)». There is a second strand which, much as most of my writings on European planning, relates to «the emergence of autonomous governance structures at the European level». Lastly, horizontal Europeanisation «concerns the institutionalization of transnational learning and co-operation Europe» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 2).

Focusing on downloading, Evers and Tennekes find that practically the entire surface area of the Netherlands is affected by multiple, overlapping EU policies so that «spatial planning in the member states and EU policy-making are much more intimately intertwined than their formal status suggests». Legal opinion has it that the Union has no competence in the matter but there is now, of course, a competence for territorial cohesion. Still, there has never been – and there is little prospect of there to be – a relevant initiative to instigate the ‘ordinary legislative process’ in the matter. This being so, maybe over-optimistically, our two authors hope that their evidence might «inform the ongoing European policy debate on policy coordination and fragmentation (e.g. the Better Regulation Agenda. The European Urban Agenda and the Territorial Agenda)» (Evers, Tennekes 2016, p. 2).

One could add that, under the EU treaties, the Union even seems under an obligation to ensure what the French text of Article 13(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon calls the coherence – the English text uses the less passionate term consistency – of the institutional framework of the EU. This quite apart from the shared competence under the Lisbon Treaty for territorial cohesion where the English and the French texts invoke the same term. Arguing for the Commission being given a role in spatial planning, the then Commissioner of Regional Policy Monika Wulf-Mathies said essentially the same argument in 1995: Since the Union has various competences with spatial impacts, why not allowing it to plan for their coordinated use? So, Wulf-Mathies was for uploading spatial planning.

But member states working on the ESDP kept this task to themselves, which is why subsequently the Commission put its case in terms the pursuit of territorial cohesion. To repeat though, as far as this is concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon remains a dead letter. Not only does the Commission abstain from taking an initiative, one of the initiators of, and a leading light during the making of the ESDP, the Netherlands, has abandoned national spatial planning, let alone that there is an appetite for promoting it on European level. Which forms the unspoken backdrop to Evers and Tennekes’ study. Having demonstrated that «the geographical footprint of EU policies is fragmented, multifarious and complex and thus presents a clear challenge for coherent spatial strategy» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 15) they point out that the Dutch 2012 National Spatial Strategy Framework gives no overall guidance on urban development. Instead, the current philosophy «is that national government should be responsible for ensuring that a well-functioning spatial planning system exists, but not necessarily what the system does. Provinces and municipalities have been cut free... European policies complicate this aim to decentralize and deregulate» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 15).

National government remains after all accountable to the EU. Which would seem to imply one of two things. Either lower-tier governments should be more involved in the EU’s policy-making process, or national government should once more take an active role in spatial planning. The more gen-

eral conclusion is that Europeanisation «poses a direct challenge to the ways in which spatial planning is organized in member states» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 16). If this challenge were addressed in earnest, and if, furthermore, the Better Regulation Agenda were to lead to the Union pursuing the coherence of its policies with a spatial impact, then this would require the same reciprocal fine-tuning between national and EU policies which the ESDP has been quoted as advocating. If done successfully, this would amount to – but the name given to the exercise is not important – some form of strategic spatial planning. And it would require member states engaging in some form of national spatial planning. Otherwise there could be no meaningful participations. With meaningful national participation, the two levels would come closer, such as is the case with other EU policies, not in the last place cohesion policy, the seedbed of so-called multi-level governance.

In this joint operation, a condition of success would be mutual learning, which is the third meaning attached to Europeanisation. Mutual learning is what my 2014 paper discusses. The section that follows elaborates on it.

3. EUropeanisation or Europeanisation of spatial planning?

Here I revisit my distinction between the two concepts in the title of my paper. Before doing so, the article on which I draw exuded disappointment with the poor showing of European spatial planning. Indeed, the ESDP had been less than could have been expected. Member states had failed to follow through on their own convictions. In lieu of a veritable spatial framework for EU policies, they kept to general propositions. With each member state pursuing its own style of planning and making its own assessment of what would be in its own best interest, there was no other way.

The Commission's subsequent initiative for an EU territorial cohesion policy had been stifled by the failure of getting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ratified. Referenda in France and the Netherlands had put spanners into the works. Ironically, these had been the two countries whose national planning establishments, each for its own good reasons, had been the most proactive in initiating the ESDP process. By the time the Treaty of Lisbon, coming as it did in lieu of the ill-fortuned Constitution, was finally on the books, momentum had been lost. The member states' own follow-ups in between the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty – the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (2007) and the Territorial Agenda 2020 (2011) – both lacked conviction. Polish efforts to resuscitate the initiative by identifying 'spatial keys' (Zaucha *et al.*, 2014) as the entry points for planning into the evolving mainstream dissipated. The Commission prioritised defending EU Cohesion policy as such. With the next programming period looming, this is once more the case.

Making sense of the situation, in Faludi (2014) I drew on Clark and Jones (2008) differentiating between EUrope and Europe. They make it based on their conviction that, «while the integration narrative and Europeanisations's underlying processes have tended to be conflated they are not the same». They identify «a unique geographic suit of processes springing from territorial propinquity, comprising myriad socialisation and learning processes» (Clark, Jones, 2008, p. 303). Elsewhere they say EUrope and Europeanisation «have been configured over centuries by distinct patterns of European government and power. Suppression and/or control of these continent-wide processes has been integral to nation state building, and the inherent tension between states and the supranational political project of building 'EUrope' arises precisely because Europeanisation processes are both supportive of yet transcend national territory-government power bases» (Clark, Jones, 2008, p. 313).

To the extent that it regards planning, European integration has been my topic of research for years, but I am turning critical. The prevailing, what I call territorialism negatively affects the European construct (Faludi, 2016a, b). This will be discussed below. In the 2014 paper giving an account of the decade-long, but unsuccessful campaign for the EUropeanisation of planning, I only refer to terri-

torialism in the margin, yet express my hope that mutual learning, for instance in the framework of INTERREG and through joint research under the ESPON programme will be the seedbed for new initiatives in future. So, the «EUropeanisation of planning may have stalled, but, through continued support for “European Territorial Cooperation” under cohesion policy, its Europeanisation continues» (Faludi, 2014, p. 164). In support I invoked Richardson (2012, p. 350) writing on what he calls the EU policy-making state. About that state, he says that, «like an iceberg which has nine-tenths of its ice below the waterline, EU public policy-making generally takes place in a rather closed world of experts and interests far away from the public glare». The metaphor also conjures up an inexorable movement leading to change. Richardson coins the term ‘tectonic movement.’ So, I ventured to suggest that there was, albeit hidden, progress towards European planning.

But there is increasing opposition against this, apparently unstoppable dynamics. Populists and nationalists are driving member states to reassert their positions as defenders of the national interest, including their sovereign control over their territory which of course militates against EUropeanisation, also and in particular of planning. Clearly, this is not the moment to expect more of it.

This having been said, there may also be what Richardson calls a ‘seismic event’ – Brexit perhaps – jolting the Union into resuming its path towards more integration. Less dramatically, the way forward could be the idea of a ‘multispeed Europe’ with groups of member states making use of a facilities in the EU treaties called ‘enhanced cooperation’. In fact, patchwork EUropeanisation takes place all around us on with multiple, overlapping sites.

Indeed, it is important to realise that opposition to this notion notwithstanding, a multi-speed Europe, being one of the scenarios which the Commission outlined for the future of Europe (European Union, 2017) is lived reality. There are opt-outs and, less well-known, opt-ins. Iconic though it may be, Schengen, is a patchwork: Non-members Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein participate, but some members have negotiated opt-outs, with others so far excluded. The Eurozone, too, is patchier than one might think. There are member states due to join. Others have negotiated opt-outs – or are simply refusing, like Sweden, to join, but without ever having negotiated an opt-out. Curiously, there are also opt-ins: Montenegro and Kosovo using the Euro. So with the mini-states Monaco, San Marino and Andorra and, under yet different arrangements, the Vatican: patchwork. So with other forms of cooperation, like the ‘Visegrád 4,’ together with Romania and Bulgaria, member states otherwise opposed to a multi-speed Europe for fear of being demoted to a lower tier working on a joint planning perspective. In so doing, they follow procedures as in the ESDP process, with the successive Presidencies taking the lead. Patchwork once again.

My 2014 paper ended with sketching out a ‘deep change’ scenario under which, perhaps in response to some seismic event, «the incessant Europeanisation of planning will make planners rise to the occasion, whatever it is, and partake in redefining European integration as such. The point is, this would indeed mean a deep change, also in thinking about the EU» (Faludi, 2014, p. 165). I added that this deep change would imply «the EUropeanisation of planning, but in a form relating to a fundamentally different notion of the EU and of space and territory and thus of the nation state» (Faludi, 2014, p. 166). This, then, is what I am working on now in ways outlined in Faludi (2016a) where, taking a leaf out of Zielonka (2006; 2014) and other authors, I speculate about ‘neo-medieval’ European spatial planning (Faludi, forthcoming).

4. Territorialism

Neo-medievalism draws inspiration from the situation before the Peace of Westphalia has led to states claiming sovereign control over their territories: territorialism. So, EUropeanisation is taken to mean member states fusing into one EU state and their territories into one EU territory. But, this poses

a challenge to existing identities, feelings of belonging, cultures and languages. Not the cosiest of institutions, existing states seem at least closer than yet another, yet more distant level of government with bureaucrats having outlandish names and speaking foreign languages.

It is difficult to convince people that the states and the language they are used to and the cultures and identities they are attached to are themselves constructs forged during the last couple of centuries. And it is even more difficult to argue that the future is open, and that we should explore new avenues and in so doing be prepared to modify assumptions and habits and institutions. So, EUropeanisation is a hard sell. But I have already referred to patchwork EUropeanisation. So, maybe it need not mean one large, more distant state.

Before pursing what else it might mean, it is important to realise that there are massive interests in keeping the situation as is. These are the vested interests of what I call the 'Territorial-Administrative Complex' (Faludi, 2016b). The *raison d'être* of each such complex – from the administration of a municipality, a district, a region to that of any state – is to defend its territory and the people in it. Now, if that were all, this would be fine, but politicians want to be re-elected, and maybe their livelihood depends on the Territorial-Administrative Complex thriving. So, in their own best interest, politicians magnify real or imagined threats to their territory and people.

The incentive seems the greater, the more recently states emerging from under Soviet domination have joined the EU. (Butler, 2017) For them EUropeanisation in the sense as discussed is a non-starter. But populists generally perceive the Union, like national movements before the Great War have perceived the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, the Russian and the Ottoman Empire, as a 'prison of nations'. In fact, many new EU members are successor states of those empires. They have seen purges of minorities, and in places they continue. So, rather than integration, we witness nation-building before our eyes, making EUropeanision seem anathema.

The same is true for Europeanisation – the learning involved in the incessant work of implementing regulations and directives, in cross-border and transnational cooperation and in building up civil society: Anything that distracts from the power and the glory of the state is looked upon with suspicion. If they have to, state administrations go through the hoops to satisfy the givers of grants, but without the intention of entertaining real change.

Is the answer insisting on rules to be observed, and on EUropeanisation to be pursued against the odds? The alternative is to abandon the path leading to Richardson's European 'policy-making state.' Maybe, rather than the way to prepare the ground for EUropeanisation, actors growing together though learning and open-ended mutual recognition is what European integration is all about? Maybe we should forget about EUrope shining at the end of the road!

States as we know them will not disappear. Together with international companies, action groups and functional organisations, they will remain operators in a network society. But the scenario sketched implies states giving up their monopoly on power, in fact an illusion anyhow. Giving it up should encourage them to pay more than lip service to the interests of other states, international organisations, and so forth. Anyhow, purely national sovereignty «has been gradually replaced by a differentiated and overlapping functional form... [So-AF] the exercise of sovereignty becomes reflexive and dynamic as it implies a search for the best allocation of power in each case» (Besson, 2005, p. 196).

To invoke a metaphor which I like, it would mean states seeing themselves as islands in a sea of relations, functional or otherwise. It would mean recognising that pulling up the drawbridges is not the way. Islands are served best by interacting with the seas which lap their shores.

The metaphor of states as islands in a sea of relations is the antithesis of EUropeanisation. The sea is not like a territory. Rather than sovereignty, the Freedom of the Seas reigns. It grants any one island access to a myriad of opportunities. The opposite to the metaphor of Europeanisation creating a sea of opportunities is EUropeanisation: member states coalescing into a super state, with their territories merging and citizens roam freely, albeit within external borders.

Conclusions

EUropeanisation implies dissolution of nation states, a fiction we see unravelling before our eyes. Arguably the most fundamental reason for their resilience is that the production of democratic legitimacy is framed by elections per member state. So, it is to their own voters that governments are responsible. The upshot is that territorialism reigns, also in democratic decision-making. This means that democracy is inherently nationalistic. Historically, nationalism has created the people it was meant to serve, not the other way around. That most nation states exhibit linguistic and ethnic homogeneity is, however, the outcome, and not the reason for their formation. Where they exhibit ethnic diversity, nation states tend towards what Oren Yiftachel (2006) calls ethnocracy. Anderson (2016, p. 1) defines it as government or rule «by a particular ethnos in a multi-ethnic situation where there is at least one other significant ethnic group».

Dreaming the dream of EUropeanisation, its enthusiasts are in danger of becoming ethnocrats, too: Turkey should not join because it is a Moslem country. There may be reasons for Turkey not joining, but this is not one. But ethnocracy is a potent force. Witness the posture, already referred to, of new member states. They pursue French President Charles de Gaulle's 'Europe of Fatherlands' concept, defining themselves as ethnocracies and giving preference to the nations that lend them their names. So, unless they assume new identities Estonia and Latvia do not grant Russian speakers having migrated to what were once Soviet Republics and their descendants citizenship (Agarin, 2016).

Nor are old member states immune to the virus. So, EUropeanisation is not going to happen, not even, as I once surmised, through persistent Europeanisation. A policy-making state Europe is no longer realistic. Being about, following Clarke and Jones quoted above, «a unique geographic suit of processes springing from territorial propinquity, comprising myriad socialisation and learning processes», Europeanisation is, however, open-ended. So, we might imagine us growing together into a new formation, a leap into the unknown shaped by, and fitting for, a network society. I am reminded of Marshall McLuhan (1964) writing on 'The Media is the Message.' Maybe, Europeanisation is not only the medium of EUropeanisation but the message itself.

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FREDERIC SANTAMARIA,¹ BERNARD ÉLISSALDE²

THE CONCEPT OF TERRITORY REVISITED TO GO BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY OF SOFT SPACE AND HARD SPACE

1. *Introduction*

In the area of spatial planning, the notion of territory, in its different lexical forms and in particular as a qualifier (territorial), has become a major reference, whether in political discourse or in academic reflection. In the earlier, classic and historical acceptations of the term, territory refers to an essential signifier of the competence of the State or of public collectives, and entails an idea of power and control across a portion of space, legitimised by a legal order, at the origins of territorial grids that are structuring our countries. This understanding of territory, although it underpins the contemporary political order, today appears as obsolete because it is unsuited to the social and economic dynamics of a shifting world, moving at a faster pace. This is why certain authors would like to see a "variable geometry" in territorial development matters, pointing to institutional territories as being so many obstacles to the achievement of innovating spatial development projects and to a better fit between planning and development and the actual socio-economic functioning of spaces in the setting of globalisation³. In this context, the alternative concept of soft space, pursued by several researchers in recent years, despite the origin of which is highly contextual (see below), is increasingly called on in applied research, as can be seen from some of the research within the ESPON 2013 programme funded by the European Commission⁴. This contribution is an attempt to tackle the dichotomy hard space/soft space. To do this our paper is based on a revisited conception of territory through a constructivist approach.

2. *Soft spaces or the obsolescence of political and administrative territory*

The notion of soft spaces was forged to counter the classic conception of territory (Walsh and *al.*, 2012). The emergence of this new notion was thought to underscore the obsolescence of the political-administrative territory, because it was out of touch with contemporary socio-economic dynamics. From this point of view, according to Stead, European integration, in particular on account of the rescaling it requires, contributed markedly to this situation: «European integration has not only been accompanied by changes in powers across existing layers of decision-making, but also by new scales of intervention, new actor constellations and variable geometries of governance [...]. The emergence

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³ See in particular: Allmendinger, Haughton, Knieling, Othengrafen, 2015 and Faludi, 2013.

⁴ For instance, in the draft final ESPON 2013 report entitled *Territorial scenarios and visions*: «New planning and territorial cooperation initiatives are needed at all geographic levels, open to networks of public and private institutions, attached to ad hoc geographies [...]. Solutions should not necessarily be found in designing new jurisdictions, rather policy delivery should be based on informal and flexible governance arrangements, such as 'soft spaces'» (ESPON, 2014, p. 35) – the author's underlining.



of "soft spaces" – regions in which spatial strategy is being made between or alongside formal institutions and processes – is a phenomenon associated with contemporary processes of spatial rescaling» (2014, p. 681). The concept of soft space thus appears as a sort of updating of vocabulary and of the modes of intervention in the area of spatial planning.

In the competition between the institutional frameworks of spatial interventions and the realities of the use of space by societies, the idea is that there is today, more than ever, the need to alter modes of action and the usual planning strategies (regulations, long-term spatial planning) so as to find better spatial and temporal adjustments to respond to the challenges of socio-economic change, which is accelerating, in particular on account of increased competition between spaces. Thus the 'rigidity' of the former boundaries of public management is replaced by the informality of a new form of governance, a sort of 'soft' governance, the emergence of which signals the end of the power balances within and between spaces.

The reference to soft spaces provides a conceptual framework to identify, and even promote, 'new geographies' that transcend existing political and administrative boundaries: «The concept of soft spaces, in particular, signals an attempt to understand the implications of relational and non-state-centric geographies for spatial planning and governance» (Walsh *et al.*, 2012, p. 1). Various spaces of project, at different scales, are set up, transcending the institutional territories, as the European macro-regions or spaces of local development (Stead, 2014). The results of empirical studies mobilising the notion of soft spaces can show that the spatial reality is more complex than a mere dichotomy between these new planning spaces and traditional, institutional spaces (Allmendinger, Chilla, Sielker, 2014),

Defined in this manner, soft spaces do indeed belong to a conception that is an alternative to the 'traditional' understanding of territory. Thus, if we stick to the 'classic' definition of territory, we must subscribe to the above comments and accept the rejection of 'territorialism' proposed by A. Faludi (Faludi, 2013). However, we consider that this contrast is reductive, because it introduces an artificial dichotomy between consubstantial spatial realities. More over this contrast includes some implicit understandings. Within the couple soft space/hard space public framework is seen as inertia and as a container but we can assert that social inertia does exist too. This consideration leads us to offer a definition of the notion of territory, returning to academic reflection that dates back some years, moving beyond the traditional conception.

3. For a 'syncretic' definition of territory

3.1. A polysemic successful notion

In modern times, the first acceptance of the word territory is not dissociable from the idea of political dominion, building around the idea of domination or power wielded by a prince or any other body over a particular space, outlined by borders and/or administrative boundaries that are recognised and perennial. This applies for instance to municipalities, or in the past to parish boundaries. In this acceptance, territory is singular, and requires an understanding of the logic of the fixing of territorial boundaries, what that entails, and the implications for the populations concerned, in particular with respect to identity and the inclusion/exclusion dialectic (Foucher, 1991).

The notion is nowadays in a paradoxical situation. Despite this classical meaning, 'territory', in the European spatial planning literature, became a very successful notion for the Cohesion Policy. This notion is mobilized in different lexical forms and in particular as a qualifier (territorial): Territorial Agenda, Territorial Governance, Territorial Impact, and many more in various ESPON projects. In the European official documents like the "Cohesion Reports", no less than six different meanings can be found (Elissalde, Santamaria, Jeanne, 2014).

3.2. Territory as a social construct: a constructivist / systemic approach

We consider, in this paper, the territory as a 'syncretic' concept which allows to take into account the coexistence, within the same spaces, of relations between various elements – a systemic approach – of the territorial construction that cannot be reduced to a mere dichotomy between soft space and hard space. That implies explaining our constructivist approach from a theoretical point of view based on the general idea that it is in no way possible to gain direct access to reality as such is a point common to all present forms of constructivism. It reflects at once the rejection of a social reality seen as an immutable object and hence not open to change – created by official discourse (religious, state, middle class establishment, scientific and so forth).

Here, such an approach implies no spatial delimitations of a territory, from the outset, can be identified; and, consequently, that a territory is not an identifiable object without taking into account the experience of the actors, their representations, their practices and their spatial strategies. In this constructivist perspective, the territorial configurations give sense ('semiotization') to a space that is gradually 'interpreted' and transformed to become a territory (Raffestin, 1986). This semiotic process is the result of a systemogenesis (Durand-Dastes, Sanders, 2005) in which interact the actors, their representations, and the structuring elements of the organization of the space. The actors who participate in the functioning of a territory are endowed with strategic capacities.

For the geographer Di Méo (1998), territory thus refers to a mode of organisation and a dividing-up of space ensuring the specificity, the regulation and the reproduction of the human groups occupying it. In this conception, territory belongs to the social space, but is also linked to the 'lived-in' space. It belongs at once to the domain of objectification, because the social space concerns places organised by characteristic social and spatial relationships, and also to the realm of the subjective, because territory is also a 'lived-in' space. As such, territory expresses the existential relationship, necessarily subjective, that groups establish with their living environment. Territory, conceived in this way as a spatial entity to apprehend relationships between spaces and societies, places the notion of appropriation at the heart of the debate. Territorial construction is indeed an on-going process enabling an understanding of the dynamics of relationships between spaces and societies. Appropriation is effected by players who have a degree of awareness of themselves, and who have some representation of what their living environment, and hence the territory they occupy, should be. This is valid whatever the society concerned, whatever the era, the latitude, or the continent. This conception makes it possible to place the emphasis on the voluntary and intentional nature of the functioning of a territory. It enables the introduction of the logics of different players (citizens, politicians, entrepreneurs, planning professionals, etc.), their practices, and their representations, into the analysis of the functioning of a geographical entity. The players have skills and competences (strategic, legislative, argumentative etc) and there is coherence in their behaviours.

Considering territory as a social construct enables an interpretation of spaces that incorporates different dimensions: social, economic, and also political and administrative. Any intervention of a group of actors takes place on a geographical space, which presents amenities and constraints (social and physical). The process of territorialisation comes true by feedback loops between the representations of the actors and the characteristics of the space that is at stake. This feedback presents a cumulative nature, which is going to lead to a more or less intense transformation of a space. The speed of appropriation or, to the contrary, of resistance, of this space, varies according to the level of sensitivity and/or acceptability of the local societies and according to the relative appropriateness of the territorial project to the considered space. In this conception, the political-administrative dimension of a space is not antagonistic with the formation of more 'uncertain' spaces undergoing the vagaries of economic and social evolutions, but is, concomitantly, a structuring element, and one projection amongst others by societies on their spaces at a given moment. Of course, political and administrative constructions are often forms of organisation of space that have a certain duration, or even a degree of

inertia. They cannot however be discounted from any analysis aiming to give an account of all the dimensions and dynamics contributing to the organisation of space, for the purpose of adjusting planning and development policies more efficiently.

As we have seen earlier, while a territory corresponds to a relationship between social groups and a given space, the internal and external transformations and tensions that affect the territory alter the balance between groups and their living environment. If the territory is viewed as a social construct in which the use of the land and space in general is a socio-spatial issue among others, the territorial dynamics are constantly driven by variable patterns and paces of evolution, linked to temporalities that are specific to each constituent of the territorial system. In this perspective, what some describe as soft space should be considered as a break in the dynamic of a territory, and a 'normal' stage in the permanent processes of change in a territory. Two other stages and two dependent notions, 'de-territorialisation' and 're-territorialisation' can follow these processes, named 'territorialisation'.

3.3. Territory and planning issues

While the mobilisation of the concept of soft spaces contributes to the understanding of the real-life functioning of spaces, it also raises an operational issue: that of adjusting planning and development actions to the functioning in question. From this point of view, the authors that use this concept consider it *ipso facto* as a problem-solving resource that postulates the mismatch between political and administrative territory (and more generally the outlining of spaces with a legal basis, sometimes referred to as hard spaces) and the realities of the geographical functioning of a space. Along these lines, the identification of soft spaces is seen as a means, in the short term, to counterbalance institutional inertia by introducing new spaces for action defined from functional geographies. These 'new geographies' are thought to facilitate the implication of different players, and to coordinate sectoral action in spaces that are meaningful with respect to the planning and development actions (Allemendinger *et al.*, 2015). Soft spaces then appear as a method for solving the problems raised by planning and development actions, and planning action is more likely to provide answers to contemporary socio-economic and spatial issues. For our part, we think that this conception entails the risk of retaining only an instantaneous view of development action, along with an implicit idealism: the actions implemented in the name of spatial development and planning are assumed to lead to the effects expected by the planners. The definition of territory that we propose, on the other hand, means that territory can be considered as a place in which challenges and also controversies and conflicts take form, and not as a problem-solving tool for the challenges in question. At the same time, we do not consider *a priori* that planning operations conducted in the context of spaces purported to be more relevant (soft spaces) are a way to solve socio-spatial issues, but rather that they are an important element that casts light on the way players act or intend to act on a space.

With regard to this intentional dimension (Raffestin, 1986), it is interesting to confront the intellectual representations of players with respect to what their territory should be with the way in which the territory actually functions. There is not necessarily a match between the initial projects for the territory, and actual implementation and functioning. The territorialisation process may not be the perfect result of projects elaborated by the different players. The use of the concept of territory thus allows revealing these various representations. With the prospect of policies choices in the field of spatial planning, the definition of territory proposed in this article allows to identify conflicts between actors that emerge as the expression of the various representations of space. If the professional of spatial planning can be then considered as an actor among others, with his own representations of the territory, he can also intervene as the one who organizes the debates, potentially contradictory, based on the various representations of a territory. Such an approach can then join with the idea that the skill of the planner is to organize the dialogue between actors to clear finally more consensual and new solutions (Stein, Harper, 2012).

This type of analysis leads to the question of the matching of the project for organising the territory with reality, or what is finally achieved. Any alteration in balance, spatial organisation, or landscape is liable to produce conflict. Conflicts can be analysed from the point of view of collective action, from that of forms of mobilisation, or that of the values and ideologies they carry with them.

Conflicts or controversies concerning a given territory should be considered as providing insight and information. They reveal power balances in the local space, as well as the relationships between the population and that space, and the representations they have of the future of their living environment. They can bring a particular problem to light, and via the opposition generated they can lead on to alternatives to the official plan. Finally, they enable an assessment of the ability of inhabitants to mobilise social or political networks.

Conflicts on the subject of territory relate mainly to four situations:

- competition between users of a given space;
- defence of the social or territorial *status quo*; (including NIMBY effects)
- competition between territories for infrastructures or amenities;
- conflict between inhabitants and public players/decision-makers (e.g. opposition to a development project).

By way of its very existence, any territorial conflict or controversy also reveals dysfunctions in public action in terms of negotiation and consideration of the expectations and demands of the population.

The intervention of public players on territory via public policies corresponds to an objective of regulation and transformation of territories by way of infrastructures, amenities, and supporting structures. Yet in spite of the official labelling proclaiming general interest, considerable gaps are observed between a theoretical behavioural model and the reality in the field. The authors also show that there is no unity in the behaviours of public players (State, local / regional authorities, public or semi-public bodies). When acting on territory, despite certain myths, public players do not act independently from particular interests, although there may not be any corruption. In the area of public interventions in a territory, there are phenomena of inefficacy (inadequate results) and inefficiency (disproportion between cost and results in relation to initial decisions and plans). These dysfunctions can certainly be attributed to the obsolescence of the political, administrative and legal frameworks (structures, bodies, competences...), but they can equally be attributed to the way the players deal with them.

Consequently, the way in which planning and development actions are implemented within a space enables the processes coming into play to be identified, and increased knowledge on the functioning of the space in an area of interest, in this case that of the implementation of planning and development action. Thus the analysis of each situation enables a characterisation of the way in which a space actually functions in the setting of a planning operation. Combined with different elements that qualify territory as a social construct, this information should enable a territory to be apprehended with a view to the way in which a planning operation is to be implemented. In this sense, territorial analysis can be a useful tool to tailor public action, especially in the area of planning and development.

4. Territory as a tool to analyse space with a view to action

The definition of the notion of territory developed thus far, based on fairly long-standing academic thinking, makes it possible to integrate the different dimensions that describe a space without excluding one particular essential dimension, that of its legal, political and administrative organisation.

In addition, this definition should be able to give an account of a concrete spatial reality without

any preconceived position as to its relevance as a space for action, in particular in the area of planning and development. Indeed, the approach involving the notion of soft spaces tends to suggest that these spaces are necessarily more suited to the implementation of development action. Yet while spaces with a 'variable geometry' can indeed exist outside political and legal boundaries, this does not necessarily make them 'performing' or efficient spaces for the implementation of actions. Conversely, omitting political and administrative spaces from the equation appears as a rather risky affair. However, being acquainted with the characteristics and dynamics of a territory by integrating its different geographical, economic, ideological and power-balance dimensions makes it possible to objectify spaces on the basis of their real-life functioning, whatever the scale of observation. Again returning to the work by Di Méo (1998) the process of appropriation can be political, social, economic, ideological, imaginary, and so forth.

The economic dimension enables the economic activity to be approached from the point of view of its ability to produce territory in a logic of differentiation, qualification and singularisation of space. Here the focus is the specific economic features of a space, taking account of the characteristics of the activities deployed there. Particular attention is required towards interactions among inhabitants of the space, to their knowledge, their know-how, their economic capital, to the natural resources available, to the cultural, social and identity values mobilised in the localised economic activity, and to the way in which these interactions structure social life and the geographical context, and thus shape specific places and landscapes.

The ideological dimension concerns the strategic orientation with which a group or a collective endows itself for the purpose of action, in particular with respect to the relationship with space. Territorial ideology thus covers all the spatial identification and appropriation processes on the part of a group contributing to its reification, and to giving it meaning, that is to say to instating it as a territory. In concrete terms, territorial ideologies contribute to producing places of memory, heritage objects, spatial practices and routines, landscape references, and this generates a feedback.

The political dimension for its part concerns the manifestation, the organisation and the representation of power in a given space. It concerns both the spatial organisation of political power, in particular via the establishment of a territorial grid, and the interplay of influence and domination within the space among individuals or groups.

The approach presented here therefore consists in distinguishing these different dimensions enabling the description of a territory. It should however be underlined that this is merely an approach providing a simplification of the means to detect the characteristics and dynamics of a territory. Indeed, to identify a territory, what is required next is the identification of the dialectic relationships among the different dimensions. We have here a proposal for a way to approach the issue of fitting, as far as possible, policies decided on European level in the framework of the cohesion policies to their implementation at national level, by building on the so-called place-based approach. This approach is currently an important orientation for the implementation of cohesion policies under the 2014-2020 programme, in particular via the ITI tools (Integrated Territorial Investments) and the CLLD (Community-led *local* development) strategies.

Nevertheless, resorting to this type of approach based on the identification of territories of action requires proof of better adjustment to the functioning and characteristics of a territory for the planning and development initiatives, and consequently proof of greater efficacy of the actions in question. Yet intervention in a territory does not only concern the players taking part in new forms of governance and regulation, it also clearly concerns the system of values determining and justifying the action. As indicated earlier, positioning in favour of decoupling soft space/hard space place the emphasis on the informality and operational efficacy of the new intervention frameworks, and call for new forms of governance. Following on, we wish to emphasise the fact that re-compositions make no assumptions about the implicit or explicit systems of values coming into play in a process of territorial

re-composition or a development project, since soft spaces can adjust to any one of the four main value systems set out below. Indeed, the notion of territory can be used differently to shape spatial planning and development initiatives according to the systems of values to which actors refer. In this perspective, the spatial framework in which spatial planning and development projects is less important than the values underpinning the action.

5. Identifying systems of values

By applying the general categories of systems of values set out by Kymlicka (2001) to the notion of territory, we propose an analysis grid enabling the situations of territories to be classified according to the dominant system of values, and the characteristic forms of appropriation.

The political philosophy offers clues to consider the territory as a common good allowing going out the approaches that judge the public action on the territory only in the light of efficiency. The current debates in political philosophy question the categories of traditional thoughts (as the public-private, economic/social, right-left). With new categories of thought as the ones linked to social cohesion, equity, living together, the transposition of Will Kymlicka refocuses the action on the territory on the sense and on the values that a territorial orientation, at some point, carries or involves. This transposition underlines that the modalities of the process of appropriation vary according to the value system.

- Territorial constitutionalism: this is based a public agreement reached freely by players gathered around a common project, elaborated within a contractual framework, democratically recognised, and guided by the general interest. This positioning seeks for instance to find fair solutions to the unequal distribution of services or access to amenities. Certain provisions of the 1999 European Spatial Development Perspective (1999) belong to this category. It is above all an ideal that is regularly put forward by local/regional authorities and some elected representatives.
- Territorial libertarianism: this postulates an autonomous use of the appropriated territory, corresponding to free usage of the space, or at least without explicit social or political restrictions. The valorization of shared goods or belongings entails their appropriation within a private framework; the autonomous use, corresponding to the fact of using the space freely or at least without explicit social constraint. Never absolute, but ever totally absent either, this autonomy (or control of space) is more or less strong according to the groups and the spaces. This control over space by private interests, without ever being complete, is more or less marked depending on groups and places. In the field of spatial planning, the New Right Planning can be classified in this category when taking into account the weakening of planning control, notably to facilitate private initiative (Taylor, 1998).
- Territorial communitarianism: these postulates exclusive usage of the space concerned. The unit of reference is not the individual but the group (and its social, ethnic, religious, linguistic or other affiliation). The exclusive use corresponds to a logic of competition for supposed rare goods. This exclusivity is most of the time collective based on concrete but restricted groups. It can result from strictly material or functional reasons but also from social, ideological, religious reasons. The appropriation of the space is synonymous here with closure, withdrawal and protectionism with respect to the outside. There are many examples, ranging from the establishment of restrictive legislation for access to property for non-native populations to the effects of the not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) syndrome, gated communities, or the erection of walls on borders.
- Territorial perfectionism: this supports a substantialist view of territory. The elements making up a territory are public entities that have permanent reality and impinge on all. The value of these elements derives from a single, primordial order (sacred, philosophical, naturalistic, security-based,

mobility based, etc.), they transcend quarrels of interest and all must comply. The appropriation means here the control of the space – and above all of its uses. Control comes true through a transcendent project which allows to legitimize a domination and bans exercised by a State apparatus or institutions, for instance as in a totalitarian State. Territorial perfectionism purposes to provide uniform responses based on this dominant order, whatever the diversity of the situations encountered.

The aim of this classification is not to review the many examples of these situations, but to propose frameworks to decipher the processes of territorial re-composition. This is variously facilitated or otherwise by the relationship with space that the players propounding the system of values entertain. The visibility of an implicit system of values is more often opaque than transparent, and this is all the more so because, as in any territorialisation process, there are discrepancies between the initial project and the final result.

Conclusion

The debate opened by the recent emergence of the notion of soft space to refer to spaces with variable geometry, purported to be better suited to the contemporary challenges of development action, puts a different perspective on already long-standing academic reflection and research centred on territory. The conceptual framework of soft spaces are considered as a way to solve the mismatch between administrative boundaries and the permanent shaping of economic and social forces in a territory. In this permanent process of de-and re-territorialization, the mismatch must be seen as a temporary stage. Political and social and economic temporalities do not match at the same pace. Although it is not antagonistic with the notions of hard and soft spaces, stating that territory is a social construct led us to underline the basic question of values. Beyond the fundamental aspects of the notion of territory, it also provides a valuable conceptual tool to interpret the reality and dynamics of a space. These assertions enabled us to move on from the debate on the efficiency of the implementation of development actions to the debates on the values that underpin any action for territorial planning and development. In deliberative democracy, it is more and more relevant to stress on what kind of systems of values are based public or private actions, especially in a context of growing audience of populist parties among the EU member states.

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THE IMPACT OF EUROPEANIZATION ON NATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEMS. A COMPARISON OF SPATIAL PLANNING PROCESSES IN ITALY AND ROMANIA³

1. Introduction

Broadly speaking, Europeanization refers to the processes of integrating EU policies and socio-economic dynamics into the domestic discourse and national policies, thus leading to systemic convergence in different sectors across the EU Member States (Demetropoulou, 2002). Hence, Europeanization comprises processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of different rules or procedures, which are transferred from the EU public policy to be integrated in the domestic discourse (Radaelli, 2003). However, this is not a one-way transfer, with EU Member States being both contributors and products of European integration (Papadimitriou, Phinnemore, 2004).

As far as national planning systems are concerned, the EU's influence has been significant in their evolution, in relation to other factors such as the internationalization of planning education and practice or the strengthening of lower levels of government (Servillo, Lingua, 2014). Nevertheless, some authors consider the notion of Europeanization of spatial planning to be exaggerated (Reimer *et al.*, 2014), especially considering the various legal and administrative, policy and governance-related, cultural and social aspects that determine the diversity of spatial planning systems in Europe (Stead, Cotella, 2011, Stead *et al.*, 2015). Hence, these observed differences between nations become the main reasons discussed when assessing the lack of convergence of European planning systems (Stead *et al.*, 2015).

Instead, one can consider that convergence is not the necessary result of such kind of development. In agreement with Knill and Lehmkuhl (1999), three processes of change can be described as Europeanization dynamics:

- Prescription: Domestic change by institutional requirements where an institutional model must be adopted.
- Strategic interaction: Domestic change by alteration of domestic opportunity structures (i.e. the distribution of power and resources between domestic actors) with no mandatory institutional model.
- Cognitive influence: domestic change by alteration of the beliefs and expectations influencing strategies and preferences which, in turn, lead to institutional change.

Within each spatial planning system (despite the current planning tradition), all of these three factors contribute in changing and adapting the actual operation and behaviour.

Moreover, focusing on the general structure of the European discourse – conceived as an “uploading and downloading process but also horizontal cross-fertilisation between European territories” – spatial planning appears to play a fundamental role (Elissalde *et al.*, 2014; Faludi, 2009; 2010; 2014;

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³ Although in the unity of purpose, paragraph 3.1, can be attributed to Radu-Matei Cochechi, paragraph 3.2 to Angela D'Orazio, while the remaining parts are result of shared work.



Farinós Dasí, 2006).

While the European Union does not have competences in the field of spatial planning, some strategic spatial concepts or European meta-narratives like the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) and the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (TAEU) have influenced national planning systems, despite their non-binding character (Reimer *et al.*, 2014). These changes, visible especially in south European spatial planning systems, are the result of domestic actors experiencing new ideas and practices leading to cultural innovation models (Giannakourou, 2005). Consequently, the planning discourse has been modelled, in the case of various Member States, according to the principles drawn out in the ESDP, but also through the INTERREG (Plurel, 2010) and ESPON⁴ initiatives (Dühr *et al.*, 2007), often determining the diffusion of new instruments and the shift from land-use planning to a spatial planning approach (Giannakourou, 2012).

The process of Europeanization also tends to be more and more related to funding conditions for lower-level public authorities, with strategies at regional and local level becoming a prerequisite for EU financing (Albrechts *et al.*, 2003). Europeanization can thus be regarded as a process of top-down and bottom-up European integration (Reimer *et al.*, 2014), or better as an iterative cycle of uploading and downloading influences that links the EU level territorial governance with domestic territorial governance and spatial planning system² (ESPON, 2013a).

In this context, two main mechanisms of Europeanization of national planning systems can be identified: a soft mechanism, characterized by networking, policy transfer and learning, and a hard mechanism, determined by the obligation to comply to EU regulations (Giannakourou, 2012). The latter mechanism thus comprises legally-binding tools such as the European Water Framework Directive and the Habitats Directive, exerting a direct influence on spatial development, albeit in a strictly sectoral-oriented logic (Reimer *et al.*, 2014). This mechanism is clearly showed by Evers and Tenneke for the Netherlands case (Evers, Tenneke, 2016).

As far as the soft mechanism is concerned, this is mostly based on the exchange of ideas, principles and concepts between the EU and national/regional institutions through transnational cooperation programmes (Dühr *et al.*, 2007; ESPON, 2013b).

The extent of the influence of the Europeanization process on different national planning systems is related to factors such as planning culture, national institutional settings related to planning or socio-economic settings (Giannakourou, 2012). Its effects, on the other hand, are visible especially in relation to the participation in territorial cooperation programs, a more strategic approach towards regional planning or the emergence of new governance paradigms (Cotella, Rivolin, 2011).

Taking into consideration the different facets of the Europeanization process discussed above, the aim of the article is to explore the impact of this process on the national planning systems in Italy and Romania, with methodological aspects described in the following chapter. The two planning systems share some common features, with comparative analyses between the two realized before, in relation to the inclusion of environmental aspects in the planning law and practice (Cocheci, 2016) or even to the impact of EU funds (Elisei, Pascariu, 2012). While Europeanization aspects have been studied separately both for Italy (Cotella, Rivolin, 2011) and Romania (Dobre, 2010; Munteanu, Servillo, 2014), we considered that a comparison of the impacts of Europeanization processes on the two national planning systems is useful in order to identify similar trends and possible legislative responses to the common challenges faced.

⁴ Reflective observations on ESPON power in building European approach to spatial planning can be founded in Transnational Networking Activities developed under ESPON 2013 programme (https://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/Menu_ESPON2013Projects/Menu_TransnationalNetworkingActivities/).

2. Methodology

The comparative analysis of the Italian and Romanian planning systems was realized on the basis of four criteria:

- (1) the general characteristics of the planning systems;
- (2) the evolution of the planning instruments in the last decades;
- (3) the integration of sectoral EU policies in the planning processes, determined by the *hard* Europeanization mechanism (Giannakourou, 2012);
- (4) the relation of the planning systems with EU planning concepts and discourse, including references to territorial cohesion aspects.

The analysis was based on an extensive literature review, but also on the provisions of the national and regional legislation. Current spatial planning practices in the two countries, emerging as trends in recent years, were also an important factor taken into consideration.

3. Results and discussions

3.1. Romania

As far as general characteristics are concerned, Romania's spatial planning system is based on a system of plans closely connected to the country's administrative structure, which consists of two main layers: the county level (NUTS 3) and the local level – LAU 2 (Benedek, 2013). Hence, the planning system is based on two main components, which are defined in the national law (Law no. 350/2001 on urban and territorial planning). Urban planning is realized at local level, has a normative land-use approach and is part of the urbanism tradition, having a strong architectural and urban design focus (CEC, 1997). There are three categories or urban plans: General Urban Plan (PUG – defining building regulations for the buildable area of an entire LAU 2 unit's territory), Zonal Urban Plan (PUZ – detailing building regulations for an area within a LAU 2 unit) and Detailed Urban Plan (PUD – defining the positioning of buildings within a single plot of land). While General Urban Plans can be initiated only by the local public authorities, Zonal and Detailed Urban Plans can also be initiated by private investors, who can thus override the regulations of the General Urban Plan (Cocheci, 2016).

On the other hand, territorial plans comprise multiple LAU 2 units, can only be initiated by public authorities and have a strategic and guiding character – their provisions are thus indicative and need to be taken only partly into account by lower level authorities (Benedek, 2013). Three types of territorial plans are defined in the Romanian law: the national territorial plan (PATN – structured in sections defining sectoral guidelines for areas such as transport infrastructure, settlement network or natural risk areas), the zonal territorial plan (PATZ – which can be realized at regional, cross-border, inter-county, inter-city or inter-communal level) and the county territorial plan (PATJ). While some authors consider that Romanian territorial planning is similar to the comprehensive integrated approach defined in the EU Compendium on Spatial Planning (Benedek, 2013), its close relation to the French *aménagement du territoire* (Cocheci, 2016) also suggests a possible framing within the regional economic planning approach.

The evolution of planning instruments in the last decades has been rather slow. While the planning legislation has been amended 17 times between 2001 and 2013 (Ionescu-Heroiu *et al.*, 2013), few structural changes have occurred, with the system of plans defined in 1991 (Law no. 51/1991 on the permitting of building works and Ministerial Order 91/1991) remaining almost the same until present day. The few changes in the system of plans defined by the national planning law saw an emergence of more strategic instruments defined at supra-local level: Romania's Territorial Development Strategy (adopted by the Government in 2016) and metropolitan/peri-urban development strategies (see tab. 1).

The Europeanization of spatial planning systems in Romania started with changes in the institutional and legal framework meant to transfer planning and implementation competencies to regional and local actors (Demetropoulou, 2002). This period, between 1997 and 2000, established the EU funds-related regional policy in Romania and defined the country's eight development regions, which have no legal-administrative status or policy-making powers (Munteanu, Servillo, 2014). While the Law no. 151/1998 established the institutions at regional and national level responsible for the regional development policy, the beginning of the years 2000s saw difficulties in implementation related mainly to the lack of cooperation between counties (Papadimitriou, Phinnemore, 2004). Since the new regional development law was approved in 2004 (Law no. 315/2004), the regions could draft Regional Development Plans. While they can be considered planning instruments, these regional plans are not correlated and often ignore the provisions of other planning instruments defined by the national planning law (Benedek, 2013).

Territorial units	Administrative structure	Plans
National level	State	PATN sections (6)
Macro-regional	-	-
Regional level	<i>Regions (8) – not administrative</i>	PATZR PATZJJ
Sub-regional level	Counties (41 + Bucharest)	PATJ
Inter-municipal	<i>Metropolitan areas</i> <i>Inter-community development areas</i> <i>Local Action Groups (not administrative)</i>	Metropolitan or peri-urban strategies PATZIC PATZIO
Local level	Towns (320 + 6 Bucharest sectors) Communes (2,859)	PUG PUZ PUD

Table 1. *Romania's system of plans* (adaptation after Cocheci, 2016).

Consequently, we can consider that the Europeanization of the Romanian planning system has occurred, at least as far as planning instruments are concerned, mostly outside the national planning law. As a result, one of the main issues with Romania's planning system today is its lack of connection with the regional development policy, which has rendered many of its territorial plans obsolete. On the contrary, the Romania's accession to the European Union has seen an emergence of new documents imposed by the national law as a pre-requisite for obtaining EU funding. Examples in this regard are the Integrated Urban Development Plans in the 2007-2013 period (tackling also metropolitan strategic planning in the case of seven Growth Pole cities established by Government Decision) and the new Integrated Urban Development Strategies required by the 40 county capital cities in Romania to access urban development EU-funds. These new documents often lack integration with existing territorial or urban plans, and are often drafted just to justify EU financing for a list of projects (Elisei, Pascariu, 2012).

All in all, the Europeanization of Romania's planning instruments can be related to the emergence of strategic planning approaches at local, county and regional level. Nevertheless, the main issue is that planning becomes more and more related strictly to EU funds absorption (Florescu, Mitrea, 2015) and is done outside the framework defined by the current planning legislation. While, these new, EU-triggered strategic approaches have encouraged inter-community cooperation (with the creation of structures such as Local Action Groups or metropolitan areas), these new plans and governance ar-

rangements have often remained purely formal and declarative (Munteanu, Servillo, 2014).

The integration of sectoral EU policies in the planning processes has also been developed mostly outside the national planning legislation. In 2002, the environmental impact assessment (EIA) and strategic environmental assessment (SEA) were included in the environmental legislation corpus, without a proper integration with the 2001 spatial planning law (Munteanu, Servillo, 2014). The process was similar in the case of other EU directives, like the Water Framework Directive (which triggered the drafting of River Basin Management Plans), the Habitats Directive or the Recommendation on Integrated Coastal Zone Management (Munteanu, Servillo, 2014). While these sectoral EU policies have had significant spatial impacts, like the creation of Natura 2000 protected areas – 13 % of Romania's country covered by Sites of Community Importance (Ioja *et al.*, 2010) – and the demarcation of flood-prone areas, their integration in urban and territorial planning documents remains strictly related to bureaucratic approval procedures by different institutional bodies.

In Romania's case, the relation of the planning systems with EU planning concepts and discourse is foremost a rhetoric one. Certain provisions and guidelines from European or international documents have been included in the national law – for example, the objectives of territorial planning and its characteristics (global, functional, prospective, democratic) defined by the Torremolinos charter in 1983 (CEMAT, 1983). References to the territorial cohesion concept also appear in the national planning law, with urban and territorial planning considered to be a tool for ensuring territorial cohesion at regional, national and European level. Other principles closely related to the EU discourse, like transparency, public participation in decision-making, partnerships or sustainable development, are also linked with urban and territorial planning activities in the national legislation.

Nevertheless, most of these principles are, in most cases, just formally included in the law. Most of Romania's cities do not have their General Urban Plans published on their websites, public participation in the elaboration of spatial planning documents remains, in most cases, purely formal, while the structuring of partnerships for the complex urban interventions is very difficult because of a flawed law on public-private partnerships. The lack of a culture of cooperation within Romanian institutions greatly limits the positive effects that Europeanization processes could have on the national planning system. For example, drafting a General or Zonal Urban Plan using a multi-stakeholder participatory approach in key design phases would certainly be more efficient and would result in greater quality spatial planning documents than the current bureaucratic and time-consuming approval procedures.

All in all, Europeanization processes have had an impact on the Romanian planning systems as far as new strategic planning approaches and new governance arrangements (especially inter-community associations) are concerned. Nevertheless, the planning legislation remains obsolete due to its lack of correlation with the regional development policy and environmental law, with the national Ministry for Regional Development currently leading the process of drafting a Code of Spatial Planning and Building that would, hopefully, solve some of these legislative issues.

3.2. Italy

The country has a long and stable history of autonomous bodies. The local governments are three tiered, comprising Regions (15 regular regions and 5 special regions), Provinces and municipalities. Statutes, powers and functions of these autonomous bodies are regulated by the Republic's Constitution. The relationships among various local bodies were revised by the Constitutional amendment of the Constitution's Title V (2001), as a result of which the Metropolitan Area (*Città metropolitana*) was added as a new form of administrative division.

The new political organisation affirms that State and Regions share legislative responsibility on many themes: one of this is 'government of territory'. On the other hand, the legislative power for environmental protection, ecosystems and cultural heritage belongs exclusively to the State.

In this framework, the spatial planning system is connected to the country's administrative struc-

ture, which consists of three main layers: the regional level (NUTS2), the province level (NUTS 3) and the local level – LAU 2. From the 1990s to present, in Italy, the 20 Regions have developed different Regional Laws on the topic ‘government of territory’, always formally following the old (but still in force) National Law (1150/1942) on Town and Country planning: a hierarchically-conceived law that belongs to the urbanism tradition (CEC, 1997). As far as land use control for individuals is concerned, in reality only the decisions of the Municipality master plans are mandatory.

Despite the fact that formal planning tools differ (often very much) according to different regional laws, municipal plans were broken down into two acts – a “structural” one (guidance function) and an “operational” one (building sector regulations) to be renewed periodically. Such development lines were added to public works’ programmes or private initiative projects negotiated with municipalities, which highlight the difficulty in maintaining a rigid and slowly updated schedule. Furthermore, the strong tradition in statutory planning gives a pivotal role to the formal tools in the discussions on regional and sub-regional development. A thorough reform of the national regulatory framework is clearly required, but it is not mature yet. Several proposals have been elaborated (the latest by the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport, regarding “more general planning principles and patterns” in 2014) and have raised broad consensus, but none of them have finished the legislative path. However, it is possible to sketch an evolution of the planning instruments in the last decades.

Each Region is comprised of Provinces and Municipalities. From the years 1972 to 1990, Regions were the main authority on land-use planning. In the 1970s two decrees decentralized the power for planning. At that time, several land-use and natural resource preservation responsibilities were transferred to regions. Regions assumed the responsibility for sector plans (e.g. transportation, solid waste, surface mining) and had the authority to designate the boundaries for regional parks and special conservation areas. This responsibility shifted in 1990 as a result of Act 142, when Provinces were given the power to design plans. In the light of this law, Provinces must prepare Territorial Provincial Plans and, in cooperation with the regions, approve urban plans for Municipalities. Some Regions have also proposed the delegation of urban plan approval to Provinces. Consequently, Italy’s basic framework for statutory urban plans subsequent to the decentralization of authority in 1990 (according to the New Local Autonomy Law) is as follows (in the order of descending priority; see tab. 2):

1. regional territorial plans (*Piano Territoriale Regionale*) – a territorial plan (PTR) is devised by each of the 20 regional governments as the upper-most plan. A territorial plan covers regulations on particular land uses, the development of large land areas, as well as the planning of infrastructure such as road and railway networks. The draft of a regional territorial plan is prepared with the participation of provinces, municipalities, private entities, and other stakeholders and is finalized by obtaining the approval of the regional assembly;
2. provincial territorial coordination plans (*Piano Territoriale di Coordinamento Provinciale*) and metropolitan area plans (PRGI);
3. municipal master plans (PRG);
4. detailed plans (PP).

Aside from this framework for statutory urban plans, regional territorial landscape plans (*Piano Territoriale Paesaggistico Regionale*) pursuant to the Galasso Act⁵ are also important local development tools. Each regional government is required to design a landscape plan, which is widely incorporated into the regional territorial plan (PTR) subject to review in accordance with the environmental protection provisions.

In these last few years, a reform process started: Law No. 56 of 7 April 2014 (the so-called “Delrio Law”) re-defines local administrations’ boundaries and responsibilities without amending Title V of Italy’s Constitution. The implicit aim of the legislator was to build with this law a first step towards a

⁵ Legge Galasso: Emergency Legislation for Protection of Areas with High Environmental Value, legislated in 1985, the Act was amended in 2004.

new Constitutional arrangement (this needs a new constitutional reform: this reform has been proposed by constitutional referendum in the autumn 2017, but was rejected), by outlining, for the first time in Italy, two levels of government based on a "two-tier democratic system". On the one hand, the Law entrusts metropolitan cities with the strategic task of promoting the development of their own areas (also from the point of view of infrastructure and international relations) in a future-oriented logic and grounded upon dynamic relationship-based conditions. On the other hand, the Law attributes few basic functions to Provinces, thus letting their own identities largely depend on the choices that will be taken at regional level.

«In providing for the birth of metropolitan cities and, more generally, for the evolution of Provinces, the Delrio Reform assigns an important role to municipalities and associations thereof to address and manage much bigger problems and territories than those delimited by current administrative boundaries. As a matter of fact, the Reform introduces specific provisions on union and merging of municipalities. In defining the vertical stability pact, Regions can identify suitable measures to encourage partnerships and mergers of municipalities, without prejudice to the public finance objective ascribed to Regions» (Italy's Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 2016, p. 37).

The general process of change in the rationale of the Italian planning system is influenced by the following drivers:

- the market's push towards the use of occasional plans for limited areas, with many partial amendments to general plans;
- specific policies leading to the amendment of municipal plans and resorting to public-private partnerships;
- regional legislation introducing a governance system to reconnect land governance with strategic lines of protection and sustainable development;
- the need of alignment of Regions in the use of EU funds.

The promotion of the spatial and regional development policies in Italy has been focused on the economic aspect of redressing the disparities between southern and northern Italy ever since the unification of Italy in 1861. Beginning with the first long-term economic plan for the 1965-70 period, the development of the economically inferior southern Italy has been incorporated into the plan as a national economic policy.

Italy does not have higher level spatial plans that supersede regional plans, such as national spatial plan. Plans of a national scale are now devoted to specific sectors, in particular to infrastructure investment (highway, railroad, and energy). These planning activities are more influenced by EU guidelines and policy frameworks, as well as by specific Directives on sectors, which comprise the *hard Europeanization* mechanism. However, at political level, as well as in citizen awareness, the degree of such integration of sectoral EU planning processes in national activities is not recognized.

On the other hand, in response to the regional policies of the EU, Italy has been implementing a national fund allocation program since the 1990s based on plans, transcending national territory and the Structural Funds. Italy's central government is fulfilling its role as a coordinator of both EU policies and the country's regional policies. Regions also participate in the formulation of the national operational plan necessary for the use of the EU Structural Funds. The operational plan is devised concurrently with the regional spatial plan, in alignment with the latter.

Each Region must prepare an 'Integrated Planning Document' to set up the strategic development for the whole territory. This document is coupled with a financial program which is mandatory in order to access the EU and National resources.

The feedback effect of European policies on Italian dynamics is generally recognized: concerning infrastructure investments, as well as the State/Regions relationships, but also in each region regarding its territorial policies. The strong mutual relation (and cross-fertilization) with EU planning concepts and discourse, including references to territorial cohesion aspects is witnessed, beyond the rhetoric, by the formal documents produced in the field of regional development and planning (D'Orazio, 2012; 2014, ESPON, 2014).

The actual driving force supporting the planning system is now related to the Cohesion concept (Prezioso, D'Orazio, 2014): the national body responsible for negotiating the allocation of resources

(both European and national) is named Cohesion Agency and is the decision-making place for assigning the funds at Regional and Metropolitan level for implementing (but also elaborating) planning decisions.

Territorial planning broadly happens in consequence of an economic planning policy managed by the Region by means of a set of specific strategic projects selected in the framework of a rationale, declared as both national and European. Instead of long-term regional guidelines (often too abstract), the actual regional activities rely on fund allocation rationale: resource concentration on few interventions with an envisaged strong socio-economic impact. These regional strategic projects should allow the mobilisation of mostly private resources (mainly in the road and energy sectors), in an integrated and multiregional perspective. The planning activity ends up identifying the already-defined interventions and choosing the best ones in order to reduce timing and facilitate administrative procedures across different levels of government and control.

It is the same logic that now orients the 21 *Patti per lo sviluppo* (Pacts for the development) signed by National Cohesion Agency with both the Southern regions (the 10 less developed regions) and with most of Metropolitan Cities⁶ (11 in October 2017).

The territorial plan/regional framework must be connected to the system of objectives declared at European level and included in the National Agreement⁷, by means of a negotiation developed between Regions and the National political authority (Cohesion Agency).

The requirement of ESIF planning, to which national systems have to be aligned, is the main driver in deeply modifying the nature of traditional territorial planning instruments.

The same mechanism is acting now for urban planning, where the process of designing plans for urban development includes the adoption of Urban Agendas. These Urban Agendas are required for accessing funds, but they also contribute to the more concrete design of sectoral urban policies (mobility, energy, social needs).

Unfortunately, in response to this genetic modification which is the product of a Europeanization dynamic – a more strategic approach with no clear normative support –, no reform of the traditional planning system has succeeded: the main effect is the lack of a long term territorial perspective, both at national and regional level.

Territorial units	Administrative structure	Plans
National level	State	-
Macro-regional	-	<i>Piattaforme Territoriali</i>
Regional level	Regions (20)	<i>PTCR Regional Territorial Coordination Plan</i> <i>PPR Regional Landscape Plan</i>
Sub-regional level	Provinces (110) and Metropolitan Cities	<i>PTCP Provincial Territorial Coordination Plan and Metropolitan Territorial Plan</i>
Inter-municipal	Metropolitan Cities <i>Unioni di Comuni</i> (voluntary association)	<i>PRGI Inter municipal master plan</i>
Local level	Communes (8,094)	<i>PRG Municipal master plan</i>

Table 2. *Italy's system of plans* (modified after Cocheci, 2016).

⁶ http://www.agenziacoesione.gov.it/it/politiche_e_attivita/programmazione_2014-2020/patti_per_lo_sviluppo/index.html: National Cohesion Agency website.

⁷ Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo (2014), Accordo di partenariato 2014-2020 per l'impiego dei fondi strutturali e di investimento europei, available at: <http://www.dps.gov.it/it/AccordoPartenariato>.

Conclusion

The results of the analysis highlight that both planning systems, closely-related to the “urbanism” planning system tradition at local level, have undergone a transition towards more strategic instruments, often developed independently from the planning legislation. However, both national planning systems are in need of reform, with the Italian planning system still governed by the national law from 1942 and the Romanian planning instruments becoming obsolete due to the proliferation of less-regulated strategic plans required for the accession of EU funds. The on-going debates around large urban development and metropolitan areas, in both countries, illustrate the difficulty of adapting certain European models to the local and regional planning cultures. The Europeanization of the Romanian planning system seems to have remained at an absorption level, with the main elements of EU discourse being formally included in the national legislation, but few changes realized within the planning instruments themselves. On the other hand, Italy has witnessed a wide development of innovative planning instruments at the beginning of the 2000s, which has not been repeated ever since, but also, more recently, renewed attention on development issues in regional planning in relation with EU programming periods requirements. With both countries currently planning major legislative proposal of changes in the field of spatial planning, it remains to be seen to what extent will Europeanization processes affect future planning provisions.

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THE LONG ARM OF THE EU? EVIDENCE OF EUROPEANIZATION OF SPATIAL PLANNING IN ALBANIA AND SWITZERLAND

1. Introduction

The concept of Europeanization has progressively entered spatial planning studies as a consistent approach for interpreting the complexity of outcomes resulting from almost thirty years of European spatial planning experiences (Faludi, 2010; Dühr *et al.*, 2010). Interestingly, this has occurred despite the lack of a formal mandate for spatial planning and territorial policies in the EU legislation. The roots of this phenomenon date back to the inclusion of the 'cohesion' objective in the EU Treaties in late 1980s – as the agreed condition for a balanced integration in terms of "levels of development of the various regions" (former Treaty Establishing the European Community, Art. 158) – that implied a factual engagement of the EU in territorial policies and allowed for the progressive consolidation of a EU territorial governance framework (Cotella, Janin Rivolin, 2015).

Whereas various authors have studied the Europeanization of spatial planning in EU member states (among others: Janin Rivolin, 2003; Giannakourou, 2005; Waterhout, 2007; Stead, Cotella, 2011; Maier, 2012), no significant contribution has yet explored the potential impact that the EU may exert over the SPSs of those countries which, despite not being part of the EU, are subject to the influence of the latter in one way or another – e.g. due to their participation in the EU pre-accession or neighbouring policy, or even to their voluntary participation in selected EU territorial initiatives.

In order to shed some light on the matter, the authors analyse the impact of Europeanization mechanisms on the SPSs of two countries that are in a very different relation with the EU. On the one hand, AL gained EU candidate status in 2014 and is currently undergoing accession negotiations. On the other hand, CH, despite having signed various bilateral agreements with the EU and voluntarily participating in a number of EU territorial actions, has never applied for EU membership. The contribution is structured into three sections. Following this brief introduction, section two presents the conceptual framework upon which the analysis has been built, sketching out the three channels of influence through which the Europeanization of spatial planning is explored. Sections three and four present the results of the analysis for AL and CH respectively. Section five rounds off the contribution, comparing the findings and discussing them in the light of the broader academic debate.

2. The Europeanization of spatial planning: theoretical and methodological approach

The study conceives Europeanization as an iterative cycle of uploading and downloading influences that links the EU-level territorial governance with the SPSs of the constituent countries (Cotella, Janin Rivolin, 2015). In this light, figure 1 symbolizes the mutual influences occurring between one supranational EU cycle and various national domestic cycles driven by (i) the SPSs of the various domestic domains (the small circle in the figure) and (ii) the EU-level territorial governance taking a similar form and "including" the domestic systems (the large circle in the figure).

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


Figure 1. Relations between domestic and EU systems. Source: adapted from Cotella, Janin Rivolin, 2015.

Through an exploration of the relations linking the two realms, it is possible to analytically separate a number of channels of influences that links the EU and the Member states in the field of spatial planning. More in detail, the diagram allows for the identification of a typology of EU influences that includes (i) three types of top-down influence on domestic SPS respectively pivoted around EU legislation, policies and guidance documents and (ii) two types of bottom-up influence through which the European countries potentially influence EU policy-making.

Type of influence	Direction	Drivers of change	Mechanisms of change
Structural	Top-down	Rules	Legal conditionality
Instrumental		Resources	Economic conditionality
Dialogic top-down		Expert knowledge	Cognitive conditionality
Dialogic bottom-up	Bottom up	Expert knowledge	Cognitive conditionality
Practical		Interactive knowledge	Social learning

Table 1. Typology of influences in EU territorial governance. Source: adapted from Cotella, Janin Rivolin, 2015.

As the countries under scrutiny do not take part in the EU policy cycle, it is reasonable to assume that their influence on the development of EU territorial governance is rather limited. Due to this reason, the analysis focuses only on the top-down impacts that the EU has exerted on AL and CH SPSs. In this light, the following sections will analyse the impact of:

- *Structural influence*, i.e. the indirect impacts that the EU exerts through the development of sectoral legislation in various fields that have implications for spatial planning, such as the environment, energy, transport and competition.
- *Instrumental influence*, i.e. the introduction of recursive incentives for regional policy, systematic territorial cooperation, sustainable urban development etc., that modify the cost-benefit logics of domestic actors and enhance variations in established spatial planning practices.

- *Discursive influence*, i.e. the result of discursive integration processes through which the concepts and ideas included in the EU guidance documents alter beliefs and expectations of domestic actors.

More in detail, the impact of each channel of influence on the SPSs of AL and CH has been assessed both in terms of the significance of the impact – 0 = not significant; 1= scarcely significant; 2 = rather significant; 3 = highly significant – as well as the trend of such intensity – ↓ = decreasing; ↑ = increasing; ↔ = constant, ↑ = swinging. This preliminary synthetic assessment is substantiated through evidence collected through desk research and interviews.

3. Evidence from Albania

3.1. The traditional approach to spatial planning in Albania and changes since 1990

Despite the relatively short period running between 1990 and 2016, AL² already faced important reforms that completely modified its SPSs from the traditional “urbanistica” approach to a more comprehensive approach to “territorial planning and development”. For long time spatial planning in AL has been characterized by a highly hierarchized system where national interests took precedence over local priorities. Despite the fall of the Soviet bloc the introduction of new laws (above all in 1993 and 1998) the logic of urban planning, perceived as a technical and regulative process though which to address urban and territorial development, dominated the spatial planning experience until 2009, when a more radical reform took place, followed by the present law on spatial planning and development passed in 2014. Thanks to the last reforms, the scope of planning has shifted from urban planning to an inclusive territorial planning where sectoral policies and planning levels are mutually interconnected. However, in spite of several crucial changes involving different aspects of planning, like procedures, instruments, competences and responsibilities at the central and local level (excluding from any important responsibility the meso level – Qarku), plan contents, objects and principles, the procedure of allocation of the development rights have remained almost unaltered.

3.2. The impact of the EU on the Albanian territorial governance and spatial planning system

Since the Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into force in 2009, the Albanian EU integration path has been faster than ever. As a matter of fact, AL reached the status of Candidate Country in June 2014 showing a progressive integration attitude in transposing EU directives. One year before, precisely in June 2013, the policy paper for the territorial planning and development AL, launched by the Ministry of Urban Planning and Tourism, was adopted. This document explicitly recognises the need for a ‘Europeanization’ of spatial planning as one of the main challenges for the country, and defines it as an increasing process that will influence the Albanian planning system, both in terms of policies and practices. More in detail, the document states the intention to align the SPS to the ESDP, to the EU sectorial directives, and to the Europe 2020 Strategy. This evidence confirms the domestic SPS general intention to move towards a EU inspired planning system, despite the absence of any formal obligation in this concern.

3.2.1. Structural influence: the impact of EU sectoral legislation

Despite the fact that AL is currently only a Candidate Country, the process of EU Directives transposition has already deeply affected its legislative framework. Numerous laws are transposed in several policy sectors interconnected to territorial governance and spatial planning. As illustrated in table 2, the major influences derive from the environmental and transport legislation and from the pre-accession negotiation, while there is less impact from competition and energy. The influence intensity is different in respect of the levels while the trend is generally increasing.

² AL is a republic that has three administrative level with different degree of responsibility in the field of spatial planning: the national level, the meso level represented by Qarku and the local level. However, the meso level has less competences than national and local level.

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU competition legislation	1	↑	0	↔	1	↑
EU energy legislation	1	↑	0	↔	1	↑
EU environmental legislation	3	↑	0	↔	2	↑
EU transport legislation	2	↑	0	↔	1	↑
Pre-accession negotiation	2	↑	0	↔	1	↑

Table 2. Evaluation of the EU sectoral Legislation impact on SPS in AL. Source: authors' elaboration.

More in detail, the EU impacted by updating the existing legislative framework and/or introducing new laws, above all transposing the EU Environmental legislation. Hence innovation has been introduced by the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment (2011/92/EU), the Directive on Strategic Environmental Assessment (Directive 2001/42/EC), the Directive on Habitat (92/43/EEC), the Water Framework Directive (2008/105/EC). Secondly, the EU directive implementation produced a significant institutional restructuring promoting new institutions like NAPA-National Agency for Protected Area, NEA-National Environmental Agency and several departments. Moreover, the directives' transposition induced changes promoting new strategic and action plan instruments like the NES-National Energy Strategy, Marine Environmental Strategy, National Environmental Strategy, National Transport Plan and the Sectoral Transport Strategy. Even more important, changes have involved the planning procedure introducing the EIA-Environmental Impact Assessment, the SEA-Strategic Environmental Assessment and potentially the certification of building energy conformity (still to be adopted). Last but not least, the transposition of the EU directives and their implementation are responsible for introducing new concepts and paradigms in the AL SPS.

3.2.2. Instrumental Influence: the impact of EU policy

As a candidate state, in AL the influence of the EU policies has impacted less. As illustrated in table 3, in the case of both EU cohesion policy and EU urban policy no impact has been registered while little influence has been listed for European territorial cooperation. Similarly, rural development policy seems to have a moderate impact while, on the contrary, pre-accession and neighbourhood policy seems to have a significant impact. As can be observed, the impacts are different in each planning level while the trend is increasing.

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU cohesion policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
European territorial cooperation	1	↑	0	↔	1	↑
EU urban policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
EU rural development policy	2	↑	0	↔	1	↑
Pre-accession and neighbourhood policy	3	↑	0	↔	1	↑

Table 3. Evaluation of the EU policy impact on SPS in AL. Source: authors' elaboration.

Overall, some aspects shall be underlined in order to highlight the main changes in AL due to the EU impact. First of all, the introduction of the programming period has obliged AL to align its programming period to the EU. Secondly, the introduction of the strategic approach was the basis for the launching of several strategic plans and programs. The promotion of the integration approach has contributed to transform the sectoral perspective to a more adequate cross sectoral one. More in de-

tail, regarding the EU pre-accession and neighbouring policy – at the national level several strategic programs have been launched in different fields aiming at applying the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). In fact, the CBC-Cross Border Cooperation segment of the IPA fund is playing an important role in sharing competences and projects across neighbouring countries. In this respect, several initiatives have been undertaken to harmonize national (strategic) and local planning instruments. While, referring to the EU rural development policy, AL is part to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) through IPA rural development funds. As a consequence of CAP's provisions and indications, several strategic plans were launched (among other, Rural Development Program 2014-2020 funded by IPA, Inter-Sectoral Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development 2014-2020).

3.2.3. Dialogic Influence: the impact of the EU Discourse

As mentioned above, the registered shifting from urban planning and urbanism logics to a territorial planning and development approach is not just a legislative aspect, but is fully related to the conceptual metamorphosis from urban planning to a spatial planning approach.

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU development strategies ³	2	↑	0	↔	1	↑
EU spatial policy documents ⁴	2	↑	0	↔	1	↑
EU urban agenda ⁵	1	↑	0	↔	1	↑
ESPON Programme ⁶	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 4. Evaluation of the EU discourse impact on SPS in AL. Source: authors' elaboration.

In this regard, the EU discourse, in particular, and of the international discourses, in general, played a crucial role on influencing the national spatial planning discourse. As shown in table 4, except the ESPON programme that does not produce substantial effects (Albania neither took part to the programme, nor was targeted by its studies), some relevant influence was exerted through a number of EU development strategies and spatial policy documents as well as through the EU urban agenda.

Indeed, analysing the large number of national strategies, documents, policy guidelines, recommendations, plans and etc., it seems that the ESDP guidelines (above all) have had a conspicuous impact on the spatial planning AL discourse, however not often translating into practice. Concepts as polycentric development, subsidiarity, rural development, integrated transport system, conservation of natural and cultural heritage, etc., have become hegemonic concepts within the domestic discourse (Cotella, Berisha, 2016a, b). Other topics such as decentralization and self-government coming from EU directives and general recommendation are fully addressed in the planning debate. However, as had happened in other contexts, the incorporation of these notions in different planning documents has been often misinterpreted and not well contextualized for different local reasons like political will, lack of expertise at the local level, and lack of academic debate (Cotella *et al.*, 2012; Adams *et al.*, 2013). Most importantly, in fact, the domestic territorial knowledge community until now appeared unpre-

³ The EU development strategies includes the Lisbon and Gothenburg Strategies and the EU2020 Strategy.

⁴ The EU spatial policy documents include the ESDP, the EU Territorial Agenda, the EU Territorial Agenda 2020, the EC Green paper on territorial cohesion.

⁵ The EU urban agenda and related documents includes the Green paper on the urban environment, the Leipzig Charter on sustainable cities, and all the documents developed within the European Commission Urban Development Group.

⁶ The ESPON programme include applied research projects, targeted analyses, the development of visual representations of the European territory in forms of maps and scenarios, the development of the ESPON database.

pared to receive and literally translate EU notions in the local language and/or often the translation is incorrect and in certain cases the using of foreign terminology generated misunderstandings.

4. Evidence from Switzerland

4.1. The traditional approach to spatial planning in Switzerland and changes since 1990

In CH⁷, spatial planning methods and issues have changed considerably in recent years and the planning process is moving towards more flexibility and a strategic management of the territory, integrating the concept of sustainability, supporting private-public partnerships and negotiation-oriented planning (Gerber, 2016). The country's use of direct democracy to face land use challenges is particularly relevant in this regard, as can be seen in the 2013 referendum. On 3 March 2013, the Swiss population was called to vote on whether to limit building land, tightening the Federal Law on land use. This referendum led to the 2014 partial revision of the 1979 Federal Law on Spatial Planning, which, together with the 1999 Federal Constitution, is the legal structure of the territorial development of the country. The Federal Government has proposed a second phase of the 2014 partial revision of the Federal Law of Spatial Planning, and is drawing up a project together with the cantons and municipalities, gradually involving other interested groups⁸.

4.2. The impact of the EU on the Swiss territorial governance and spatial planning system

Because CH is not an EU member, the influence of EU policies is stronger than that of EU directives and sectoral legislation. This can be seen in the increasing adoption and implementation of new cycles of European policies, such as the current Interreg and URBACT projects. Nevertheless, the Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE) points out that it is vital for a small country like CH, whose cantons and infrastructure are closely bound up with those of its European neighbours, to maintain a close dialogue with partners outside its borders. With this in mind, ARE, on its website, declares its intention to pursue the following goals: «we want to contribute actively to European spatial planning; we are seeking to integrate our urban system into that of the rest of Europe; and we are striving for the closest possible cooperation among Europe's rural and Alpine regions»⁹. In any case, compared to the past, an increasing involvement in EU activities and projects can be detected.

4.2.1. Structural Influence: the impact of EU sectoral legislation

As noted above, CH is not a member of the EU and so there is no legal conditionality pushing for the transposition of EU sectoral legislation on the country's SPS. There is, however, a certain amount of indirect influence and there are shared initiatives, such as the bilateral agreements and the EU projects in which CH participates. In fact, as we can see from table 5, there has been an increase of attention in: energy legislation (e.g. open new opportunities in the market of renewable energy throughout Europe; Swiss goals largely correspond to the EU's targets); environmental legislation (e.g. the creation of the Emerald Network in November 2016); transport legislation (e.g. the Gotthard tunnel opened in December 2016; the national policy takes into major consideration the key European transport corridors).

CH has been negotiating with the EU on a bilateral agreement in the electricity sector since 2007, also to better regulate cross-border electricity trading. As can be observed in the Swiss Energy Strat-

⁷ CH is a federal republic and has three main levels of government, each involved in planning: the national or confederation level, the cantonal and the local level. The Cantons especially have considerable autonomy.

⁸ The consultation phase has ended on 15 May 2015 and towards the middle of 2017 the Federal Council will take a decision on implementation.

⁹ www.are.admin.ch.

gy 2050 on renewable energies, the country is pursuing its own goals which mainly correspond to EU's targets. Moreover, since 18 November 2016, CH, together with Belarus and Ukraine, has officially adopted the Emerald Network, the equivalent of Natura 2000 in non EU countries. As regards the impact of EU transport legislation, the national transport policy and planning takes into major consideration key European transport corridors, such as the Rhine-Alpine Corridor.

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU competition legislation	1	↔	0	↔	1	↔
EU energy legislation	2	↑	1	↑	1	↑
EU environmental legislation	2	↑	1	↑	1	↑
EU transport legislation	2	↑	1	↑	1	↑
Pre-accession negotiation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 5. Evaluation of the EU sectoral Legislation impact on SPS in CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

4.2.2. Instrumental Influence: the impact of EU policy

The implementation and influence of European policies, through projects such as Interreg and URBACT, has led to increased trans-national cooperation and encouraged dialogue, especially in the Swiss cross-border regions and municipalities. Indeed, the Interreg incentive programme and its projects are important for CH and constitute a significant part of the Swiss regional policy. As regards URBACT, all Swiss cities can participate as partners in the network, developing international contacts, exchanging experiences and disseminating knowledge with other cities facing similar challenges to theirs. The influence of EU policies can also be seen in the creation of the New Regional Policy (NRP) which promotes European territorial cooperation, as well as innovation, value creation and competitiveness in a sustainable way. In general, current Swiss regional policy can be considered to be increasingly designed to establish competitive, supraregional, supracantonal and international value creation systems (see tab. 6).

Although CH is not a member of the EU and therefore outside direct implementation of EU Cohesion Policy, it nevertheless makes an independent contribution to EU Cohesion Policy (Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA, December 2016).

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU cohesion policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
European territorial cooperation	2	↑	2	↑	1	↔
EU urban policy	2	↑	1	↔	2	↑
EU rural development policy ¹⁰	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Pre-accession and neighbourhood policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 6. Evaluation of the EU policy impact on SPS in CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

For example, with the enlargement contribution (Memorandum of Understanding with the Euro-

¹⁰ Because of its traditional strong respect for local identities and procedures, Swiss rural development policy follows national legislation rather than EU directives, and is highly localised at both the cantonal and communal level.

pean Community of 27 February 2006), CH participates in the reduction of economic and social disparities within the enlarged European Union (implemented with the ten bilateral framework agreements signed in Bern on 20th December 2007). CH is currently participating in Interreg V (A-B-C) for the programming year 2014-2020 (e.g. Alpine Space). Indeed, the Interreg projects have increasingly strengthened cooperation and encouraged dialogue in the Swiss cross border regions and municipalities¹¹. As regards the impact of EU urban policy, URBACT III (2014-2020) includes the EU countries as well as CH and Norway. The cities of Zurich, Basel and Lugano have been participating in URBACT projects, improving and strengthening the partnership and cooperation with neighbouring municipalities. Moreover, on a macroeconomic scale, Swiss agricultural policy has followed a historical path similar to that of the EU Common Agricultural Policy.

4.2.3. Dialogic Influence: the impact of EU Discourse

EU policy documents, strategies and initiatives, such as the ESDP, have brought, to a certain extent, changes within the Swiss planning discourse (see tab. 7). For example, CH shares the same aims as the ESDP, such as 'a polycentric urban development and a new relationship between urban and rural areas, 'equal access for all European regions to infrastructure and know-how', and 'prudent management of the natural and cultural heritage' (OECD, 2002, p. 91).

	National level		Sub-national level		Local level	
	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend	Intensity	Trend
EU development strategies	1	↔	0	↔	0	↔
EU spatial policy documents	1	↓	0	↔	0	↔
EU urban agenda	1	↑	0	↔	1	↑
ESPON Programme	1	↑	0	↔	0	↔

Table 7. Evaluation of the EU discourse impact on SPS in CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

According to the OECD (2002, p. 91), even though CH is not an EU member and is not included in the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), the country commented on the first draft during the process of preparation. Yet, CH has been witnessing a «fading level of interest in the application of ESDP ideas» (ESPON, 2006, p. 106). Since 2002, CH has also been participating in ESPON programmes. ARE, on its website, declares that the participation in the ESPON programme has also helped CH establish a number of valuable relationships and build up its own international network of long-term international partners. Moreover, since the late 1990s, integrated approaches to urban development have become increasingly important in CH.

5. Discussion: The long arm of the EU?

As argued by several authors, the Europeanization of a planning system can be observed from different perspectives (Cotella, Janin Rivolin, 2015). Researchers like Janin Rivolin and Faludi (2005) link this influence to the consolidation of an EU multi-level governance framework, while others emphasize the process of institutional transformation of the domestic context (Giannakourou, 2005; Maier, 2012) or suggest focusing attention on discursive integration processes that lead to co-generation and more or less structured exchange of knowledge (Böhme, 2002; Adams *et al.*, 2011; Cotella *et al.*, 2012). The richness and variety of interpretations are, however, complementary to each other. Be this as it

¹¹ A new transnational instrument also addresses EU macro-regional strategy for the Alpine Region (EU-SALP), involving Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Slovenia and Switzerland.

may, scarce attention has been dedicated until now to the potential impact that the EU may exert upon aspirant members or neighbouring countries that have no intention to join.

Building on this awareness, this contribution aims to answer a guiding question, i.e. whether the long arm of the EU reaches out to these countries too and, if so, how. Table 8 compares how structural influences affect the SPS in AL and CH. As shown above, there are some areas, especially competition and energy, that have the same impact both at the national and local level¹². Similarities are present also regarding transport and environmental legislation. It is interesting to note that the EU has influenced both countries in a similar way despite the different integration perspectives. In this light, one could argue that AL's willingness to join the EU has been balanced by CH's pragmatic attitude, that has led it to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with the EU.

	AL			CH		
	National	Sub-national	Local	National	Sub-national	Local
EU competition legislation	1↑	0↔	1↑	1↔	0↔	1↔
EU energy legislation	1↑	0↔	1↑	2↑	1↑	1↑
EU environmental legislation	3↑	0↔	2↑	2↑	1↑	1↑
EU transport legislation	2↑	0↔	1↑	2↑	1↑	1↑
Pre-accession negotiation (if applicable)	2↑	0↔	1↑	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 8. Comparison of the structural impacts between AL and CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

When it comes to analysing the instrumental impacts (see tab. 9), certain differences emerge. As illustrated, excluding the territorial cooperation area, where the impact is relatively high in CH and less important in AL, the majority of areas are not comparable at all. This diversity is mainly based on the fact that AL is not allowed to participate in EU cohesion and urban policy, while CH has made bilateral agreements with the EU to be included in some policies and projects, and has also contributed to certain areas of EU Cohesion policy.

	AL			CH		
	National	Sub-national	Local	National	Sub-national	Local
EU cohesion policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
European territorial cooperation	1↑	0↔	1↑	2↑	2↑	1↔
EU urban policy	N/A	N/A	N/A	2↑	1↔	2
EU rural development policy	2↑	0↔	1↑	N/A	N/A	N/A
Pre-accession and neighbourhood policy	3↑	0↔	1↑	N/A	N/A	N/A

Table 9. Comparison of the instrumental impacts between AL and CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

¹² The subnational level for AL has not been affected at all.

Finally, table 10 compares the dialogic impacts on the two countries. As has been highlighted, the EU discourse seems to have much more impact in AL than in CH due to two main reasons. First, because CH has only been partially involved, for example submitting comments during the draft process of the documents (e.g. for the ESDP). The second reason is much more path dependent; indeed, while CH's SPS developed throughout the past century in a comprehensive integrated way, AL's SPS developed within the context of the communist bloc, hence has needed to align to the western type economic model as well as to EU concepts and its discursive arena.

To conclude, the contribution shows that the long arm of the EU is able to influence EU non-member States SPSs to a variable extent, and this influence largely depends on multiple issues, foremost among which are the actual motivation of a country to interact with the EU, as well as the path-dependent logics that permeate that country's domestic context.

	AL			CH		
	National	Sub-national	Local	National	Sub-national	Local
EU development strategies	2↑	0↔	1↑	1↔	0↔	0↔
EU spatial policy documents	2↑	0↔	1↑	1↓	0↔	0↔
EU urban agenda	1↑	0↔	1↑	1↑	0↔	1↑
ESPON Programme	N/A	N/A	N/A	1↑	0↔	0↔

Table 10. Comparison of the dialogic impacts between AL and CH. Source: authors' elaboration.

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EUROPEANIZATION OF SPATIAL PLANNING SYSTEMS. COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN ALBANIA AND SERBIA

1. Introduction

Albania achieved the candidate country status in 2014 and is waiting to open negotiations (COM, 2016a), while Serbia has been a candidate country since 2012 and has already opened negotiations for integration (COM, 2016b). The *Copenhagen Criteria* for integration, part of the treaty of the European Union is based on three main issues: «stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights [...], including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the 'acquis'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union» (EUR-LEX, 2017). The EU supports Albania and Serbia through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) (COM, 2014). Balkan countries are going through important reforms also in their planning system (Cotella, Berisha, 2016). There is a move away from the "old" planning doctrine of "urbanism", towards more integrated and comprehensive planning approaches. Legislation may change rapidly (G, 2004), however institutional culture takes time. Therefore, the paper looks at the main changes in the spatial planning systems of Albania and Serbia from the looking glass of Europeanization.

2. Europeanization

Europeanization is not purely a formal issue of legal and policy compliance. Domestic change in more comprehensive terms hints at the cultural, ideological and discourse change through Europeanization (Borzel, Risse, 2000). This view is supported by Radaelli who defines the concept as «consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies» (Radaelli, 2004, p. 3). Europeanization, is seen as a term of "many faces" (Olsen, 2002), spanning across different areas of the polity, policy and politics (Knill, Lehmkuhl, 1999). Therefore, it is a complex process of co-evolution and mutual adaptations of institutional context (Ladrech, 1994), influenced by the "downloading" of EU policies at the domestic level (Ladrech, 2010) as well as the vice-versa process of "uploading" policies from the domestic level towards the EU (Borzel, 1999). In understanding the reasons for domestic change, it is argued that one of the main preconditions is the "misfit" between EU policies, processes and norms compared to the domestic ones (Borzel, Risse, 2000). The second, is the existence of certain actors, institutions or other facilitating actors which respond to pressures for change. In building a logic of domestic change there are two main agents, such as formal institutions seizing the opportuni-

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ties provided by change in redistribution of power, and a “bottom up” approach entailing civil society and informal institutions/actors acting as agents of change and through persuasion (Borzel, Risse, 2000).

3. Europeanization of Spatial Planning

Considering the different phases in the evolution of integration theory, after the 1990s there was a shift on the «how and with which social and political consequences does integration develop» (Diez, Wiener, 2004, p. 7), reflected also on spatial planning systems research (Rivolin, 2012). Thus, it became imperative to develop a conceptual and methodological framework to compare planning systems and the impact of Europeanization. The first attempts were based on broad distinctions of the legal systems (Davies, 1989; Newman, Thornley, 1996). Nevertheless, it is argued fact that «a complex mixture of factors such as historical and cultural conditions, geography, constitutional and administrative arrangements, levels of urban and economic development as well as political and ideological aspirations had led to a large variety of systems» (Duhr, Nadin, Colomb, 2010). Hence other studies focused on a broader selection of criteria beyond the narrow view of legislation such as maturity of the system, governance system, citizen acceptance etc. (CEC, 1997), on social models (Nadin, Stead, 2012), and more ambitious ones on planning cultures (Sanyal, 2005; Othengrafen, Reimer, 2013). The planning culture notion offers a conceptual framework, albeit ambitious (Rivolin, 2012) and difficult to operationalize in methodological terms. In analyzing culture and especially cultural change (Othengrafen, Reimer, 2013) the culturalized planning model consist in three analytical dimensions: planning artifacts (manifest culture), planning environment ((both manifest and nonmanifest) and societal environment (nonmanifest culture). Meanwhile, using the concept of institutional technology for planning systems is seen as a more operational framework comprising “the broad idea of ‘usage and knowledge of tools, techniques, crafts, systems or methods of organization’ affecting the ‘species’ ability to control and adapt to their natural environment’, within ‘a structure or mechanism of social order and cooperation governing the behavior of a set of individuals (Rivolin, 2012). The conceptual model for analyzing the spatial planning system is based on four main issues such as “S” (structure), “T” (tools), “D” (discourse), “P” (practice). The latter offers a more comprehensive, structured and operational conceptual methodological model for analyzing and comparing spatial planning systems when compared to the more ambitious model of spatial planning culture.

The framework by Rivolin (2012) offers also an opportunity to integrate the different impacts of Europeanization of spatial planning system in a more structured way. It can be divided into three main areas such as the direct impacts of EU legislation, directives and policies on space, the debate surrounding the evolution of “European Spatial Planning”, and thirdly through the most recent events of informal and formal learning supported by territorial cooperation practices.




Figure 1. Europeanization of Spatial Planning System. Source: Cotella, Rivolin, 2010.

4. Spatial Planning in Albania & Serbia

4.1. Governance System and Spatial Planning system changes in Albania

The socialist regime, established in Albania after WWII, escalated soon into one of the most repressive and closed dictatorships in the whole eastern Block (Aliaj, Shutina, Dhamo, 2010). During this time, private property was seized, private economy banned, while many citizen rights reduced. The centralization of the government extended also to the absence of democratically elected local government (Aliaj, 2008). In terms of land-use planning, architecture and urban design were at the center of attention and operated under strict rules (Aliaj, Shutina, Dhamo, 2010) initially supported from foreign architects (Dhamo, Thomai, Aliaj, 2016) and afterwards taken over by the new Albanian "elites". As everything was decided at the center, usually with 5-yearly plans (non-spatial), the role of planners and architects became primarily technical (Aliaj, Janku, Allkja, Dhamo, 2014), focusing on the rules for extension of cities, villages and new industrial towns (Aliaj, Shutina, Dhamo, 2010).

In the early 1990s, the fall of the regime, opened up the development of the democratic system in Albania. The application of the "shock therapy" led Albania from one extreme to the other (Aliaj, Shutina, Dhamo, 2010). The inability of the state to control and foster territorial development, combined with a peculiar land reform (Sabates-Wheeler, Waite, 2003), and high demands of people for housing and jobs (Aliaj, Lulo, Myftiu, 2003) were met with informal development both in terms of economy and urbanity (Aliaj, 2008).

The two main legislations of the post-socialist Albania in the 1990s are Law 7693 on 'Urban planning' 1993 and "Law 8405- On Urban Planning" in 1998 (Toto, 2012) defined planning as «the general rules of the location and architecture buildings throughout the territory» (Keshilli i Ministrave, 1993).

The plans were based on the “containment paradigm” using functionalist measures in allocating land-uses (Jacobs, Craig, 1997). In addition, due to informality, the role of the planner changed to work in retrospective, fitting and plan for new infrastructure after development had already taken place (Aliaj, 2008). Thus, the disoriented state of the early 1990s was also reflected in a weak and “dis-oriented” land use system. In 2009 with the approval of law 10119 “On Territorial Planning” had the aim of establishing an entirely new planning system reflecting a more spatial, comprehensive and integrated approach (Ministria e Zhvillimit Urban, 2014). This legislation was soon followed with law 107/2014 “On Territorial Planning and Development”, merely an amendment of the first, which tried to correct some of the short-comings of the previous law. The changes of the last decade were associated with the forming of new institutions as well as new instruments of spatial planning and land development.

4.2. Governance System and Spatial Planning system changes in Serbia

Former Yugoslavia (and present Serbia) departed from the Soviet centralized planning model soon after the World War II and moved to develop a participatory system of comprehensive or integrated planning (Nedović-Budić, Đorđević, Dabović, 2011). In order to recover a war-torn country, the state started a politics of urban renovation with heavy investments in cities aimed at supporting mass-urbanization. Planners were actively engaged in plans and other planning documents for municipalities (Gligorijević, 2015), in line with the national renovation movement (Ferenčak, Macura, Medvedev, Savić, Stojkov, 1993). The state boasted a coordinative governance model where the rational planning approach, based on positivist influences, was largely dominant (Friedman, 1987). Planners were regarded as apolitical experts who promote public interest, but plans were developed more as a product of intuition and application of simple concepts of urban form, rather than actually striving to relate physical development to social-economic (Taylor, 1999). However, during the 1970s (Lazarević-Bajec, 1995), defined to be the golden age of planning in Serbia, intensive sublimation of planning theory and praxis started to evolve leading spatial planning to assume a more proactive role (Bajić-Brković, 2002). Social-economic planning was constitutional and legal obligation at all governance levels, while development was completely planning-led (Đorđević, Dabović, 2010).

In the 1980s a decline and marginalization of planning occurred, which was to culminate in the 1990s underpinned by disintegration of planning institutions (Gligorijević, 2015), privatization of certain planning competences (Ferenčak, Macura, Medvedev, Savić, Stojkov, 1993) and development of disintegrated (sectoral) legislation (Bajić-Brković, 2002). In the 1990s, the fall of socialist state in East and Southeast Europe aggravated the situation even further, especially in the countries formed by the dissolution Yugoslavia. Diverse responses to new conditions have been created by political democratization, reintroduction of market principles (Nedović-Budić, Đorđević, Dabović, 2011), privatization, the state's fiscal crisis (Tasan-Kok, 2004), discontinuation of ‘welfare state’ programs and intensified international financial transactions and investments (Tsenkova, Nedović-Budić, 2006).

In Serbia, for most of the 1990s planning was largely marginalized as it lost the legitimacy it once had (Milicevic, Ristic, Marjanovic, 2017). Radical and abrupt transformation of the social system brought new challenges for the transition period: disorientation of all stakeholders in the planning process, staggering of the system due to the loss of the old legitimacy, numerous transitional and temporary solutions, new institutions in the old milieu, strong pressure of the private sector and foreign factors, etc. (Đorđević, Dabović, Živak, 2013). Immediately in the 1990s, the state went on to draft a new constitution, after which the new planning act was to be developed. Unfortunately, this was delayed by the Yugoslav civil war and then by the abolishment of the sanctions after the war. The new legislative package on planning was not adopted until 1995. This legislative change was supposed to provide the adaptation of planning to the new economic and political situation. What it actually did was to formalize the centralized control over planning and urban development in the country and

further reduce planning competences of subnational and local authorities (Nedović-Budić, Đorđević, Dabović, 2011). The disorientation of both system and planners continued also in the 2000s and even after, marked by constant legislative changes and amendments. When discussing the contents of 1985, 1995 and 2003 planning laws in Serbia, Nedović-Budić, Đorđević and Dabović (2011) note that the Serbian planning system and laws «have encountered a turbulent period of re-centralization of political power and planning controls in the 1990s, a lagged reform process that only started from 2000, and a continued search for an effective planning modus operandi» (p. 430). The authors compare the planning legislation of Serbia to a swinging pendulum which have taken amplitudes from centralized (top-down) model to fully decentralized (participatory bottom-up approach), to yet another re-centralization and re-decentralization. However, their conclusion is that the main source of a flawed planning are not laws, «but their implementation that is based on flawed institutional processes and difficult societal circumstances» (p. 451). Despite the legal changes undertaken in Serbia in 2002-2003 made significant improvements (e.g. private ownership of urban land was enabled, the planning was decentralized, etc.), they failed to address problems with the planning properly which just shows that there is a «lack of both theoretical and methodological knowledge on the veritable options of future planning modes and arrangements», which Vujošević (2004, p. 12) labels as a 'crisis of expertise' in planning theory and practice and attributes it, in a large part, to insufficient research.

Attempted harmonization of Serbian planning system with an eye on European and international experiences resulted in chaotic decision-making that predominates, where planning is led by development instead of being vice-versa. New development activities are not the outcome of a purposeful planning action founded on comprehensive scientific analysis and foresight, but they often come from *ad hoc* generated decrees and political decisions that suit the needs of new investors (Milicevic, Ristic, Marjanovic, 2017). Spurred by the political and economic elites and supported by key international actors, the role of the planning has been reduced to that of a 'junior partner of the market', which has led the country to have a 'growth without development' – a state that is a consequence of a «hegemony of domicile neo-liberal gurus, seconded by mostly second- and third-grade foreign experts, and concomitantly poor role of independent expertise» (Vujošević, 2010, p. 23).

	Albania (Post 2009)	Serbia (Post 2003)
Structure	Ministry of European Integration Department of European Integration and IPA programs at all levels of governance harmonization of domestic laws and policies with the EU legislation new territorial organization of the country NTPA/ATD/ARD INSPIRE	Department of European Integration and IPA programs at all levels of governance harmonization of domestic laws and policies with the EU legislation new territorial organization of the country national infrastructure for geospatial data (INSPIRE)
Tools	General Territorial Plan composed of Strategic Plan, Land Use and Regulation (Central and Local) Strategic Environmental Assessment Environmental Impact Assessment SAA&NSDI transfer of development rights", "conditional building intensity", "land readjustment" and "compulsory land development"	Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Review of existing instruments & tools Spatial plan of Serbia 2010-2020
Discourse	Spatial Planning Cohesion Regional Development Polycentrism Urban Metabolism	decentralization and unbalanced regional development National integrated and sustainable urban development policy
Practice	Visioning Strategic Open Process, Participatory planning, use of GIS Regional Development Programs	Widening of scope and sectors becoming part of planning practice Wide use of GIS Regional Development Programs

Table 1. Comparison between Albania and Serbia.

4.3. Impacts of Europeanization on Spatial Planning in Albania & Serbia

In analyzing the impact of Europeanization in Spatial Planning, the conceptual framework developed by Rivolin (2012) will be used. Thus, the impacts are analyzed across 4 main strands *such as structure, discourse, tools and practice*.

5. Conclusive discussion

The main aim of the paper was to compare and analyze the impacts of the process of European Integration and “Europeanization” in general in Albania and Serbia. Using the conceptual framework by Rivolin (2012) the two planning systems were analyzed. Both countries, although with different departures in terms of the evolution of spatial planning and the development of the democratic system, show similar features in the Europeanization of spatial planning. As such it can be concluded that:

a. Structure

The main direct impact as part of the Europeanization process (European Integration) is the establishment of directories and departments which deal with transnational cooperation, cross border cooperation in authorities spanning from the national to the local level. These departments, besides dealing with the transposition of EU legislation in the domestic legislations, are engaged in various territorial cooperation initiatives. Meanwhile, indirect impacts can be seen also in the territorial and administrative structure of the both countries. Serbia has been more advanced in further developing the regional level, while Albania is yet to resolve the question of regionalization (Aliaj, 2008). The latter cannot be considered as direct impacts of the process of Integration, but as a consequence of the general Europeanization of the governance system. Thus, the horizontal exchange through local and international experts engaged in the process have played a big role. Changes in the institutional structure of spatial planning try to mimic different European system structures. As such, they can also include the establishment of national geo-spatial data infrastructure based on INSPIRE in both countries.

b. Tools

After signing the Stabilization and Association Pact, Albania and Serbia have also drafted the respective Strategies for Development and Integration, which serve as an umbrella for other planning documents. The impact of the EU integration process on spatial planning tools is the requirement to conduct also a Strategic Environmental Assessment, and Environmental Impact Assessment for large scale projects. The two instruments are results of the transposition of environmental directives into the respective legislation. Nevertheless, in both countries, SEA is usually conducted by the very same people who make respective plans or by the people within the same organization. Thus, external validity is not ensured. Planning decisions are rarely amended as a consequence of the assessment and the tool mainly serves as a ‘checklist’ that approves the planned resolutions. Therefore, the SEA can be seen as another bureaucratic instrument that manifests the compliance with the European provisions, but without genuine will of domestic actors to make the tool to serve its true purpose.

Horizontal exchange, through local and international experts have had an impact on spatial planning tools such as for Serbia, the impact has been primarily on the revision of existing instrument, including the Spatial Plan for Serbia 2010-2010. In Albania prior to 2009, there were three main instruments such as the “masterplan”, the “partial urban study” and the urban regulations (Keshilli i Ministrave, 1993). These “left-overs” of the socialist regime, (Aliaj, Shutina, Dhamo, 2010) changed (AKPT, Co-Plan, 2012) offering a greater degree of hierarchy between plans. Tools have been enriched also at the “development” level with different land instruments (Co-Plan, AKPT, 2015).

c. Discourse

The main change in discourse regarding spatial planning has come due to two main issues, local agents and international consultants. Local agents have been exposed to different planning approaches in Europe and Internationally. International experts, as well as the advancement in communication technology have opened both countries to a greater array of hegemonic concepts coming from Europe. Spatial planning discourse has stepped up from the local urban level towards more national and regional spatial development concepts (Co-Plan, AKPT, 2015). Issues such as polycentrism, sustainable development, climate change, smart urban development and smart cities, metabolism analysis of the territory”, as well as “central place theory” have also penetrated the Albanian discourse (Allkja, Tavanxhiu, 2016). In addition, when analyzing the General National Spatial Plan of Albania there is a clear reference to many European directives, such as Habitats Directive, Water Framework Directive as well as different ESPON studies such as for example the EUROPA 2050 Vision (Ministria e Zhvillimit Urban, 2016). Similarly, in Serbia discourse has been led by various European strategies and policies, many of which have found their way into national, regional and local strategies, policies and spatial development plans. On the other hand, more recent shifts towards sustainable urban development, problems of urban areas and environmental degradation also follow ongoing European trends. As high discrepancies between the two planning contexts exist, the EU approach to spatial development seen through the growth perspective (which tells us that everyone can grow) is unfitting to adequately address planning issues and *issues with planning* in countries with flawed institutions and uncertain political climate. Moreover, the real spatial problems that Serbia and Albania face, like the issue of informal dwellings and settlements, are almost unknown to the Union.

d. Practice

Europeanization of spatial planning practice in Albania and Serbia can be noted also within the different spatial planning tools. It is also a result of changes in legislation and general discourse in planning. Looking at the spatial planning legislation in Albania and Serbia, it is striking to notice, that one of the articles of the spatial planning legislation, suggests that the General National Spatial plan needs to be aligned with the policy objectives of the ESDP (Kuvendi i Shqiperise, 2014). Similar to the case of Albania, the planning practice in Serbia has been developing following different international influences that may not be necessarily attributed to the European integration process, but also to various international organizations and development agencies that took part in the development of country's institutions in the period of post-socialist transition. Cooperation activities with countries like France, Germany, Netherlands etc., can be used to explain the nature of existing planning practices. With these international influences, new themes started not only to penetrate the domestic planning practice, but they also came to the forefront of the social agenda.

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IL CULTURAL HERITAGE IN UNA DIMENSIONE SOVRANAZIONALE²

1. Presupposti, obiettivi e metodologia del lavoro

Oggi il valore del *cultural heritage* (*c.h.*) in Europa è sensibilmente cambiato; la cultura non è più importante solo in quanto tale, ma è considerata un volano di sviluppo sociale ed economico: «Culture is one of Europe's greatest strengths: it is a source of values and identity and gives to the continent a sense of belonging. It also contributes to people's well-being, to social cohesion and inclusion. The cultural and creative sectors are a driver of economic growth, job creation and external trade» (Eurostat 2016, p. 8). Infatti, sia i governi, sia i cittadini dell'Unione Europea hanno iniziato a comprendere il valore di un settore che si è anche dimostrato resistente alla crisi. Nel 2014 le imprese culturali e creative hanno rappresentato il 3,5% dei servizi realizzati nell'UE, dando lavoro quasi 7 milioni di persone che rappresentano il 3% della manodopera (Eurostat, 2016). Tuttavia in ambito europeo sono ancora scarsi i provvedimenti normativi volti a tutelare, valorizzare e promuovere il patrimonio culturale. Comunque, grazie alla Strategia Europa 2020 si sono registrati alcuni segnali di cambiamento, quali: azioni di *policy* (*work plan, work groups, etc.*) relative al *cultural heritage* o, in diversi casi, l'inclusione del patrimonio culturale nella legislazione riguardante tematiche più o meno affini alla cultura in senso stretto.

Obiettivo del presente lavoro è pertanto appurare come e se l'UE supplisca a tale *vacatio* tramite la programmazione diretta e/o indiretta stimolando la realizzazione di programmi e/o l'erogazione di fondi volti a valorizzare e promuovere il patrimonio culturale prima e dopo il lancio della Strategia Europa 2020.

Per conseguire tale obiettivo è pertanto stato necessario consultare oltreché una letteratura di tipo classico (volumi, riviste, report), siti internet di alcuni programmi e/o progetti europei così come materiale grigio elaborato da studiosi e/o funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali.

2. Linee di intervento, politiche e azioni sovrnazionali in materia di patrimonio culturale

L'attenzione al tema del *c.h.* e dei beni culturali, come evidenziato da Tosco (2014, p. 104) è «abbastanza recente nelle politiche comunitarie, e non si delinea prima degli anni Novanta: soltanto con il trattato di Maastricht del 1992 è stata introdotta una competenza comunitaria nel settore». Il Trattato dedica al tema l'intero Titolo XII (art. 167) insistendo sul principio di sussidiarietà, sulla valorizzazione del retaggio culturale europeo così come sul rispetto della diversità culturale (art. 3). L'art. 6 tra le azioni intese a sostenere, coordinare e completare l'azione dei Stati membri elenca anche la cultura accanto a tutela e miglioramento della salute umana, industria, turismo, istruzione formazione professionale, gioventù e sport. Infine, l'art. 30 consente agli Stati membri di prevedere deroghe al principio di libera circolazione delle merci se finalizzata alla protezione del patrimonio artistico, storico o

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² Anche se l'intera elaborazione ha costituito un lavoro comune, si devono a Stefania Mangano i paragrafi 1, 2 e 4 e a Gian Marco Ugolini il paragrafo 3.

archeologico nazionale.

La legislazione europea è invece pressoché circoscritta all'ambito delle esportazioni illegali dei beni culturali, in particolare il Regolamento CE n. 3911/92 e la Direttiva CE n. 93/7. Al contrario, al patrimonio ambientale è stata dedicata una grande attenzione: la Direttiva Uccelli e la Direttiva ne sono il principale esempio.

La Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell'Unione Europea (7/12/2000), nella quale è contenuta un'enunciazione di principio sulla libertà delle arti e della ricerca scientifica e la Convenzione sul Paesaggio del Consiglio d'Europa (art. 6)³ hanno invece assunto valore propedeutico.

Vi sono poi altri documenti quali ad esempio linee guida e/o raccomandazioni redatti allo scopo di indirizzare i comportamenti in materia di *c.h.*; tra queste l'iniziativa dell'UE del 2014 «Towards an Integrated Approach to cultural Heritage for Europe», ove si pongono in risalto i vantaggi – assai poco compresi e/o sfruttati – legati alla valorizzazione del *c.h.* in quanto: «heritage has many dimensions: cultural, physical, digital, environmental, human and social. Its value – both intrinsic and economic – is a function of these different dimensions and of the flow of associated services. The economic value of heritage has recently come into research focus, but only partial estimates of its importance are available» (Unione Europea, 2014, p. 3). Ed ancora le *Conclusions on cultural heritage as a strategic resource for a sustainable Europe* del Consiglio dell'Unione Europea (2014, p. 1) secondo cui «cultural heritage is a major asset for Europe and an important component of the European project». In esse è anche evidenziato il ruolo trasversale del *c.h.* nell'ambito delle politiche pubbliche per conseguire sviluppo regionale, coesione sociale, sviluppo turistico, innovazione, etc.

Utilizzando le parole di Tosco (2014, p. 105) «di fatto una concreta politica europea per i beni culturali è ancora latente, e la materia rimane affidata allo stretto controllo dei singoli Stati [...]. Le difficoltà operative dell'Unione risultano alla fine bilanciate, a livello globale, dal ruolo crescente delle Nazioni Unite». La World Heritage Convention, adottata dalla conferenza generale dell'UNESCO nel 1972, attua tra gli Stati membri un modello di cooperazione finalizzato alla salvaguardia del patrimonio culturale mondiale che si concretizza in un sistema di protezione internazionale, nel quale però rientrano solo quei siti che presentano un valore straordinario e universale grazie al quale sono dichiarati patrimonio dell'umanità. Si tratta pertanto di una importante iniziativa che però coinvolge una parte piuttosto ristretta dell'enorme patrimonio culturale mondiale.

In Europa il lancio della Strategia 2020 ha generato una nuova sensibilità nei confronti del *c.h.* non più interpretato come un costo, ma come una opportunità di sviluppo (tra gli altri, Prezioso, 2007). Ad esempio, il patrimonio culturale, mobile e immobile, tangibile e intangibile, è oggi alla base di un'offerta turistica rinnovata impenetrata sulla destagionalizzazione dei flussi e sulla sostenibilità. Questo nuovo ruolo attribuito al *c.h.* ha pertanto stimolato la realizzazione di azioni politiche in campo culturale, ad esempio il Work Plan for Culture (2015-2018)⁴, così come l'inserimento di riferimenti al *c.h.* in policy e/o in disposizioni normative ascrivibili ad altri settori quali, tra gli altri, quello del turismo, dell'innovazione, dell'istruzione, dell'ambiente, etc. Tale attitudine è certamente confermata dalla decisione congiunta del Consiglio d'Europa del Parlamento Europeo di proclamare per il 2018 l'*Anno europeo del patrimonio culturale* è senz'altro un evento di grande importanza i cui principali obiettivi sono la promozione della diversità culturale, del dialogo interculturale e della coesione sociale; la valorizzazione del contributo economico offerto dal patrimonio culturale ai settori culturale e creativo, a quello delle piccole e medie imprese, così come allo sviluppo locale e regionale;

³ L'art. 6 (comma 3) recita: «integrare il paesaggio nelle politiche di pianificazione del territorio, urbanistiche e in quelle a carattere culturale, ambientale, agricolo, sociale ed economico, nonché altre politiche che possano avere incidenza diretta o indiretta sul paesaggio».

⁴ Si tratta di un piano quadriennale indirizzato alle piccole e medie imprese operative nel settore creativo e della cultura.

l'enfatizzazione del ruolo del patrimonio culturale come facilitatore delle relazioni esterne dell'UE, inclusa la prevenzione dei conflitti, la riconciliazione postbellica e la ricostruzione del patrimonio culturale distrutto. Si tratta di un'occasione importante in quanto, come sottolineato da Tibor Navracsics – Commissario UE responsabile per educazione, cultura, politiche giovanili e cittadinanza: «Our cultural heritage is more than the memory of our past; it is the key to our future. A European Year of Cultural Heritage will be an opportunity to raise awareness of the social and economic importance of cultural heritage and to promote European excellence in the sector» (European Commission, 2017a).

3. Il cultural heritage nella progettazione europea prima della Strategia 2020

Il ruolo dell'UE in materia di beni culturali ha invece assunto un'importanza via via crescente attraverso la realizzazione di iniziative e/o programmi nei quali la loro valorizzazione ha acquisito un ruolo fondamentale.

Nel complesso i finanziamenti europei sono stati considerevoli soprattutto grazie alla presenza dei Fondi Strutturali predisposti dall'EU al fine di promuovere lo sviluppo delle regioni in ritardo; riconvertire aree in declino industriale; combattere la disoccupazione; facilitare l'inserimento occupazionale dei giovani; accelerare la riforma agraria.

I finanziamenti comunitari destinati direttamente alla cultura, possono essere divisi in tre differenti periodi (Nesti, s.d.):

1) Anteriore al 2000:

- Koleidoscope 1996-1999 (719/96/CE) – relativo alla creazione artistica contemporanea e alla diffusione delle culture europee, mediante il sostegno alle iniziative di rilevante dimensione realizzate da almeno tre partner nazionali.
- Ariane 1997-1999 (2085/97/CE) – finalizzato alla diffusione di opere letterarie (romanzi, racconti, saggi, opere teatrali, etc.) di origine europea grazie alla loro traduzione nelle diverse lingue dell'Unione.
- Raphael 1997-2000 (2228/97/CE) – volto a contribuire alla salvaguardia e alla valorizzazione del patrimonio culturale (immobile, mobile, archeologico, subacqueo, museale, archivistico) tramite azioni di livello europeo.

2) Dal 2000 al 2004:

Cultura 2000 (508/2000/CE) divenne l'unico strumento generalista di finanziamento per le attività culturali articolato in quattro assi strategici: patrimonio culturale europeo, creazione artistica e letteraria; conoscenza reciproca della storia e della cultura dei popoli dell'Europa; azioni riservate (tra le altre, Capitali Europee della Cultura). Il programma ha attuato in maniera organica l'art. 167 del Trattato di Maastricht incoraggiando la conoscenza e la diffusione della cultura dei popoli europei – nel campo della musica, della letteratura, dello spettacolo dal vivo, dei beni immobili e mobili e delle nuove forme espressive – tramite la cooperazione tra operatori culturali e le istituzioni presenti nei diversi Stati membri. Il numero di obiettivi decisamente elevato che prevedeva di attuare ha fatto sì che conseguisse un'efficacia ridotta.

3) Dal 2007 al 2013:

Cultura 2007 (1855/2006/CE) ha segnato il definitivo superamento della settorialità che aveva contraddistinto il programma Cultura 2000. Uno dei maggiori pregi del programma è stato quello di rafforzare gli obiettivi trasversali dell'Unione quali, ad esempio, il principio di libertà d'espressione. Esso inoltre ha cercato di sensibilizzare l'importanza di contribuire allo sviluppo sostenibile incentivando la tolleranza reciproca al fine di superare le discriminazioni fondate sul genere, l'handicap, l'età, la religione, etc. Teatri, musei, associazioni professionali, centri di ricerca, università, poteri pubblici, etc. – grazie a Cultura 2007 – sono interpretati come un mezzo per svi-

luppare tra i cittadini quella che può essere definita come identità europea. In estrema sintesi, «la principale novità di Cultura 2007 è, quindi, una visione globale, che considera il settore culturale nel suo insieme e favorisce le sinergie. Per realizzare le azioni specifiche Cultura 2007 permette poi la cooperazione con organizzazioni impegnate in campo culturale, come l'UNESCO o il Consiglio d'Europa» (Nesti, s.d.).

Un programma di sostegno rivolto allo sviluppo culturale dell'UE – in continua evoluzione dagli anni Novanta del secolo scorso – è certamente il Media: Media 2007-2013 costituisce infatti il seguito dei Media Plus (2001-2006), Media (1991-1995) e Media II (1996-2000), confluito oggi in Creative Europe. Tali programmi riguardano essenzialmente la distribuzione e la promozione di opere audiovisive (film, fiction, documentari, animazione, multimedialità), nell'ottica di migliorare la competitività delle piccole e medie imprese dell'UE. La circolazione transnazionale delle opere incoraggia la diversità linguistica e culturale anche nelle regioni a scarsa capacità di produzione e/o diffusione, parimenti degne di essere conosciute.

Altra iniziativa europea in materia di patrimonio culturale di innegabile importanza è stata uno degli assi tematici di Espon 2006⁵: Cultural Heritage (1.1.3). A differenza dei programmi citati, non prevede azioni volte a sostenere economicamente specifiche iniziative in ambito culturale, si tratta invece di un progetto di ricerca finalizzato alla classificazione tematica degli elementi culturali. Tramite l'utilizzo di diversi indicatori, quali ad esempio l'accessibilità, esso è infatti in grado di analizzare gli apporti della cultura allo sviluppo territoriale (economico e sociale), nell'ottica di rilevare gli effetti pratici del *c.h.* a diverse scale, rappresentandoli attraverso in specifiche carte tematiche.

4. Il cultural heritage nella Strategia Europa 2020

La Strategia Europa 2020 ha cambiato in modo sostanziale la programmazione e conseguentemente la progettazione europea. È infatti facile intuire che anche le azioni rivolte alla progettazione in materia di *c.h.* abbiano subito delle variazioni. Il *c.h.* è ormai presente in diversi tra gli argomenti⁶ oggetto della programmazione e della politica europea. Pertanto, la Commissione europea, rispondendo alle sollecitazioni contenute nei citati documenti *Towards an integrated approach to cultural heritage for Europe* e *Conclusions on cultural heritage as a strategic resource for a sustainable Europe*, ha realizzato un *Mapping Report* (European Commission, 2017) contenente informazioni su azioni di *policy*, attuazione di normativa, programmazione e opportunità di finanziamento volti a sostenere il *c.h.*, ciò al fine di facilitare un approccio strategico nei confronti del *c.h.* comunitario, sempre più spesso protagonista nel panorama europeo.

Nella schematizzazione successiva le informazioni relative a programmi/finanziamenti (European Commission, 2017), suddivisi per argomento e raggruppati in quattro tipi, sono state sintetizzate come segue:

- Tipo A – Culturale: programmi/finanziamenti riguardanti la cultura intesa in stretto;
- Tipo B – Generalista: programmi/finanziamenti riguardanti i settori primario, secondario e ter-

⁵ Espon 2006 – ricerca applicata a studi di pianificazione territoriale visto da una prospettiva europea a supporto delle politiche di sviluppo. Le conoscenze nazionali, regionali e locali sono già in parte disponibili anche se coprono una piccola parte del territorio europeo. Grazie ad Espon si riesce a studiare una entità territoriale allargata. L'UE e i singoli stati possono disporre di: una diagnostica a scala europea, un'analisi di impatto delle politiche europee e della loro influenza sul territorio e sulla coesione; mappe che evidenziano la diversità territoriale, analisi strutturate tran-settoriali, indicatori e tipologie che aiutino l'allargamento evidenziando le priorità, strumenti (database, indicatori, mappe) per coordinare le politiche settoriali.

⁶ Si tratta di alcuni dei numerosi argomenti (https://europa.eu/european-union/topics_en#page=51) sui quali è attiva l'Unione Europea con specifici riferimenti al *cultural heritage*.

ziario che abbiano dei riferimenti più o meno esplicativi alla salvaguardia, valorizzazione promozione del *c.h.*;

- Tipo C – Specifico: programmi/finanziamenti riguardanti settori specifici quali, a titolo di esempio, quello ambientale e che contemplino anche il *c.h.*;
- Tipo D – Trasversale: programmi/finanziamenti riguardanti tematiche per loro caratteristiche intrinseche trasversali ad altre nelle quali facilmente è possibile trovare riferimenti al *c.h.*.

TIPO A - Programmi/finanziamenti di tipo culturale		
Argomento	Programmi/ Finanziamenti	Sintesi
Cultura	European Year of Cultural Heritage 2018	Realizzazione di campagne informative promozionali, eventi e iniziative a scala europea, nazionale, regionale e locale.
	Creative Europe Programme (2014-2020)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ European heritage days (EHD): prevede l'apertura di edifici storici o siti solitamente chiusi al pubblico (circa 20 milioni di partecipanti). È un esempio di cooperazione multiscala. ▪ European Capital (ECOC): ha come scopo la promozione del patrimonio e del dialogo interculturale e rappresenta un'opportunità unica per riqualificare le città favorendo la costruzione di una nuova immagine ▪ European Heritage Label: è un marchio concesso a quei siti che “celebrano” e/o simboleggiano la storia e gli ideali dell'integrazione (dal maggio del 2013 ne sono stati designati 29). ▪ European prize: è un premio volto a celebrare l'eccellenza di chi lavora nel settore del <i>c.h.</i>
Cultura digitale	Europeana	È una piattaforma digitale contenente oltre 54 milioni di <i>items</i> relativi alla collocazione di libri, archivi, musei e collezioni audiovisive di tutta Europa. Essa ha come scopo rendere la cultura più accessibile e nel contempo di facilitare il reperimento di dati sul <i>c.h.</i> e sulle industrie creative.
	Horizon 2020 programme - Challenge 6	Parte relativa a informazione e comunicazione in tema di <i>c.h.</i>

Tipo B - Programmi/finanziamenti di tipo generalista		
Argomento	Programmi/ Finanziamenti	Sintesi
Politica Agricola Comune	Finanziamenti/ programmi volti a sostenere il patrimonio culturale rurale	Sopportare manutenzione e ristrutturazione del patrimonio culturale e naturale di aree rurali e siti di alto valore attraverso azioni di valorizzazione economica; migliorare la gestione e la fruizione del <i>c. h.</i> nelle aree rurali; realizzare <i>start up</i> per finanziare attività non agricole nelle aree rurali; facilitare la formazione professionale e l'acquisizione di competenze per lavorare nel settore.
Mercato Interno, Industria, Turismo e Imprenditoria	COSME Programme (2014-2020) and Cultural Tourism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ European Cultural Rutes: promozione di prodotti turistici tematici che stimolino la crescita del turismo sostenibile. La Commissione sta lavorando con UNESCO e UNWTO per sviluppare, nel primo caso, un itinerario europeo tra i siti patrimoni dell'umanità, nel secondo, quello della via della seta occidentale. ▪ Diversification of the tourism offer through synergies with creative and high-end industries: valorizzazione e capitalizzazione del <i>c.h.</i> e dell'industria creativa europea promuovendo prodotti esperienziali. ▪ EDEN – European Destinations of Excellence: permette la condivisione delle buone pratiche e la messa in rete delle città hanno acquisito l'eccellenza certificata dall'acquisizione di un premio.
	Space Programme Copernicus (2014-2020)	Programma di osservazione terrestre che la tecnologia satellitare permette il monitoraggio e la protezione del <i>c.h.</i>

Tipo C - Programmi/finanziamenti di tipo specifico		
Argomento	Programmi/ Finanziamenti	Sintesi
Commercio illecito di beni	Azioni congiunte Unione Europea + UNESCO	Azioni per sostenere gli <i>stakeholder</i> coinvolti nella "lotta" al traffico illecito dei beni culturali.
Politiche marittime	European Fisheries Fund (EFF)	Valorizzazione di attività legate alla pratica della pesca in quanto considerate parte del patrimonio culturale europeo.
Politiche ambientali	Vari progetti supportati dal Programma LIFE (2014-2020)	Ampio spettro di iniziative focalizzate sulle problematiche ambientali e sulla valorizzazione dell'ambiente.
	Fondi Strutturali Europei	
Relazioni esterne e sviluppo	Instrument for pre-accession assistance IPA and IPA II	Finanziamenti per i paesi entranti erogati in funzione dei risultati già ottenuti anche nel campo del c.h.
	Integrated Rehabilitation Project Plan/Survey of the Architectural and Archaeological Heritage	Azione congiunta tra Unione e Consiglio d'Europa per i paesi entranti dell'Europa sudorientale volta a sviluppare una metodologia di recupero e valorizzazione del c.h.

	(IRPP/SAAH)	
Vicinato	EU-Eastern Partnership Culture and Creativity 2015-2018	Programma di supporto per i paesi dell'Est che intendano sviluppare azioni anche di tipo culturale.
	UNESCO-EU Cooperation in the Southern Mediterranean region	Azione bilaterale centrata sul <i>c.h.</i> attraverso la realizzazione di programmi congiunti.
	Progetti di cooperazione con il resto del mondo	Azione di implementazione di politiche sul <i>c.h.</i> dell'Unione Europea in partenariato con paesi in via di sviluppo africani, caribici, etc.

Tipo D - Programmi/finanziamenti di tipo trasversale		
Argomento	Programmi/ Finanziamenti	Sintesi
Istruzione	ERASMUS + programme	Dà l'opportunità a più di milioni di europei di studiare, partecipare a piani formativi, realizzare attività lavorative e di volontariato al di fuori del proprio paese di residenza. Le principali azioni rispetto al c.h. sono quelle previste dalla Key Action 2: cooperazione per lo scambio di buone pratiche in diversi settori.
Politica di coesione	Fondi 2014-2020	La gestione dei beni culturali è uno degli investimenti prioritari previsto dai Fondi Strutturali e Regionali, Fondo Sociale Europeo e per le Politiche Agricole.
	JESSICA	Iniziativa congiunta con la Banca degli Investimenti Europei e altri istituti di credito per realizzare una politica di coesione più efficiente e sostenibile nelle aree urbane.
Ricerca e innovazione	Horizon 2020 programme - Challenge 5 e Challenge 6	<i>Challenge 5:</i> riutilizzo della c.h. attraverso l'applicazione di metodologie, prodotti e servizi innovativi per sviluppare progetti in ambito urbano e rurale. <i>Challenge 6:</i> trasmissione del c.h. attraverso la digitalizzazione di musei, biblioteche, paesaggi, etc.
Cittadinanza	Europe for Citizens Programme	Azioni volte a promuovere la comprensione del sentimento di cittadinanza europea quali, ad esempio, gemellaggi tra città per valorizzare i rispettivi patrimoni culturali.

I cambiamenti apportati dalla Strategia Europa 2020 sono certamente tangibili in tutti i campi della programmazione: per quanto riguarda il c.h. essi non sono stati solo di tipo formale, ma anche sostanziale. In passato il c.h. difficilmente usciva dai limiti della progettazione rivolta alla cultura propriamente intesa, oggi invece è protagonista delle più disparate tematiche trattate nell'ambito dell'Unione. È sicuramente un'evoluzione positiva, che tiene conto delle molteplici sfaccettature contenute nell'idea di patrimonio culturale che può e deve essere valorizzato nei modi e contesti più disparati. La cultura rientra pertanto a pieno titolo in quelli che sono stati definiti come programmi/finanziamenti di tipo trasversale.

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MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: THE CASE OF EUSAIR

1. Macro-regions strategies: a complex European policy instrument

Almost a decade of activities relates to what could be defined a European macro-region³, i.e. "me-so-European" areas of cooperation where the strategy and its implementation is a complex multilevel governance laboratory in territorial planning and beyond. The most recent definition and the political foundation of the European Union (EU)'s macro-regional strategies can also be read in the light of the statement of the Council of the European Union held in April 2017, i.e. «unique integrated framework to address common challenges faced by a defined geographical area covering Member States and third countries which thereby benefit from strengthened cooperation contributing to the achievement of economic, social and territorial cohesion». Macro-regions are the newest and at present the most challenging EU cohesion policy instrument, and this can be consistent to the fact that MRSs (see fig. 1) are built on important cross-border discontinuities in wealth between countries (Schuh *et al.*, 2015). However, since the beginning they showed their complexity and their controversial role. Compared with traditional regional policies, the governance structure and processes signify the primary innovation in this case. Moreover, MRSs aim inherently to a transformational power, an objective that is intrinsically based on its capacity of mainstreaming in sectoral policies and in the various funds (Tani *et al.*, 2014, p. 8) as well as finding a fair governance. Interestingly, ESPON highlights the relationship of MRSs to the European Territorial Agenda 2020 and, therefore into a European spatial development perspective. Thus, planning and implementing macro-regional strategies is a very ambitious and a unique experiment of geographic policy whose specific name is inspired by toponomastics and physical geography elements. Macro-regions can be considered functional areas, where the term "region" should not be intended as a territory within specific boundaries, but perceived as an area with specific issues to be solved (Berionni, 2012, p. 733; Belloni, 2016).

Unlike European territorial cooperation programmes (INTERREG), the three-no-principle dominates (i.e. no new EU funds, no additional EU formal structures and no new EU legislation) and becomes a challenge itself, strongly fatiguing a system that starts with a weak societal ground. However, the European Council (2017) recognizes again these three-no's as an instrument for optimal use of existing financial resources, better use of existing institutions and better implementation of existing legislation. In this perspective, the EU highlights the role of MRSs as a general multi-level, multi-stakeholders integrating planning tool in a transnational area.

This paper, therefore, starting with an overview of the MRS process, will focus on the EUSAIR, i.e. the European Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region. As for the methods of investigation used, next

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³ We date the institutional start of the MRS processes at the European Council on the 14th of December 2007 where the Commission was invited to present an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

to the critical review of the scientific, institutional, political and media documentation, both authors used the ethnographic research approach, observing directly in the field the processes of the setting up and the start up of EUSAIR and the relative governance, especially in Italy.




Figure 1. Macro-regional strategy areas and discontinuities in GDP per Capita (2008). Source: Schuh *et al.*, 2015.

2. Funding processes and governance: a focus on EUSAIR

The European Commission (EC) released its first EU macro-regional development strategy in June 2009 related to the Baltic and a new strategy embracing the Danube was adopted soon after. Whilst both the first two strategies have been developed and approved rapidly, longer negotiations were necessary to adopt and implement the Adriatic Ionian one, that was finally endorsed by the European Council in October 2014, followed by the last MRS covering the Alpine area in 2016 and, during the 2017 Maltese Presidency, the WestMed one. The relative quick approval can be seen as the result of already existing physical and historical connections, common objectives and mutual governance approaches. On the other hand, 'the fatigue of constructing a process' (Stocchiero, 2015a) referred to the efforts made to build the EUSAIR can be summarized by the following statement: the EUSAIR macro-region does not 'exist' but is a social and geopolitical construction (Bialasiewicz *et al.*, 2012; Grandi, 2013; Belloni, 2016). This does not deny cultural or ethnic affinities, common historical backgrounds, functional links or common interests (Nagler, 2013; Belloni, 2016; Tani *et al.*, 2014; Ciappetti *et al.*, 2015) but we argue that these elements were felt as less influential in the decision process leading to the adoption and implementation of EUSAIR. A decisive aspect of the opportunity to pursue the strategy of a MRS and to adopt it is the need to ensure the geopolitical stability of the region by providing a complementary multilateral accompanying instrument, favouring the process of integration of the EU of four more Balkan countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia

In particular, even though only marginally expressed in the official EUSAIR documents, the theme of pacification and normalization of interethnic relations is a watermark not to be overlooked⁴.

In the EUSAIR context, Italy has been at the forefront in developing the idea and asking the EU to establish a macro-region for the Adriatic Ionian area; a similar role has been played by Austria for the Danube and Sweden for the Baltic regions. More than the State level institutions and actors, both sub-nationals and civil society players have performed a crucial role in supporting the establishment of the EUSAIR, especially leading the EU Parliament and the EU Council in December 2012 to ask to the Commission to support a study and then the definition of an action plan. Moreover, think tanks and political bodies such as the Committee of Regions (CoR)⁵ the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR) and the Adriatic Ionian Euroregion association were substantial in supporting the EU-SAIR process. In parallel, but not less important for the sea based MRSs, the Sea Basin Maritime Strategy process was developed with a more sectoral, spatial and planning purpose. The need to simplify and integrate the maritime strategy (EC, 2012), Adriatic-Ionian macro-regional initiatives (AII, Adriatic Ionian Euroregion, Forum of the Chamber of Commerce, Forum of the Adriatic and Ionian Cities, Uniadrion, etc.) IPA-Adriatic, other Interreg cross-border and transnational European cooperation programmes, governance projects (i.e. Adrigov etc.), the Interreg VIB Adriatic-Ionian – ADRION 2014–2020 during its negotiating phase, led to the creation of a «common integrated system of action, synthetized by a common action plan» (EC, 2016). This action plan includes. a strategy, several political documents, a governance structure, an annual stakeholder forum, a EUSAIR facility point, a communication platform, a set of strategic projects, etc.

⁴ Further information can be found in AII (2017).

⁵ Under the presidency of a specific intergroup created for the Adriatic Ionian macro-region led by the Marche Region.

3. The case of the EUSAIR macro-regional strategy: Governance and Implementation

In its White Paper on Multilevel Governance the CoR refers to multi-level governance as to a «condition of good European governance» (CoR, 2009, p. 5) as «the European Union's capacity to perform its role and achieve Community objectives depends not only on its institutional organization but also and above all on its mode of governance. The legitimacy, efficiency and visibility of the way the Community operates depend on contributions from all the various players. They are guaranteed if local and regional authorities are genuine “partners” rather than mere “intermediaries”. Partnership goes beyond participation and consultation, promoting a more dynamic approach and greater responsibility for the various players. Accordingly, the challenge of multilevel governance is to ensure that there is a complementary balance between institutional governance and partnership-based governance». More generally, «multi-level governance can be defined as an arrangement for making decisions that engages a multiplicity [...] of interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels» (Kern, Gänzle, 2013, p. 10). As macro-regionalisation transcends EU borders multi-level governance embraces both EU member and non-member states. The inclusion of (parts of) non-member states is a common feature of all macro-regional strategies which have been developed or proposed so far.

In its Communication concerning the EUSAIR (EC, 2014) the Commission states that «experience with existing MSR shows that good and stable governance mechanisms are crucial for effective implementation». Furthermore, according to the Commission's Report on governance (EC, 2014), three main needs should be taken into consideration within the EUSAIR Governance: stronger political leadership, effective decision-making, and good organization where «better governance is not about new funds nor bureaucracy, but how and by whom the Strategy is implemented and joint actions initiated and financed. Governance must have both a political and operational dimension» (EC, 2014, p. 10).




Figure 2. Governance Architecture and official leaderships 2017. Source: author elaboration, 2017.

EUSAIR architecture at EU level (see fig. 2) started with two main levels: the political and the institutional technocratic ones. In turn, the second involves two main levels: the coordinating level represented by a Governing Board (GB) and the implementation level represented by Thematic Steering Groups (TSGs). In both of them the representation is provided to all eight countries composing the macro-regional area, i.e. four EU member states (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Slovenia) and four not-yet member states but benefiting of IPA funds.

The GB, based on self-approved rule of procedure, coordinates the work of the TSGs in charge of implementation of the pillar activities through strategic guidance provided by the EUSAIR Action Plan. To this end, representatives from the participating countries should be duly empowered by their respective Governments (EC, 2014). In particular, the GB is co-chaired by the country chairing *pro tempore* the AII and a country whose rotating leadership follows the alphabetical order criteria for equal leadership opportunities. Standing members are the national representatives for each participating country, at central government level, represented by two formally appointed National Coordinators, i.e. one senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and one from the Ministry or national administration responsible for coordinating EU cohesion or IPA funds in the country. Furthermore, to ensure the dialogue between the EU and transnational and national institutions, the GB is also composed by formally appointed Pillar Coordinators (high level officers of sectoral state-level Ministries, but without voting power)). Other members of the GB are: EC services (DG REGIO, DG MARE, DG NEAR and other Directorates-General as appropriate), a representative of the European Parliament, a member of the Committee of the Regions accompanied by a representative of its Adriatic-Ionian Interregional Group, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, the Permanent Secretariat of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, a representative of the Managing Authority of the Interreg Adriatic Ionian (ADRION) programme and of the EUSAIR Facility Point⁶.

A specific element of MRS processes is the strong involvement of institutional actors in defining and implementing an integrated, balanced, harmonized and sustainable development strategy; the official intention was the need to create a multilateral territorial governance for a greater alignment of regional, national and European policies and for the joint solution of common territorial problems, as the overcoming of infrastructural and intangible barriers. With this framework, the Communication from the Commission on the EUSAIR identifies four main interdependent pillars of strategic importance and accordingly, four TSGs (one per pillar) have been set up, with special arrangements set for Pillar 2 envisaging the creation of two sub-groups for transport and energy. The TSGs are chaired for an initial period of three years by a tandem of countries, on a rotating basis, starting with those acting as coordinators for the pillar of their choice during the consultation process (see fig. 2).

The architecture of the GB and TSGs does not show significant subnational roles despite the intent related to cohesion policy. This displays that the integration process and the regional decentralization has a variable geometry in the Western Balkan area compared to Italy. However, the Italian model of operation could possibly be imitated by the other participating countries.

As for Italy (see fig. 3), while applying the principles of good governance and in responding/recognizing the substantial role of promotion of EUSAIR and identification of factual project proposals of the Italian Regions, the articulation of the Italian representation in the TSGs is based on the presence of a member of the relevant central government bodies (i.e. the line Ministries) and a member of the Region leader of the EUSAIR intraregional governance Committee that was created earlier than 2011 following the AIE and AII processes, then consolidated with ADRIGOV-IPA Adriatic project⁷.

⁶ The ADRION programme supports the governance and implementation of the project “EUSAIR Facility Point”.

⁷ The Conference of Presidents of Regions and Autonomous Provinces on July 24, 2013 decided to set up

Under the auspices of the Italian Presidency of the Council – Department of European Policies, since the early stage of the implementation of the Strategy, a national EUSAIR coordination body (*cabina di regia nazionale EUSAIR*) has been set up involving both central and regional administrations aiming at strengthening the internal (national) leadership and coordination of the implementation process of the EUSAIR, thus creating a specific governance structure of EUSAIR at national level. This has been recognized as a best practice in 2016 during the EUSAIR First Forum held in Dubrovnik as an attempt to create a unique board to ensure that all leading institutions could align, inform, select and develop the Italian position in official meetings.



Figure 3. National Governance Architecture and official leaderships (2017).

To strengthen the system of Governance of EUSAIR, Italy intends to promote the setting up of a new model of rotatory advisory group made by a “Presidency Trio” (which will include the past, the current and the forthcoming chair countries), that should also prove instrumental in fostering a higher sense of ownership of the process among all the members of the Strategy.

Conclusions

On the one hand, macro-regional strategies (MRSs) can be a multilevel governance experience of the representation of territorial interests in the EU policy process with a search for mechanisms to institutionalize the ‘third level’, the sub-state one, according to Keating (2017). MRSs open up the black box of the state and emphasizes complexity, its weak ontological and normative foundations that has not yet reached the desirable resolution (*ibid.*). Projecting transnational MRSs open up the need and/or the will and the complexity of the enlarged EU. In particular, this MRS has become an opportunity to experience a multilevel approach in an area where the "maturity" of the Europeanization and pre-accession processes is still rather differentiated and the principle of subsidiarity is implemented in a

the EUSAIR Italy Working Group, entrusting the coordination to the Marche Region. As a consequence, Marche represents Italy in the Facility Point Project.

different way. In terms of governance MRSs and, in particular EUSAIR, become research labs of European integration of pre-acceding countries and capacity building in *acquis communautaire* and in multilevel governance. First, as a starting sign of involving in a broad EU political decision processes, the EUSAIR led to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia to follow actively the works of the European Council in 2014, a unique case at that time. Secondly, the example of the active role of Italian and Greece regions leads others to imitate it and empowers the Western Balkan regions. In particular this was acquired quite rapidly even if in rather differentiated actual forms going beyond the Adriatic Ionian Euroregion and project experiences. For instance, Slovenia struggled and finally decided to locate the EUSAIR facility point in a municipality and not in Ljubljana, Croatia ensured the participation of a regional representative in the Adrion programme coming from the Istria region, and the Albanian Region of Scutari is chairing the Adriatic Ionian task force in the CPRM.

On the other hand, it is too early to assess the work of TSGs as an opportunity to develop fair, effective, efficient and common supranational strategic planning systems (transport, energy), environmental policies and integrated development in the blue growth, tourism and innovation fields. Indeed, revising the MRS creation process by observing EUSAIR's governance leads to some clear conclusions regarding the complexity of this "new geometries of spatial association and integration" (Bilasiewicz *et al.*, 2012). The 'fatigue' (Stocchiero, 2015) is also there: it is partially due to a lack of significant dedicated funding that could have been a stronger incentive and motivation to technocrats and attract more the stakeholders' attention, but also it can be related to a weak trade integration, to non-homogeneous economic and technological capacities of the countries/regions involved and to the diversity and fragmentation of institutions and local/regional administrations (Ciappetti *et al.*, 2015). Moreover, an important element is still missing in all the EUSAIR processes, the capacity to really mobilize people, a broader set of stakeholders that goes beyond ministries, local and regional policy officers, practitioners in networking and EU project development.

To conclude, we believe that given its complexity and ambivalence it is too early to evaluate the positive or negative final potentials and results of MRS, this might be done around 2020 when TSGs projects should have delivered some significant results; however, there are already some learnings to be converted in policy recommendation in the post-2020 programming process.

The EUSAIR governance is a living lab and a capacity building platform, even if it has still several weak points, stemming from the overlook of some pre-conditions when it was launched. For instance, the Action plan (EC, 2014b) was developed without a complete study and a dataset for the indicators, but rather following political will, an imaginary sense of a functional area that had a weak ground and, last but not least, a creeping attempt to get new funds from the EC, then disappointed in practice, rather than willingness to develop supranational territorial planning. These elements result implicitly in words of the Commission (EC, 2016) and the European Council (2017) highlighting that further efforts should be done to reach expectations: stronger political commitment, sense of ownership for the implementation, improved coordination and cooperation, building the necessary administrative capacity, empowering key implementers and increase the ownership of the involved line ministries and mobilizing other stakeholders.

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DOMINIQUE RIVIÈRE¹

LA POLITICA EUROPEA DI COESIONE, QUALE APPROCCIO DEL TERRITORIO IN UN CONTESTO METROPOLITANO? IL CASO ROMANO

1. Introduzione. Collegare la metropolizzazione e la politica europea di coesione

In un testo che viene spesso citato, l'idea di europeanizzazione è definita da Radaelli (2002) come «processes of construction diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms [...] incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies». È possibile investigare la politica di coesione secondo questa prospettiva? Si tratterà qui più precisamente di analizzare l'europeanizzazione dal punto di vista *domestic*, cioè dal basso, cercando di entrare nel processo attraverso il quale l'azione locale/regionale/nazionale si collega alla dimensione europea. Questo processo è infatti larga parte dell'europeanizzazione perché è appunto la transcalarità di questi *ways of doing things* che fa esistere concretamente la politica di coesione sul territorio – adottando l'approccio di Pasquier e Pinson (2004) che vedono la politica di coesione come *une feuille de route*, una tabella di marcia che gli attori locali devono interpretare.

La dimensione della governance trans-scalare, strutturata intorno alla scala regionale, è una dimensione ormai ben nota della politica europea di coesione; a partire dagli anni 2000, innumerevoli studi e rapporti comunitari vi hanno fatto identificato il suo maggiore valore aggiunto (per esempio Leygues, 2001; Parlement européen, 2008, etc.) con effetti indiretti ma notevoli sulla stessa organizzazione interna dei singoli Stati (Ferlaino, Molinari, 2009). Al di là della coesione, l'idea della transcalarità è anche ben presente nell'idea di *aménagement du territoire* européen, che Baudelle e Elissalde (2007) definiscono come «le résultat [...] d'un demi-siècle de constructions institutionnelles incrémentales et de tâtonnements dans la légitimité des prises de décision»². Ma oltre l'interrogazione di fondo – è ancora *incrementale* questo processo di europeanizzazione nel momento della Brexit? – fino a che punto questi *tâtonnements* evocati da Baudelle e Elissalde o questi *ways of doing things* evocati da Radaelli hanno creato dei legami seri, validi, tra la programmazione comunitaria e gli altri livelli – statali, regionali e locali? Qual è la dimensione territoriale di questo sistema?

La politica di coesione sociale, economica e territoriale, dotata oggi di più di un terzo dei mezzi finanziari europei, è certamente la più territorializzata delle politiche europee, sia per le sue finalità di solidarietà inter-regionale e di sviluppo socio-economico regionale, sia per gli obiettivi specifici che si sono succeduti dalla riforma dei fondi strutturali del 1988 in poi³, e infine per il sistema di attori coin-

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² [Il risultato [...] di mezzo-secolo di costruzioni istituzionali incrementali e di tentativi ed errori nella legittimità delle decisioni].

³ Già negli anni '90, oltre al ritardo socio-economico (ex obiettivo 1, poi di convergenza), lo sviluppo rurale (ex-obiettivo 5b), la riconversione delle zone industriali in declino (ex-obiettivo 2), hanno legato la coesione alle politiche di sviluppo locale e regionale, radicandola nei territori urbani e rurali. Oggi la coesione usa tre categorie definite a scala regionale: regioni più sviluppate, in transizione e meno sviluppate.

volti intorno alla scala regionale – come si sa bene in Italia, l'ente Regione rappresenta l'autorità di gestione dei POR (piani operativi regionali). Alcuni anni fa, si è anche molto parlato a suo proposito di una *placed-based policy*. Ma nello stesso tempo, dalla metà degli anni 2000 in poi, questa dimensione territoriale è ridefinita, in alcuni approcci contestata: le strategie macro economiche come la strategia di Lisbona, oggi detta *Europa 2020* (Bruno, 2008) definiscono sempre di più le grandi linee della politica di coesione, ponendosi innanzitutto il problema della competitività dell'intero sistema UE nella problematica della globalizzazione delle economie e del cambiamento climatico. Quindi come si articolano queste diverse dimensioni? C'è anche l'intuizione che, a fronte di certe parole d'ordine su partenariato e integrazione pluri-scalare resa necessaria dalla politica di coesione, si incontrano nei diversi territori europei situazioni diversificate e complesse, alcune poco chiare, altre conflittuali, e che queste situazioni richiedono di valutare l'europeanizzazione tenendo conto anche dei mutamenti istituzionali recenti, in particolare dei mutamenti della geografia del potere tra regioni, Stato, enti locali, etc.

La crisi dell'idea di solidarietà inter-territoriale a vari livelli che si è diffusa negli due ultimi decenni ha anche modificato il quadro d'insieme della coesione: ne testimoniano a livello europeo le tensioni ricorrenti sugli equilibri da determinare tra Politica Agricola Comunitaria e Politica di Coesione ma anche sulla parte da attribuire alle regioni (prioritarie, più sviluppate...) e anche, più recentemente, la grave crisi Nord-Sud che ha accompagnato la cosiddetta "crisi dell'euro" nel 2011. In questi ultimi anni, in un clima di euro scetticismo crescente, l'Unione europea è spesso vista dai cittadini come una realtà lontana, o peggio come "il Grande Mercato che stravolge il territorio", più che come un sostegno, e anche per questo motivo, la politica di coesione viene valorizzata in modo molto disuguale dagli stessi attori pubblici chiamati ad attuarla. Per valutare questo processo di europeanizzazione attraverso la politica di coesione è dunque necessario tenere conto in qualche modo di queste ambivalenze, che diventano in alcuni casi contraddizioni.

Paradossalmente, mentre il progetto europeo si trova in una crisi sempre più seria, la politica di coesione diventa anche il campo di affermazione di nuove problematiche, tra cui quelle urbane e metropolitane.

La metropolizzazione è oggi una questione molto presente nel contesto europeo, sia come fenomeno che come preoccupazione delle politiche pubbliche (Reitel, 2012). Può essere definita genericamente sia come un processo di affermazione delle grandi città come nodi della globalizzazione, sia come formazione di una realtà territoriale molto complessa e frammentata (St-Julien, 2015), sia in alcuni casi come l'istituzionalizzazione di un nuovo livello di potere, come viene previsto ad esempio nelle leggi Delrio in Italia o Maptam (*Modernisation de l'action publique territoriale et d'affirmation des métropoles*, 2014) in Francia. Questa istituzionalizzazione modifica notevolmente il quadro d'insieme nel quale interviene la politica di coesione. Anche se la città metropolitana è tuttora per la maggior parte da inventare, comunque gli altri attori istituzionali consolidati – le Regioni, i comuni... – devono tenerne conto almeno come contesto istituzionale nuovo (Cremaschi *et al.*, 2015). Tuttavia questa situazione di incompiutezza potrebbe durare a lungo, in Italia come del resto in Francia, dal momento che la metropoli è, come nota Storper (2014) «the governance problem par excelllence», e la stessa idea di un'istituzione metropolitana continua ad essere contestata da diversi autori che la considerano anzi come una specie di controsenso (Vanier, 2013).

Le diverse dimensioni della metropolizzazione – nodo della globalizzazione delle economie, istituzione territoriale nuova, etc. – sono comunque collegate tra di loro: ad esempio un recente rapporto sulle città metropolitane italiane (Vetrino, 2017) afferma che «le città italiane, in un contesto economico in cui le città sono ridiventate i poli di traino dei sistemi economici nazionali, i loro principali hub di sviluppo (nel duplice senso della crescita economica e del mantenimento di sostenibili sistemi di inclusione sociale, stanno in larga misura mancando l'appuntamento con il nuovo ruolo che la modernità assegna loro», legando questa considerazione con l'idea che le città metropolitane potrebbero mi-

glierare la situazione delle grandi città nella competizione territoriale mondiale⁴.

La complessità del processo metropolitano viene anche oggi riconosciuta dalla politica di coesione. Da due decenni in effetti, l'UE e più particolarmente la DG Regio (Direzione delle politiche regionali e urbane della Commissione) ha poco a poco sviluppato una visione dualistica delle grandi città, viste come «the engines of the European economy and [...] catalysts for creativity and innovation throughout the Union. But they are also places where persistent problems, such as unemployment, segregation and poverty, are at their most severe» (DG Regio, 2016). L'interesse europeo si è portato in un primo tempo soprattutto sulla frammentazione interna delle città, con il programma Urban, che era centrato sui quartieri urbani in crisi (Mboumoua, 2007; Pasquier, Pinson, 2004). In un secondo momento, cioè a partire del 2007 – con l'eleggibilità di intere regioni alla politica di coesione, anche quelle ricche (dette di competitività) e non più soltanto le regioni povere (dette di convergenza) – la problematica metropolitana è entrata nel *mainstream* della coesione. L'Asse urbano della programmazione 2007-13 ha contribuito a porre l'attenzione su questa problematica. La programmazione 2014-20 impone oggi agli Stati membri l'allocazione di un minimo del 5% delle risorse FESR al tema dello “sviluppo integrato urbano”. Accanto alla spinta a questo approccio territoriale integrato, c'è anche uno sviluppo della tematica metropolitana tramite la priorità data alla ricerca e sviluppo, all'innovazione etc. all'interno dei programmi regionali e nazionali, ma anche la possibilità – a certe condizioni – di finanziare l'edilizia sociale (prima del 2010 questi interventi erano completamente al di fuori dal campo di azione di questa politica). Entrambe queste azioni avvicinano la politica di coesione alle problematiche sia strategiche che quotidiane delle metropoli. Nello stesso momento, la soppressione della zonizzazione per l'erogazione dei fondi permette non soltanto alle aree marginali metropolitane ma anche alle stesse zone centrali delle metropoli di entrare nel campo di azione dei fondi strutturali. Infine, recentemente sono nati diversi esperimenti promossi da singoli Stati o regioni, alcuni dei quali sono direttamente legati con la creazione delle Città metropolitane: ad esempio, nell'attuale programmazione 2014-20 dei fondi strutturali, il governo italiano ha deciso di collegare le due problematiche – coesione e città metropolitane – attraverso il Programma nazionale (PON) Metro. Anche se promosso dallo Stato, come lo è stata del resto la stessa riforma Delrio del 2014, questo programma⁵ sembra europeanizzare il processo metropolitano italiano, ponendolo «in linea con gli obiettivi e le strategie della costituenda Agenda urbana europea» (Agenzia della Coesione, 2015): «Mentre in passato l'attenzione verso le città si concentrava sulla risoluzione dei soli squilibri sul piano socio-economico e ambientale – fenomeni di esclusione sociale, difficoltà di accesso ai servizi per il welfare e la qualità della vita, crescenti forme di pressione sul capitale naturale – la fase più recente, influenzata dal perseguitamento degli obiettivi della strategia Europa 2020 e da quanto emerso dai tavoli nazionali di confronto [...], attribuisce alle politiche urbane ulteriori ed ambiziosi compiti rispetto a quelli già praticati nei precedenti cicli di programmazione. Oggi si tratta di far convergere sulle città, tutte quelle politiche che si propongono di contrastare le ricadute sociali della crisi economica, di esplorare con maggiore efficacia il tema del cambiamento climatico, di accompagnare i processi di riforma e riorganizzazione istituzionale che si stanno compiendo negli Stati membri» (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, 2015, p. 7).

Quindi, come si adattano gli attori tradizionali – Regione etc. – della coesione a questo nuovo contesto metropolitano? Quali sono gli effetti sul contenuto della politica di coesione e sull'articolazione dei diversi livelli di governo regionale/metropolitano/locale?

⁴ Però per la loro definizione il criterio economico non è stato usato né in Italia, dove si è usato il quadro provinciale preesistente, né in Francia, dove ci si riferisce a criteri funzionali (*aires urbaines*) e istituzionali (*intercommunalités* preesistenti).

⁵ Seguendo un impulso alla presa in considerazione del fatto urbano sia a livello nazionale (Barca) ed europeo (Hahn), che sembra essere venuto meno in seguito.

2. Il caso di studio: Roma e il Lazio

Il caso del Lazio offre un esempio interessante per affrontare queste questioni, anche se per certi aspetti è anche un caso ambiguo.

Mentre diverse regioni metropolitane ricche, come ad esempio l'Ile-de-France o anche la Lombardia tutto sommato accedono da poco tempo al FESR (dal 2000 per la regione parigina), nel Lazio invece la politica di coesione aveva assunto, già nei lontani anni '90, l'eredità dell'Intervento straordinario, che ai tempi della vecchia Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, cominciava ai confini del territorio romano, precisamente nelle località romane di Santa Palomba e Castel Romano (Rivière, 1996). Oggi, la regione Lazio è classificata tra quelle meno agevolate della politica di coesione, dato il suo livello di sviluppo (considerando che il PIL per abitante supera del 10% la media europea), anche se come vedremo in seguito, l'eredità del passato si evidenzia ancora in alcune materie. Il legame tra coesione e metropolizzazione presenta comunque una grande diversità nel caso della capitale italiana. L'Asse urbano è stato usato nel Lazio nel POR del 2007-13, come in diverse altre regioni italiani e francesi (DATAR, 2014), anche se soltanto alla fine della programmazione, cioè in pratica dal 2011 al 2015 (termine dei finanziamenti). L'attuale POR 2014-20 non usa lo strumento degli interventi territoriali integrati (ITI), che ha ereditato gli interventi dell'Asse urbano in diverse regioni metropolitane europee (come ad esempio l'Ile de France) ma, per definire le sue priorità, utilizza piuttosto 45 progetti, non specificamente urbani, scelti direttamente dalla Regione Lazio (fig. 1, la diffusione auspicata della banda larga).




Figura 1. Il POR del Lazio, 45 progetti per il Lazio: la priorità Banda larga, Regione Lazio, 2014.

Nel catalogo delle misure cofinanziate dalla politica di coesione, c'è anche il programma nazionale appena citato, cioè il PON-Metro-Roma, che è centrato sul Comune di Roma.

Ma il Lazio è anche per alcuni aspetti un contro-esempio o comunque presenta una situazione considerata da tutti gli attori della coesione incontrati durante l'indagine⁶ come "molto difficile".

Questa diagnosi ricorrente è legata principalmente all'instabilità politica e alle numerose crisi di legittimità e di esercizio concreto del potere relative a questa instabilità: prima al livello della Regione (ad esempio, molti ritardi di spesa erano accumulati all'inizio del mandato dell'attuale giunta Zingaretti, cioè nel 2013), poi del Comune di Roma (scandalo mafia capitale...) in un clima nazionale marcato da numerose crisi del potere locale e regionale. Al di là di questo contesto difficile, c'è comunque anche da tenere conto del fatto che Roma, essendo un comune eccezionale sia per i suoi poteri di capitale che per la sua ampiezza territoriale – 1.287 km² e 2,8 milioni di abitanti, cioè i due terzi della popolazione della nuova Città metropolitana (4,3 milioni) e quasi la metà della popolazione della stessa regione Lazio (5,9 milioni), con processi notevoli di crescita demografica periferica sia fuori che dentro i confini comunali⁷ – è, già di per se, anche con tutti i suoi limiti, un potere alternativo alla nascente Città metropolitana. Anche dal punto di vista funzionale, la situazione romana e laziale è ambigua: da una parte, la regione capitale ha sperimentato per diversi decenni un *trend* piuttosto favorevole, che negli anni 2000 ha favorito più o meno tutte le capitali europee (UE, 2010) e che nel caso di Roma le ha permesso di affermare il suo ruolo rispetto a Milano – senza considerare inoltre il fatto che Roma dispone, in relazione al suo patrimonio culturale, di una fama senz'altro di livello "mondiale" senza essere "globale" nel senso consueto come lo sono per certi aspetti Milano o Parigi (Gorrha-Gobin, 2012). Ma dall'altro lato, come altre grande città italiane, la capitale italiana ha sofferto della crisi dei *subprimes* del 2008 e di quelle che l'hanno seguita – come dimostrato recentemente dalla crisi dell'Alitalia e dalle vicende della candidatura alle Olimpiadi, etc. Roma inoltre dimostra secondo molti autori anche una metropolizzazione incompiuta: sia morfologicamente che da un punto di vista funzionale, si presenta come una realtà metropolitana satellitare, difficile da integrare (Cremaschi, 2010; Prezioso, D'Orazio, 2015).

Insomma, anche in questo contesto difficile, si poteva seguire almeno come ipotesi di partenza l'idea che il contesto metropolitano e la scala regionale si articolassero, poco a poco, nel quadro europeo e nazionale appena evocato, sia nel contenuto dei programmi di attuazione della politica di coesione che nella governance di questi stessi programmi. Si poteva pensare che, appunto in un contesto di instabilità del potere, indotto dal riordino territoriale (istituzione della Città metropolitana) e dai processi contraddittori di decentralizzazione/ricentralizzazione e di incertezza finanziaria degli ultimi anni, la politica di coesione coinvolgesse intorno alle sue problematiche, tra cui anche quelle urbane e metropolitane, diverse territorialità istituzionali. L'idea che ci sarebbe stato, in un sistema di governance certo ancora chiaramente dominato dalla scala regionale, un'emergenza, una percolazione di una problematica metropolitana, è infatti presente, almeno dal punto di vista retorico, nel POR della

⁶ L'indagine ha mobilizzato diversi incontri, tenutosi tra novembre 2013 e la primavera 2017 (cioè prima dell'attuale giunta romana), con sette attori della coesione, a diversi livelli della Regione Lazio (Assessorato allo Sviluppo economico e Attività produttive) o del Dipartimento per la coesione (PON METRO), e cinque attori locali e responsabili della coesione al livello di Roma (Risorse per Roma, Comune di Roma, Comune di Fiumicino), di cui alcuni sono stati intervistati diverse volte, cioè una ventina di incontri in tutto. Ringrazio tutti per la loro disponibilità. Per la dimensione comparativa con l'Ile-de-France, si deve ringraziare anche i responsabili del Servizio europeo di Plaine Commune, incontrati numerose volte anche nell'ambito del master Aménagement-développement local dell'Università Paris-Diderot. Questa indagine ha avuto il sostegno dell'Ecole française de Rome e dell'UMR Géographie-cités.

⁷ Nel 1998 il 18% della popolazione comunale abitava fuori dal GRA, mentre nel 2012 vi risiede il 26%. PON Metro, 2016.

stessa Regione Lazio del 2014, come si legge ad esempio a proposito della mobilità urbana⁸ – problematica di per sé chiaramente metropolitana: «La situazione del traffico pendolare da/verso Roma è rappresentata in modo molto accurato nel PGTU di Roma (settembre 2014): la mobilità pendolare è cresciuta del 50% tra il 2004 ed il 2013, passando dai 550mila spostamenti giornalieri agli attuali 820mila; [...] Nello stesso modo il redigendo Piano regionale per la mobilità, attualizza e contestualizza le previsioni dei precedenti strumenti di pianificazione, incluso il Piano di Bacino passeggeri della Provincia di Roma [...]. Gli obiettivi rappresentati per la Città metropolitana non riguardano la sola sfera del PO, perché ad essi concorrono ulteriori risorse regionali (circa un ulteriore 40% degli investimenti) e le ulteriori risorse destinate a Roma Capitale dal PON Metro» (*POR FESR LAZIO 2014-2020, misura RA 4.6Aumento della mobilità sostenibile nelle aree urbane*, p. 94.).

In questo testo, la transcalarità (tra Comune, Provincia – oggi Città metropolitana – e Regione) è messa in rilievo, come lo è l'idea della complementarità tra la politica di coesione nel Lazio (il POR, il PON-metro) e gli altri programmi locali o regionali. Tuttavia in realtà, questa convergenza delle questioni metropolitane e della politica di coesione, pur rimanendo uno dei fili di lettura possibili del POR e del PON Metro, non è così ovvia. Oltre i limiti legati alla minore visibilità della politica di coesione nelle regioni ricche⁹, diversi problemi metodologici sono legati alla complessità, appunto, di un sistema trans-scalare come quello della coesione. Da una parte, si deve tenere conto di temporalità complesse: l'attuazione delle politiche comunitarie è ritmata dai successivi bandi della Regione, dalle temporalità dei diversi livelli istituzionali o imprenditoriali connessi. Bisogna anche tenere conto del fatto che la politica di coesione è soltanto una parte di un'azione pubblica più ampia¹⁰. Si deve infine prendere atto sia dall'aspetto "trainante" della coesione che delle difficoltà quotidiane, delle incertezze nelle quali agiscono concretamente molti attori della coesione e delle politiche urbane, nel contesto attuale di scarsità delle risorse finanziarie. A Roma – come del resto a Parigi o in altre regioni –, gli attori accennano volentieri, e in termini spesso quasi identici malgrado i diversi contesti nazionali, al fatto che la programmazione europea è una nicchia di innovazione in materia di governance, grazie alla trilogia diagnosi/formulazione di una strategia di sviluppo / azioni, adottata in un modo o nell'altro da tutti i POR, grazie anche all'idea di progetto integrato, molto presente negli aspetti più territorializzati della coesione come l'*Asse urbano*¹¹. Ma d'altro cento, la maggior parte degli stessi attori, sia della Regione che del livello locale, sottolineano la loro difficoltà a vedere chiaro nel contesto dentro il quale sono inseriti, a proiettarsi a breve o medio termine. Questo è particolarmente ovvio in un contesto romano senz'altro dominato in questi ultimi anni dall'emergenza.

Comunque, al di là di questi aspetti metodologici e al di là del difficile contesto attuale, l'esempio del Lazio dimostra a nostro parere anche un'ambivalenza più profonda, nel senso che la metropoliz-

⁸ Sul periodo 2016-18, nell'Asse 4 del POR FESR Lazio 2014/2020 – *Energia Sostenibile e Mobilità*, sono previsti, 32,7 milioni di euro, in maggioranza per Roma capitale: quasi la stessa cifra dell'intero programma PON METRO ROMA (37,7 milioni). Deliberazione della giunta regionale n.323, 14 giugno 2016, <http://lazioeuropa.it/files/160908/>.

⁹ Anche se in Italia, la politica di coesione è di solito più valorizzata che in Francia, dagli attori locali/regionali nel loro marketing territoriale, c'è un contrasto da questo punto di vista tra le regioni prioritarie da una parte, dove l'impatto della coesione si vede a ogni angolo delle vie di Napoli o di Palermo, e dall'altra parte le regioni non prioritarie: a Roma ben raramente è messa in rilievo, neanche nelle zone urbane dove è stata usata, come ad esempio nella riqualificazione del quartiere di Porta Portese (ma non lo è molto di più nella periferia nord parigina di Seine St-Denis, pure lei beneficiaria dei fondi di coesione).

¹⁰ Vedi ad esempio i 500 milioni del *Bando periferie* della legge n. 208 del 2015 della Regione Lazio, che si collegano solo in parte con i finanziamenti del POR.

¹¹ Alcuni autori propongono l'idea di un tipo specifico di professionisti della coesione, che sarebbero, per la loro capacità a costruire la trans-scalarità, da distinguere dagli attori usuali dalla governance locale (Marchand-Tonel, Simoulin, 2004).

zazione sembra per alcuni versi un elemento dell'europeanizzazione, presente nelle scelte regionali e nazionali, ma per altri versi rimane come contenuta da altre priorità.

3. Europeanizzare: quali priorità territoriali della coesione per una regione metropolitana?

Per una prima indagine sulla situazione a livello regionale, il POR è una fonte di informazione insostituibile, costituendo la parte prevalente dell'apparato istituzionale e finanziario della coesione: 2,6 miliardi di euro rispetto ai 38 milioni del PON metro-Roma¹². A questo si devono aggiungere le informazioni ottenibili dalla banca dati *Open coesione* del Dipartimento per la coesione della Presidenza del Consiglio: la piattaforma permette di seguire i finanziamenti in modo abbastanza dettagliato, almeno alla scala comunale (purtroppo non è disponibile il dato disaggregato al livello dei municipi). È anche possibile usare il POR come punto di partenza per una prima visione del territorio dal punto di vista della Regione, perché la Regione Lazio ha fatto appunto la scelta di integrare i diversi fondi sia regionali che nazionali intorno alle sue 45 priorità per favorire un effetto leva¹³ della coesione sui propri investimenti (Regione Lazio, 2014).


La scelta principale della Regione Lazio, per la programmazione 2014-20 come d'altronde nelle precedenti, è chiaramente un'allocazione delle risorse *Lisbona oriented*, cioè un appoggio indiretto alla metropolizzazione nel senso economico, abbastanza tipico delle regioni non prioritarie: si tratta di favorire il "sistema Roma" nella rete delle regioni ricche italiane e europee. Per il FESR 30 % dei finanziamenti sono dedicati alla "competitività"; quasi il 20% a ricerca-innovazione; un altro 17% va alla digitalizzazione. Alcuni settori sono considerati trainanti e messi in rilievo: a livello europeo l'aerospaziale è oggi più valorizzato dei beni culturali dalla Regione Lazio. Il POR 2014-20 è anche molto orientato verso le imprese mentre, per evitare i ritardi di erogazione dei fondi del programma regionale precedente, si è fatta la scelta di eliminare il più possibile i "settori a rischio" come le opere pubbliche. Comunque, a parte la mobilità richiamata sopra, siamo lontani da un approccio urbano nel senso fisico e morfologico del termine; si tratta piuttosto di favorire Roma come nodo europeo. Un altro elemento di questa strategia è la rete trans-europea della politica europea dei trasporti (RET), anche, se da questo punto di vista, pure essendo parte del Corridoio tirrenico, il Lazio è meno favorito della Lombardia.

Sempre nel POR, l'accento messo sulla coesione sociale è la controparte dell'approccio orientato alla competitività (fig. 2). Questa dimensione sociale, in sintonia con la tematica dell'Agenda urbano 2030 (tuttora in costruzione), si ritrova in altri programmi attivi nel Lazio, come il PON-METRO di Roma¹⁴ (tav. 1).

¹² L'allocazione dei fondi del PON-Metro è graduata a seconda del livello di priorità delle regioni, tra regioni più sviluppate, in transizione e meno sviluppate.

¹³ Nei 45 progetti della Regione Lazio, alcuni interventi non sono appoggiati da fondi europei ma piuttosto da fondi nazionali. Inoltre, alcuni progetti un tempo 'europeanizzati', perché coerenti con l'*Asse urbano* del 2013-14 proseguono oggi con altri finanziamenti della stessa Regione – come ad esempio le piste ciclabili del litorale romano, finanziate, nel caso di Latina, dall'*Asse urbano* 2011-13 che oggi non sono più nel POR ma sono finanziate dall'azione 'ordinaria' della Regione Lazio.

¹⁴ Il PON-Metro insiste sul «permanere di fenomeni di degrado ambientale e marginalità sociale soprattutto nelle periferie ed in contesti 'di cintura' (ovvero nelle agglomerazioni insediative delle grandi città in espansione che inglobano vecchi borghi e trasformano aree verdi in periferia, il cosiddetto 'processo di metropolizzazione')». Agenzia per la Coesione, *ibid.*, p. 8.



Fonte: Regione Lazio, 2014.

Figura 2. Le priorità del POR 2014-20 della Regione Lazio, Regione Lazio, 2014.

	Risorse assegnate (milioni di euro)
Agenda digitale metropolitana	10
Sostenibilità dei servizi pubblici e della mobilità urbana	13,5
Servizi per l'inclusione sociale	9,8
Infrastrutture per l'inclusione sociale	3,4
Assistenza tecnica	1
Totale	37,8

Tavola 1. Le priorità del PON metro di Roma.Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, 2016, PON-METRO Roma.

È anche presente in alcuni progetti dell'Asse urbano 2011-13: ad esempio a Pomezia, comune della periferia Sud di Roma, il progetto locale cofinanziato dai fondi di coesione era mirato all'inclusione sociale e co-finanziando un asilo nido e diversi servizi (tirocini formativi, etc.), mirati all'inserimento delle donne nel mercato del lavoro. Questa dimensione sociale della coesione si può interpretare in due modi: da una parte come la doverosa affermazione della dimensione sociale della strategia di Lisbona, ma dall'altra come il riflesso almeno per alcuni aspetti di un certo fallimento della stessa Unione europea, che "rovescia" oggi sulla coesione alcune materie che forse dovrebbe trattare in modo più energico, come ad esempio l'accoglienza dei migranti¹⁵.

¹⁵ Nel PON-Metro di Roma, diverse comunità Rom sono *target* nell'ambito dell'inclusione sociale. Più genericamente, la politica di coesione offre un sostegno all'impegno notevole dei comuni italiani: nel 2015, secondo l'associazione Urban@it, sono stati 30 000 i beneficiari dei progetti del *Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati* (Sprar), con il coinvolgimento complessivo di oltre 1.000 comuni.




Figura 3. Finanziamenti per ab. (Euro), istantanea rilevata sul sito open coesione, ottobre 2017.

Per quanto attiene alla geografia dell'intervento europeo (fig. 3), c'è da rilevare una contraddizione: mentre, nella rappresentazione che gli stessi attori locali si fanno della coesione, Roma viene spesso vista da diversi attori locali della sua periferia come un punto che "fagocita le risorse" – ed è in effetti favorita rispetto a Fiumicino ad esempio, se si considerano gli investimenti per abitante –, invece, a livello regionale, la visione dominante è che «il Lazio non è la Baviera o Ile de France, qui ci sono anche zone sotto-sviluppate» e si tratta di «allentare la pressione su Roma»¹⁶ favorendo le periferie più lontane – che di fatto concentrano i finanziamenti maggiori per abitante (fig. 3). Per certi aspetti, si potrebbe intravedere dunque piuttosto un approccio contro-metropolitano che metropolitano, in continuità con la visione del territorio che prevaleva già, da parte della stessa Regione, ai tempi dell'Intervento straordinario (Rivière, 1996). Globalmente, le periferie regionali – ad esempio Civitavecchia – sono agevolate, mentre quelle metropolitane vengono meno prese in considerazione malgrado il fatto che siano al cuore della costruzione della Città metropolitana.

Tuttavia si pone anche la questione di come valutare il riferimento metropolitano? Dal punto di vista funzionale, diversi interventi che sono a distanza di Roma, come ad esempio il raccordo Orte-Civitavecchia (fig. 4), potevano essere concepiti negli anni '70 e '80 soprattutto come a favore della periferia laziale. Invece possono oggi essere anche concepiti come parte integrante di una città-regione metropolitana tuttora in costruzione – inoltre, sono anche un modo di allontanare dalla metropoli una parte del pesante traffico stradale che subisce oggi giorno.

¹⁶ Giorgio Pugliese, Regione Lazio, Direttore dell'Area programmazione economica, intervistato il 1/4/2015.



Figura 4. Il raccordo Orte-Civitavecchia, una dei 45 priorità della regione Lazio, Regione Lazio, 2014.

Più genericamente, questo esempio pone il problema della definizione del perimetro della metropolizzazione: qual è la scala la più adatta per agire sul territorio nella competizione internazionale al tempo della *city region* (Salone, 2013)? Nella legge Delrio, il perimetro della città metropolitana coincide con quello dell'ex-provincia, scelta che, nel caso di Roma ha un certo senso dal punto di vista funzionale – a differenza di altre metropoli italiane come Torino, dove l'abito nuovo della Città metropolitana è chiaramente troppo ampio, o anche a differenza di Parigi, dove l'abito è al contrario ben troppo stretto¹⁷. Comunque, la Città metropolitana non è e non sarà mai sufficiente, neanche nel caso romano, a contenere l'insieme delle problematiche della metropolizzazione, lasciando così un ruolo notevole alla scala regionale – situazione che si ritrova in altre metropoli come Parigi (Lacoste, 2013).

Se si ritorna brevemente ai territori della periferia metropolitana esterna di Roma si deve aggiungere un altro elemento. Il fatto che Fiumicino (secondo comune del Lazio per importanza demografica con quasi 80.000 abitanti), sia un po' in ombra nel POR può sembrare strano, tanto più che, in un contesto marcato dalla crisi finanziaria, immobiliare (e oggi anche aerospaziale), c'è una domanda forte rispetto alla coesione in questa fascia della corona metropolitana. Come rileva un coordinatore locale della politica di coesione: «Fiumicino era fuori dalla storia anche perché c'erano i trasferimenti statali, adesso dobbiamo trovare risorse»¹⁸. Inoltre, diversi progetti, indirizzati verso i beni culturali o la mobilità urbana, avrebbero bisogno urgente di co-finanziamento. In questa stessa corona esterna di Roma però, alcuni territori sono più favoriti dall'erogazione delle risorse, come Pomezia, Aprilia o Latina, anche qui in continuità con i lontani decenni dell'Intervento straordinario nel Mezzogiorno – anche se ormai queste aree non sono al primo posto della graduatoria. Questo suggerisce che l'abitudine a sollecitare e a usare i meccanismi della coesione giocano un ruolo, nel Lazio come in altre regioni europee: insomma la conoscenza pratica del sistema fornisce «un atout favorable aux territoires les

¹⁷ L'aeroporto Charles de Gaulle e altri siti di servizio delle metropolizzazioni non fanno parte della *Métropole du Grand Paris* come viene definita dalla Legge MAPTAM del 2014 (Lacoste, 2013; Rivière, 2015).

¹⁸ Intervista di Anna Fioracci, Ufficio europeo di Fiumicino, giugno 2015.

meilleur informé»¹⁹ (Lamenie, 2015) mentre la sua assenza penalizzerebbe i neofiti. Ad esempio, sempre nel caso di Fiumicino, un progetto di parco archeologico litorale, mirato a valorizzare l'eccezionale patrimonio storico del Porto di Traiano, situato a ridosso di Ostia Antica – e che avrebbe una dimensione metropolitana ovvia, essendo al confine dei due comuni, – è stato presentato troppo tardi per essere inserito nella programmazione del POR 2014-20.

4. Un sistema di governance regionale, ma marcato dalla concorrenza più che dalla complementarietà tra la Regione e Roma

Questo pone il problema più generale della governance della coesione. Senza entrare qui nella complessità della governance del Lazio²⁰, è importante rilevare come i rapporti di potere difficili che si pongono tra la scala regionale e quella metropolitana, questa volta nel senso istituzionale del termine (cioè la Regione rispetto alla Città metropolitana, ma soprattutto rispetto al Comune di Roma), giocano un ruolo notevole nelle vicende della politica di coesione.

Una prima serie di osservazioni attiene all'importanza data nella governance della coesione al livello della Città metropolitana in costruzione o di Roma comune, rispetto a quello tradizionale e tuttora vigente, cioè quello regionale. Anche se la questione era già risolta, a favore delle regioni, per l'attuale programmazione comunitaria 2014-20, al momento dell'approvazione della legge Delrio, è ovvio che la nuova situazione amministrativa dell'Italia pone una specie di ipoteca sul futuro, tanto più che la storia dei rapporti tra Città metropolitana e Regione è già lunga nella regione romana. In effetti il Lazio è stato ed è ancora oggi (Società Geografica Italiana, 2013) l'oggetto di diversi progetti di ridefinizione dei confini regionali coinvolgendo Roma o la sua provincia da una parte, il resto della regione dall'altra. L'equilibrio dei poteri tra Regione e capitale è tanto più instabile che, anche al livello europeo, la supremazia del livello regionale è stata (brevemente) messa in discussione durante la preparazione della programmazione 2014-20: si è parlato dell'opportunità di associare altri livelli decisionali o di attuazione infra-regionali. Dunque, la politica di coesione si inserisce in un complesso gioco di potere/contropotere tra Stato, Regioni e poteri locali, contesto per certi versi instabile e sempre incerto oggi. La scelta (statale) del PON-Metro di puntare soltanto sul comune centro²¹, Roma, e non sull'intera città metropolitana, con i suoi 121 comuni, è abbastanza rappresentativa di questa situazione locale e regionale un po' confusa. La questione evocata sopra dell'importanza data alla capitale nel POR è verosimilmente anche da valutare alla luce di questo conflitto lampante di legittimità: mentre secondo la Regione «noi non possiamo programmare soltanto con Roma *prima inter pares*»²²,

¹⁹ una carta vincente favorevole ai territori meglio informati.

²⁰ Per la coesione, la Regione Lazio si organizza in diverse sub-strutture. La Cabina di Regia è presieduta dall'Assessore al Bilancio della Giunta Regionale. Sono inoltre componenti della Cabina di Regia: l'Assessorato al Bilancio della Giunta Regionale; l'Assessorato Sviluppo economico e Attività produttive, che svolge di fatto il ruolo maggiore ma anche diversi Assessorati come Formazione, Ricerca, Scuola e Università, Agricoltura, Turismo; il Nucleo di Valutazione e Verifica degli investimenti pubblici della Regione Lazio; la Struttura Rapporti con gli Enti Locali, le Regioni, lo Stato, l'Unione Europea presso il Segretariato generale, cui sono affidate le funzioni di Segreteria scientifico-amministrativa. Inoltre, diverse agenzie sono coinvolte nella politica di coesione: all'agenzia Sviluppo Lazio è affidata l'assistenza tecnica, ma collabora anche con altre agenzie, come ad esempio BIC Lazio. Anche per il Comune di Roma capitale, la coesione interessa diversi organismi e agenzie, tra cui Risorse per Roma.

²¹ Alcune misure toccano tuttavia la Città metropolitana, ad esempio la promozione dei servizi interattivi: l'obiettivo è di far passare il percentuale sul totale dei comuni della Città metropolitana dal 20% (2012) al 70% (2023). PON-Metro, 2016.

²² G. Pugliese, colloquio svoltosi il primo aprile 2015.

uno dei responsabili della coesione a livello del Comune si rammarica invece dei «vecchi regolamenti dove un comune vale uno, ogni ente vale uno»²³. Questo contesto incerto, sia locale che europeo, non impedisce ovviamente una collaborazione tra i diversi enti, ma rende invece problematica l'ideazione di un'interfaccia stabile tra essi. L'istituzionalizzazione dei rapporti Regione – Roma era auspicata all'inizio della programmazione: al di là del programma PON-Metro, c'era l'idea di creare una struttura di collegamento tra il Comune di Roma e la Regione per l'uso dei fondi europei, con l'intesa CREA (Comune Regione Europa Assieme) stesa nel 2014 tra i due livelli decisionali. In seguito diverse strutture come l'Ufficio Progetti europei (Roma Comune, 2014) poi il Dipartimento Europa (Comune e Stato-DPS, 2015) hanno ripreso l'idea, ma non hanno superato i conflitti d'interesse tra Regione e Comune.

Un'altra serie di domande riguarda la scala d'intervento usata nella politica di coesione quando si tratta più specificamente dello sviluppo urbano integrato: questo, nella programmazione comunitaria, è al cuore della costruzione di una dimensione urbana allo stesso tempo globale e radicata nel locale, trasversale nei suoi obiettivi, considerata come adatta alle sfide che incontrano le metropoli²⁴. Questa dimensione di “co-costruzione dal basso” con gli attori locali è anche un elemento basico della problematica della metropolizzazione – come inserirsi in questo processo? – che potrebbe dunque appoggiarsi sulla politica di coesione. Se si paragona il Lazio – nella fase 2011-13 del POR – ad altre regioni come l'Ile-de-France, alcuni punti di convergenza emergono nei progetti: genericamente, l'idea stessa dello sviluppo urbano integrato è ben presente, integrando sia opere fisiche – nel caso del Lazio, riqualificazione di piazze o vie come a Rieti, o a Porta Portese a Roma, tramite finanziamenti modesti (per 3,5 milioni di euro nel caso del mercato di Porta Portese), di palazzi (ex-CGIL di Porta Portese, altri 3,1 milioni), creazione di piste ciclabili (Latina) etc. – che misure sociali ed economiche come quelle evocate sopra a proposito di Pomezia. Da questo punto di vista, si può considerare che esiste un'europeanizzazione, nel senso che questi interventi si ritrovano quasi identici nella periferia di Parigi (miglioramento dei dintorni della stazione di St-Denis, etc.), anche se, nel caso del progetto di Porta Portese, molti si rammaricano oggi del sotto-utilizzo del palazzo ex-CGIL²⁵.

Per quanto attiene agli attori, l'importanza data alla scala comunale nel Lazio è un punto di per sé interessante per la problematica che ci interessa, quella della città metropolitana in costruzione e dei suoi rapporti con la scala regionale. Piuttosto che mirare alla metropoli romana nelle sue diverse fasce, il bando dell'Asse urbano è stato esteso a tutti i comuni di più di 25.000 abitanti del Lazio: si trattava (di nuovo) di «fare qualcosa sul territorio, di essere visibili [...] senza privilegiare Roma»²⁶.

²³ Incontro con Patrizia Paris, allora consulente per il Comune di Roma, 30 marzo 2015.

²⁴ Per una definizione dello sviluppo urbano integrato, vedi ad esempio sul sito della DG Regio «È ormai sempre più chiaro che le molteplici sfide che le aree urbane si trovano a fronteggiare – economiche, ambientali, climatiche, sociali e demografiche – sono strettamente interconnesse. Pertanto, uno sviluppo urbano positivo può essere eseguito solo mediante un approccio integrato. È necessario, quindi, coniugare le misure concernenti il rinnovamento materiale urbano con misure intese a promuovere l'istruzione, lo sviluppo economico, l'inclusione sociale e la protezione ambientale. La nascita di intense collaborazioni tra cittadini, società civile, economia locale e i diversi livelli amministrativi costituisce, inoltre, un elemento indispensabile di tale processo. La capacità di mettere insieme le competenze e il *know-how* locale è fondamentale per identificare soluzioni condivise e conseguire risultati sostenibili e all'altezza delle aspettative» (<http://ec.europa.eu/>).

²⁵ Nei progetti dell'Asse urbano, un'altra dimensione era l'integrazione tra i fondi europei – FESR e FSE e il coinvolgimento di diversi attori della società civile o pubblici – a Porta Portese, il sito dell'ex-CGIL coinvolgeva insieme la Regione e il comune. Ma non è stato purtroppo a vantaggio dell'uso del sito dopo la riqualificazione, il palazzo essendo tuttora sotto-utilizzato. Questo pone anche il problema dell'animazione dei progetti dopo la fase di riqualificazione

²⁶ Incontro con Massimiano Pacifico, in carico dei ex-PLUS per la Regione Lazio, 4 maggio 2017.

Comunque, questa procedura ha associato direttamente i comuni alla gestione dei fondi strutturali per una parte non trascurabile del POR (l'Asse urbano disponeva di un ammontare di 80 milioni di euro, ancora aumentati del 10% alla fine del programma). Invece nel POR attuale, c'è poco coinvolgimento diretto dei comuni. Al contrario nel caso della regione parigina, questa propensione a costruire la metropoli dal basso è molto presente già nel 2007-13 e forse ancora di più oggi, tramite il ruolo dato alle ex-*intercommunalités* – che sono oggi i nuovi *territoires de la Métropole* – nella progettazione dei Progetti urbani integrati (2007-13) o oggi degli Interventi territoriali integrati (ITI) del programma 2014-20 (Lamenie, 2015).



Figura 5. Il palazzo ex-CGIL a Porta Portese, riqualificato con finanziamenti europei, @DR, 2015.

Al di là del loro contenuto, hanno dunque una dimensione simbolica notevole. Ne testimonia ad esempio il fatto che recentemente lo stesso Comune di Parigi sia stato partner di uno dei *territoires* diseredati della periferia nord (Est-Ensemble cioè Bobigny, prefettura di Seine-St-Denis e suoi dintorni) nella loro comune candidatura per un Intervento territoriale integrato (con successo).

Un'ultima dimensione dell'affermarsi della problematica metropolitana all'interno politica di coesione è, al di là del controllo dei finanziamenti e delle modalità di intervento, l'importanza, per gli enti coinvolti, di rendersi visibili sulla scena europea e internazionale. I programmi di cooperazione tipo Urbact o Interact, che, contrariamente al POR, rimangono gestiti in gran parte al livello locale, offrono da questo punto di vista diverse opportunità. Oltre i loro obiettivi specifici, questi programmi di cooperazione gestiti dalla Regione o dai Comuni e soprattutto da Roma – l'agenzia Risorse per Roma è molto presente in questo campo – aiutano gli enti locali e regionali a inserirsi in una rete internaziona-

le, certo non esclusivamente metropolitana²⁷, ma che contribuisce lo stesso all'affermarsi della capitale. Questa dimensione non è specifica di Roma, anzi è oggi molto diffusa: ne testimonia ad esempio questa osservazione dell'assessore alla mobilità di Milano in un recente *workshop* di diverse metropoli italiane e europee organizzato a Roma: «Il teatro europeo offre una strategia di network»²⁸ cioè è utile anche per esistere tramite la scena internazionale – nel caso di Milano non soltanto rispetto alla relativa regione di appartenenza, ma anche rispetto allo Stato italiano.

Conclusioni

Fino a che punto si può parlare di un'europeanizzazione tramite l'ancoramento della politica di coesione ad una problematica metropolitana? L'esempio del Lazio è quello di un'europeanizzazione finora incompiuta della questione metropolitana, da una parte perché l'approccio della stessa UE in questa materia rimane limitato, dall'altra parte perché è una scelta della Regione – che si posiziona comunque rispetto a questa problematica metropolitana –, infine perché la governance delle metropoli è senz'altro complessa. La dimensione conflittuale tra la Regione e il comune, senza invadere tutto il campo – c'è comunque un dialogo tra i due livelli – rimane forte. In questo senso il Lazio, ben lontano dall'essere un caso isolato, pare invece esemplare, nel senso che mostra in modo più generico i processi in atto nel contesto metropolitano, un contesto che produce in modo generico conflitti – di uso, di scale, di competenze etc. Il concetto di europeanizzazione deve ormai integrare un generico quadro instabile di riordino territoriale, di affermazione di nuove scale come appunto le città metropolitane, e in tal quadro bisogna anche considerare la politica di coesione come un teatro – tra tanti altri resi disponibili a seconda delle diverse politiche pubbliche nazionali, regionali e locali – della convivenza attuale, ma anche di quella progettata o auspicata dai diversi poteri che si confrontano intorno alla definizione delle sue priorità o intorno alla sua attuazione. Alcuni anni fa, Fabrizio Barca proponeva già di seguire questa direzione dei rapporti di potere tra gli attori della coesione, anche se in un modo un po' diverso, esponendo in occasione di un seminario della Datar a Parigi²⁹, l'idea che il valore aggiunto della politica di coesione europea (nel suo caso *placed-based*) esisterebbe soltanto in presenza di un conflitto, che alla fine dei conti, permette anche un incontro, tra dinamiche endogene e dinamiche esogene, le prime – locali – costituendo il vettore del coinvolgimento, dell'impegno, dell'aggregazione degli attori del territorio, le seconde – quelle europee – essendo portatrici di un potenziale cambiamento, anche tramite una destabilizzazione delle forze endogene. Ma come mostra l'esempio del Lazio la realtà è più mitigata: in questo caso, alla resa dei conti, i rapporti difficili tra Regione e Comune inerenti al riordino territoriale indeboliscono finora l'europeanizzazione della questione metropolitana evocata nel POR o auspicata nell'esperimento del PON Metro. Rimane da chiarire se questa è soltanto una tappa in un processo che vedrà affermarsi di uno o dell'altro di questi riferimenti (metropoli/regione metropolitana) o se durerà a lungo, ipotesi non improbabile in un contesto italiano marcato come si sa da numerosi conflitti istituzionali.

Bisogna anche tenere conto del fatto che c'è una disuguaglianza tra gli attori locali nella loro capacità di impadronirsi delle problematiche europee, di integrarle alle diverse scale/strumenti in gioco nell'azione pubblica, anche quando la maggior parte di questi attori locali sono alla ricerca di nuove opportunità di finanziamento per i loro progetti in un contesto finanziario sempre più teso. I processi

²⁷ Ad esempio il recente progetto Sigimed (Orti urbani abbandonati) di Risorse per Roma coinvolge Barcellona e Hamman.

²⁸ Berrini, 4 giugno 2014, incontro della rete 100 *resilient cities* della Fondazione Rockefeller.

²⁹ Intervento al Seminario Coesionet, *Research Network on cohesion and territories in Europe*, 30 maggio 2011, Parigi.

di europeanizzazione hanno dunque a che fare con l'idea di una diseguale capacità degli attori locali/regionali di appropriarsi della complessità trans-scalare, e questo è certamente di per sé una dimensione della metropolizzazione.

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MAURIZIO GIANNONE¹

UE, SOFT PLANNING E RIORGANIZZAZIONE TERRITORIALE: VERSO IL SUPERAMENTO DELLO SVILUPPO LOCALE?

1. *La coesione territoriale e l'approccio spaziale alle politiche di sviluppo*

Nonostante le politiche di coesione territoriale rappresentino una delle principali direttive dell'azione dell'Unione europea, la loro definizione continua ad essere piuttosto generica (Böhme, Holstein, Toptsidou, 2015).

Risulta tuttavia chiaro che con le politiche di coesione territoriale le istituzioni europee aspirano a garantire ai cittadini dell'Unione uno sviluppo 'spazialmente bilanciato', cioè in grado di assicurare loro pari opportunità di progresso sociale e crescita economica indipendentemente dal luogo in cui vivono e lavorano (Commissione Europea, 2008).

L'obiettivo del raggiungimento di un equilibrio tra le aree economicamente avanzate e quelle svantaggiose è uno dei principi cardine dell'approccio *place-based* alle politiche di sviluppo territoriale, una strategia incentrata sul riconoscimento dell'importanza dei 'luoghi' nei processi di sviluppo e sul coinvolgimento degli attori locali nei meccanismi partecipativi e deliberativi (Barca, McCann, Rodríguez-Pose, 2012), adottata dalla Commissione europea nell'Agenda territoriale 2020 (European Commission, 2015) con l'obiettivo di ridurre i fenomeni di esclusione sociale generati dalle disparità territoriali: «[A placebased strategy] can enable the EU to respond to the expectation of the European citizens that everyone, irrespective of where she/he lives, is able to benefit from the economic gains from unification, to have equal access to the opportunities so created as well as an equal possibility of coping with the risks and threats» (Barca, 2009, pp. VII-VIII).

L'azione di riequilibrio condotta dalle politiche di coesione territoriale si concretizza soprattutto attraverso l'assegnazione di risorse finanziarie: «I fondi di coesione sono per lo più concentrati nei paesi e nelle regioni in ritardo di sviluppo affinché possano mettersi in pari, riducendo le disparità economiche, sociali e territoriali tuttora esistenti nell'Unione europea» (Commissione Europea, 2014, p. 2).

La selezione a monte delle aree che possono beneficiare dei fondi europei per la coesione territoriale (le cosiddette aree 'eleggibili') pone tuttavia due questioni di merito: la prima, relativa alla 'territorializzazione delle politiche', e la seconda, connessa con i processi di 'finanziarizzazione dello sviluppo'.

Secondo Francesca Governa la 'territorializzazione delle politiche' è un'espressione che «descrive un cambiamento di scala del baricentro decisionale, dal nazionale verso il locale, e la messa in atto di processi di decentramento e devoluzione» (Governa, 2014, p. 86). Il re-indirizzamento dell'azione politica (ed economica) verso il territorio è effetto di un diverso modo di interpretare la dimensione locale, alla quale, a partire dagli anni Ottanta, si è cominciato a riconoscere un'autonoma capacità di sviluppo ed una specifica attitudine competitiva. Tuttavia, ci avverte Governa, bisogna stare attenti a non interpretare in modo banale la funzione che, in quest'ottica, il territorio è chiamato a svolgere, rischio in cui si può incorrere quando il processo di territorializzazione delle politiche viene inteso, appunto, come mero meccanismo di decentramento delle funzioni e di responsabilizzazione delle co-

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munità locali, altrimenti si finisce per parlare di territorio come "livello di competenze" e della territorializzazione delle politiche come di un problema meramente organizzativo-istituzionale (Governa, 2014).

Di conseguenza va messa in conto la possibilità che la territorializzazione delle politiche di coesione territoriale possa risolversi, almeno in parte, in un problema di 'forma' piuttosto che di 'contenuto', cioè che chi è responsabile dell'azione di sostegno ai territori ritenga di avere assolto il proprio compito soltanto portando a termine il procedimento di assegnazione di risorse finanziarie.

L'altra questione, strettamente collegata alla precedente, attiene alla 'finanziarizzazione dello sviluppo', tema anche questo toccato dalla Governa: la competizione che si accende a livello locale per l'accaparramento delle risorse comunitarie spinge gli attori del territorio verso la creazione di vere e proprie lobby che gareggiano per aggiudicarsi la leadership dei partenariati locali e proporsi come interlocutori privilegiati nei confronti delle istituzioni europee (Governa, 2014).

Anche in questo caso andrebbe valutata la portata ontologica dell'intervento pubblico, cioè il senso di cambiamento che esso dovrebbe portare con sé, i suoi output di utilità sociale, la sua capacità di generare valore per il territorio, di mobilitarne le potenzialità. Molto spesso, invece, come spesso accade nelle valutazioni d'impatto dei programmi e dei progetti europei, dell'azione pubblica ci si limita a misurare le ricadute economiche.

Indubbiamente il cambiamento di scala operato mediante le nuove strategie pubbliche di sostegno economico allo sviluppo ha prodotto nei territori effetti importanti dal punto di vista economico-sociale, politico-istituzionale, relazionale, di comunità. Alcuni di questi effetti hanno dimostrato di avere un chiaro impatto anche sulla pianificazione dello spazio. Le comunità locali, infatti, hanno dato vita a nuove e diverse forme di organizzazione del territorio – ridisegnandone molto spesso i confini – ritenute in grado di assicurare una presenza sulla scena globale (mercati, flussi informativi, reti di investimento) sempre più vantaggiosa e competitiva. Uno degli effetti più evidenti delle nuove politiche di sviluppo locale, infatti, è stato quello della 'costruzione' di nuovi territori, un processo generato dalla capacità delle comunità locali di fare autonomamente 'massa critica' e di avviare meccanismi di aggregazione finalizzati – più o meno consapevolmente – alla formazione di nuove entità territoriali auto-organizzate (non sempre e non necessariamente oggetto di riconoscimento politico-istituzionale).

La creazione di nuove formazioni territoriali ad opera di attori locali ha così dato risposta ad una specifica esigenza espressa dai territori, e cioè quella di orientare finalmente gli investimenti verso settori (turismo e cultura *in primis*) ritenuti dalle comunità locali maggiormente sostenibili e performanti.

In questo modo negli ultimi anni si è andata configurando una nuova geografia dello sviluppo locale fondata su Patti territoriali, Progetti integrati territoriali, Programmi operativi, Distretti culturali e turistici, Strade del Vino, Gruppi d'azione locale, Gruppi d'azione costiera, Marchi d'Area e Reti ecologiche.

Tale tendenza è apparsa particolarmente evidente nei beni culturali e nel turismo, settori sui quali le comunità locali hanno subito deciso di concentrare energie ed investimenti per creare nuove opportunità di sviluppo (Cusimano, Giannone, 2006; 2007).

La nuova mappa dello spazio auto-organizzato, disegnata in forma variabile e flessibile dagli strumenti della programmazione negoziata, dalle esperienze di decentralizzazione produttiva e decisionale, e soprattutto dagli orientamenti comunitari di politica economica e sociale, si è andata dunque creando sulla base di un approccio *bottom up* che ha riconosciuto alle comunità locali il diritto di scegliere il proprio obiettivo di sviluppo ed il percorso per conseguirlo.

In realtà queste forme di "regionalismo soft" (Pichierri, 1998, p. 61), sebbene pianificate e strutturate dagli attori locali, traggono origine quasi sempre da strategie di sviluppo elaborate dalla Commiss-

sione e dalla burocrazia dell'Unione europea².

Proprio grazie alle politiche di coesione territoriale, negli ultimi decenni la distanza tra i territori e i livelli decisionali sovra-nazionali (come quello rappresentato da Bruxelles) si è molto accorciata, talvolta bypassando le strutture politico-amministrative intermedie. Questo 'avvicinamento' tra livelli decisionali di rango così diverso è effetto di un processo di *rescaling* che ha riorganizzato e riarticolato lo spazio, facendo comparire e poi consolidare alle differenti scale geografiche nuove entità territoriali, alcune delle quali candidate a sostituire, talvolta informalmente, i tradizionali istituti dell'autorità politica e sociale (Governa, 2014).

L'interazione tra i due livelli – quello dello spazio europeo e quello dei territori – si è dunque concretizzata attraverso un'azione di riequilibrio dello sviluppo condotta dall'Unione europea nei confronti delle aree deboli (processo che qui abbiamo associato al concetto di 'territorializzazione delle politiche') mediante l'assegnazione di apposite risorse che devono servire a superare il gap tra territori 'forti' e territori 'deboli' (la 'finanziarizzazione dello sviluppo', appunto). Considerati il peso politico degli attori in gioco e il volume delle risorse finanziarie messe a disposizione da Bruxelles, viene da chiedersi se il rapporto tra Unione europea e territori possa considerarsi effettivamente equilibrato³, cioè se le comunità locali abbiano o meno voce in capitolo nella definizione dei processi di pianificazione (seppure *soft*) dello spazio locale, e se l'adozione di politiche *bottom up* non mascheri in realtà la riproposizione di un modello di sviluppo *top down*.

Infatti, sebbene alle comunità locali sia data ampia facoltà, almeno nominalmente, di definire l'organizzazione del proprio territorio, il rispetto dei requisiti imposti dall'Unione europea per accedere ai fondi destinati allo sviluppo impone loro, direttamente o indirettamente, scelte che condizionano l'effettiva capacità di configurare autonomamente lo spazio del loro agire.

2. Soft planning e nuovi territori

I nuovi territori generati a livello locale dalle politiche di coesione territoriale possono essere identificati come *soft spaces* e l'azione condotta dall'Unione europea per favorirne la creazione e l'organizzazione come un esempio di *soft planning*.

I *soft spaces* si distinguono dagli *hard spaces* in quanto non generati da meccanismi rigidi di pianificazione che comportano precise responsabilità legali in capo a strumenti di pianificazione locale o regionale (Haughton *et al.*, 2010). Un'altra loro caratteristica è quella di essere delimitati da confini 'sfocati' (*fuzzy*) che sovvertono la rigida geografia degli spazi istituzionali (Allmendinger, Haughton, 2009). Da ciò consegue che i *soft spaces* si distinguono dagli *hard spaces* anche per il fatto che, a differenza di questi ultimi, non necessariamente si strutturano come vere e proprie entità amministrative.

Il processo che porta alla creazione di *soft spaces* è l'esito di interventi di *soft planning*, e cioè di azioni di pianificazione indiretta condotte da organismi pubblici sovraordinati responsabili di politiche sviluppo. La pianificazione 'morbida' incide sulle forme organizzative del tessuto locale, generalmente riconducibili agli istituti tipici delle politiche di sviluppo locale: «Although a generally accepted definition of soft planning is lacking, the term is usually used to describe processes outside the statutory planning system that nonetheless contribute to the development of an area. These processes

² Il primo intervento di territorializzazione delle politiche di sviluppo attuato dall'Unione europea in chiave economica risale probabilmente ai Progetti integrati mediterranei (PIM), promossi da Bruxelles con il Regolamento n. 2088/1985 per evitare che l'ingresso della Spagna nell'UE potesse avere effetti negativi sulle economie agricole dei Paesi mediterranei concorrenti (De Rita, Bonomi, 1999, p. 52).

³ Lo squilibrio riguarda anche il rapporto tra Unione europea e Regioni in quanto unità amministrative, sempre più dipendenti da Bruxelles sotto il profilo economico.

might take a variety of forms such as cooperation, coordination, negotiation and learning between different actors and stakeholders» (Purkarthofer, 2016, p. 7).

La Commissione europea gioca un ruolo primario nelle strategie di riorganizzazione ‘morbida’ dello spazio europeo e le politiche di coesione territoriale rappresentano uno⁴ degli strumenti di *soft planning* più efficaci. Andreas Faludi, affrontando il tema della coesione territoriale e di come questa comporti una nuova concezione “negoziata” della territorialità, ci ricorda che nello spazio europeo esiste una *soft planning for soft spaces* (2014, p. 181).

Un esempio di come le strategie *soft planning* applicate a realtà territoriali regionali o subregionali intervengono sull’organizzazione dello spazio e sulle politiche di sviluppo locale è dato dall’attuazione in Sicilia del Programma operativo del Fondo europeo di sviluppo regionale (PO FESR) 2014-2020.

Si prenda il caso degli interventi comunitari previsti per la cultura ed il turismo che, come sottolineato in precedenza, in Sicilia rappresentano i settori attorno ai quali si sono sviluppati in massima parte le progettualità espresse dai territori.

L’Obiettivo specifico 6.7 del PO FESR Sicilia 2014-2020, finalizzato al miglioramento degli standard di offerta e fruizione del patrimonio culturale, prevede che i fondi destinati al settore culturale si concentriano prioritariamente nelle aree che comprendono i siti inseriti nella *World Heritage List* dell’UNESCO ed i siti in corso di riconoscimento. La negoziazione condotta nelle fasi approvative del PO FESR dalla Regione siciliana con gli uffici della Commissione sulla delimitazione geografica delle aree eleggibili per il settore cultura ha successivamente portato ad un leggero smarginamento del perimetro iniziale con l’inclusione di alcune aree su cui insistono beni e siti culturali dotati di particolari ‘capacità attrattive’ e che con i siti della WHL intrattengono relazioni di sistema. Il risultato finale è stato quello di una perimetrazione delle aree eleggibili un po’ più ampia rispetto a quella proposta dalla Commissione ma sostanzialmente in linea con l’obiettivo perseguito dalla burocrazia europea di restringere e contenere le aree d’intervento. Nell’ottica della transcalarità dei processi decisionali e partecipativi va inoltre tenuto conto del ruolo sostanzialmente marginale giocato in questo caso dalle comunità locali nelle procedure di individuazione e selezione delle aree eleggibili.

In realtà gli indirizzi di sviluppo territoriale dettati dal PO FESR Sicilia 2014-2020 vanno letti come un ‘cambiamento di rotta’ rispetto a quanto previsto dal precedente ciclo di programmazione dei fondi comunitari.

Nel PO FESR Sicilia 2007-2013 la delimitazione delle aree destinatarie degli investimenti appariva decisamente più sfumata. In quel caso gli effetti attesi riguardavano «un generale miglioramento della fruizione del patrimonio culturale regionale» e puntavano ad una «riqualificazione dell’offerta culturale nel suo complesso» (p. 193), mentre le risorse dell’Unione Europea venivano distribuite secondo una geografia degli interventi che lasciava molto più spazio alle decisioni della Regione e delle comunità locali.

Un processo analogo ha riguardato il settore turistico.

Con la legge regionale n. 10 del 2005 in Sicilia è stata prevista l’istituzione dei distretti turistici. In forza di tale norma sono stati creati nel territorio siciliano 25 distretti turistici. Con le risorse comunitarie messe a disposizione dall’Obiettivo operativo 3.3.3 del PO FESR Sicilia 2007-2013 sono stati successivamente cofinanziati i progetti di sviluppo dei distretti. Non essendo stata effettuata a monte una vera e propria selezione delle aree beneficiarie, i territori sono stati lasciati liberi di auto-organizzarsi. Il nuovo modello di organizzazione dell’offerta turistica è stato subito interpretato dai territori come un’opportunità di sviluppo per le comunità locali, come dimostra il fatto che ben 340 comuni siciliani, su un totale di 390, hanno aderito al progetto di distrettualizzazione turistica dell’isola entrando a far

⁴ Certamente non l’unico, come dimostra il sostegno politico-economico offerto dalla Commissione europea alla creazione delle quattro strategie macro-regionali: baltica, danubiana, alpina e adriatico-ionica.

parte della compagine sociale dei nuovi organismi.

La linea 6.8.3 (Obiettivo tematico 6) del PO FESR Sicilia 2014-2020 prevede ora che la Regione siciliana elabori un modello di governance delle *Destination Management Organizations* (DMO), macroaggregazioni territoriali di gestione dell'offerta turistica, da attivare in numero ridotto⁵ e da destinare ad assorbire i preesistenti distretti turistici: il risultato atteso è la semplificazione del quadro organizzativo territoriale e la riduzione del numero di distretti turistici.

Anche in questo caso il processo appare di natura *top down*: l'azione di sostegno allo sviluppo condotta dalla Commissione europea attraverso la finanziarizzazione degli interventi di riorganizzazione territoriale dell'offerta turistica trasforma lo spazio turistico siciliano 'razionalizzandolo' e contribuendo a renderlo più governabile; e alle comunità locali non resta che adeguarsi ai nuovi indirizzi di politica territoriale sciogliendo i distretti turistici, creati soltanto pochi anni fa, per farli confluire nelle nuove DMO.

Senza entrare nel merito dell'efficacia delle scelte operate dalla Commissione europea con la nuova programmazione, in una fase, peraltro, in cui lo strumento attuativo in Sicilia è ancora nel pieno della sua esecutività, va rilevato come l'azione di *soft planning* condotta da Bruxelles attraverso il PO FESR 2014-2020 sia comunque destinata, ancora una volta, a produrre effetti concreti sia sull'assetto spaziale dell'isola che sull'organizzazione politico-economica dei suoi territori. Ma questa volta, a differenza di quanto accaduto nei precedenti cicli di programmazione, le comunità locali sembrano concorrere soltanto marginalmente alla definizione delle politiche di sviluppo dei propri territori, almeno per ciò che riguarda l'organizzazione dello spazio.

Conclusioni

Il passaggio tra i più recenti periodi di programmazione europea segna un cambiamento di rotta nelle politiche di coesione territoriale dell'Unione europea con una tendenza a ricentralizzare i processi decisionali. Dal punto di vista spaziale le trasformazioni sono state indotte dall'attuazione di strategie di *soft planning* da parte della Commissione europea. I mutamenti in corso sembrano mettere in crisi i principi su cui poggiano le logiche di sviluppo locale poiché alle comunità locali vengono lasciati margini ristretti di scelta all'interno delle strategie di riorganizzazione del territorio.

In effetti i territori, nella geografia dello sviluppo locale costruita negli ultimi venti anni attraverso le politiche di coesione territoriale dell'Unione europea ed i vari cicli di programmazione dei fondi strutturali, sembrano essere stati spinti verso continue trasformazioni e riarticolazioni in modo da adeguarsi funzionalmente ai 'cambiamenti di prospettiva' imposti dalle *élite* tecnocratiche di Bruxelles. In Sicilia il cambiamento d'indirizzo nelle strategie di sostegno allo sviluppo attuate dall'Unione europea attraverso il PO FESR 2014-2020 è verosimilmente motivato da una valutazione critica riguardo all'efficacia dei finanziamenti concessi nei precedenti cicli di programmazione, la cui distribuzione geografica è stata ritenuta eccessivamente frammentata. Di conseguenza gli investimenti vanno ora concentrati spazialmente per fare 'massa critica'.

Per la verità la tendenza a rivedere le strategie di 'territorializzazione delle politiche' in direzione di una ri-centralizzazione degli investimenti era già stata avvertita nel precedente PO FESR Sicilia. Con la programmazione dei fondi strutturali 2007-2013, infatti: «la territorializzazione delle risorse sembra prendere una strada diversa: lo spazio è stato selezionato e gli assi dello sviluppo questa volta si radicano non tanto nelle aree dove si colgono potenzialità quanto nei luoghi in cui il territorio si presenta già strutturato e, per certi aspetti, in grado di competere» (Giannone, 2015, p. 27).

Dunque già in quella fase cominciava a registrarsi una diversa e più circoscritta concentrazione

⁵ Condizione per la verità non esplicitata nel documento ma chiaramente sottintesa.

geografica degli investimenti.

Negli ultimi venti anni sembra quindi potersi cogliere il segno di un cambiamento nell'approccio dell'Unione europea alle politiche di sviluppo territoriale: da un metodo prettamente *bottom up*, caratterizzato dalla concessione alle comunità locali di ampi poteri decisionali, anche e soprattutto per ciò che riguarda l'organizzazione del territorio, con i più recenti indirizzi delle politiche di coesione territoriale pare vengano riproposte alcune strategie di taglio *top down*, in cui prevalgono gli orientamenti pianificatori dell'autorità sovraordinata volti a garantire maggiore razionalità (e produttività) allo spazio. Le trasformazioni in corso ci spingono a interrogarci sul futuro dello sviluppo locale.

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MARIA CORONATO¹

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CITIES NETWORK TO EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS. THE CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES

1. *Transnational municipal networks: a contribution for Europeanisation*

The debate on the Europeanization (Olsen, 2002; Featherstone, Radaelli, 2003; Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier, 2005; Radaelli, 2006; Börzel 2005; Graziano, Vink, 2007; Bache, 2008) is a part of the analysis of the European multi-level system by providing a way by which multi-level governance is achieved (Pollack, 2005, p. 384). Europeanization encompasses not only the domestic impact of European-level institutions but also the impact of the EU Member States' actions on EU institutions. These top-down and bottom-up dynamics (Ladrech, 2005, p. 319) are not limited to the relationship between the EU and its Member States: these dynamics are also relevant to the relations between EU institutions and local authorities (Schultze, 2003; Marshall, 2005, p. 671; Marshall, 2008).

In agreement with Faludi (2014), European spatial planning or policies on Climate Change of its Europeanisation, meaning that planning/action toward the mitigation of Climate change becomes part of the EU policy-making state, and its Europeanisation which stands for mutual learning. Anyway the intensity in which Member-States are 'affected' by Europeanisation/EUropeanisation processes varies considerably (tab. 1).

In this context the role of Transnational Municipalities Networks (TMN) in the process of EUropeanization is significative: TMNs are *in se* Europeanized objects because they adapt their organizational structures to EU decision-making structures².

Category	Features	Degree of domestic change
Transformation	States fundamentally change existing policies, practices, and/or preferences or replace them with new ones	High
Accommodation	States adopt existing policies, practices and/or preferences without changing their essential features	Modest
Absorption	States incorporate EU policies, practices and/or preferences without substantially modifying existing policies, practices and/or preferences	Low

Table 1. Categorizing domestic responses to the EU. Source: Börzel, Risse, 2003 – seen in Bache, 2008, p. 12.

¹ University of Rome "Tor Vergata", Department of Management and Law.

² TMNs open offices in Brussels (Ercole *et al.*, 1997, pp. 307) cooperate among themselves to strengthen their influence and solicit EU funding. At the same time, the EU institutions, in particular the European Commission, have become progressively more dependent on interest groups, using them as external sources of information and expert advice and thus facilitating access to European institutions (Goldsmith, 2003, p. 121, Eising, 2004, Heinelt, Niederhafner, 2008). In addition, TMNs can help the Commission implement EU policies as they stimulate the exchange of best practices and experiences between cities by developing and adopting their own regulations.

In particular, the TMNs have been set up to facilitate municipalities for the development of local strategies for the implementation of European policy considering the three dimensions of Europeanization in the city and the TMNs: the first, top-down (vertical) Europeanisation is the most obvious form because cities are increasingly affected by European norms; secondly, Europeanization (vertical) from the bottom up has developed as a response to the growing significance of EU initiatives for the local sphere, including the development of TMN; thirdly, horizontal equipment has become a common feature of the interaction of local authorities in the European multilevel system where cities learn from each other when jointly developing solutions for common problems (Bulkeley *et al.*, 2009).

The analysis of Europeanisation of cities is challenging because it requires the decommissioning of the complex and dynamic relationship between three groups of actors: the EU institutions, its 27 EU Member States and about 100,000 local authorities in the Member States. Despite the formal hierarchical structure of state-local relations, which means that cities have developed effective strategies to relate directly at national and EU level. Therefore, the analysis of Europeanization of cities requires a better understanding of the dynamic development of EU local relations and their repercussions on relations between the EU and its Member States and the relations between States and Member States. In one way: the different ways in which home actors adapt to Europe (Radaelli, 2006, p. 58), integrates the multi-level governance approach. A multi-level governance approaches presuppose that the local, national and supranational government institutions are shifted not only to the European Union, but also to national states in regions and cities (Rosamund, 2004, p. 121) and it include the whole range of governance types (i.e. public-private partnerships and non-state regulation too). This creates new opportunities for local authorities, who can pursue their interests both at national and European level but needs a strong governance control because the parties can do parallel initiatives at different levels.

Cities play a role in the process of EU legislation, access to finance and knowledge sharing (air quality, circular economy, climate adaptation, etc.) (Pact of Amsterdam, 2016) and, looking the environmental policies and local capacity to reduce the adverse effect of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, Feldman says (2012) «Network performance has three vital functions for environmental issues: (1) generate and disseminate information, (2) undertake effective policy evaluation strategies, (3) initiate response efforts local, without waiting for national efforts (both formal and informal)».

2. An application of TNA in Europeanisation process on climate change issues

Climate change debate has moved and mitigation approaches have been complemented by a new paradigm of adapting to the risks posed by climate change. The Green Paper “Adapting to Climate Change in Europe – Options for EU Action”, published by the European Commission in June 2007 (CEC, 2007) highlight the adaptation process has necessary because the effects of climate change have already become apparent (and various from region to region), and depending on physical and socio-economic vulnerability, natural and human adaptation capacity, health services and catastrophe surveillance mechanisms (CEC, 2007).

Urban areas are particularly exposed to other weather events that have intensified in recent years, such as heat waves with effects aggravated by the scarcity of green areas and trees and by the prevalence of paved areas, with strong consequences on people's health. Exceptionally heavy rainfall in urban areas meets a predominantly sealed soil which strongly obstacles the outflow of controlled waters, thus aggravating flood effects. An increasing trend of overall flood damage was recorded in Italy between 2008 and 2014 (ISPRA, 2015)³, and weather-climate anomalies will negatively impact on wa-

³ Environmental Data Yearbook (*Annuario dei Dati Ambientali*) – 2014-2015 Edition –

ter supplies.

Intense urbanisation actions implemented according to criteria that do not take account of future climate scenarios result in high financial, economic and social adaptation costs. Cities are the privileged place for dissemination and use of renewable energy and energy efficiency measures at system level, through reorganisation of urban functions and services (HABITAT III, p. 33).

More than a third of the EU's 2020 climate target will be delivered by cities, equivalent to 240 million tonnes of CO₂ emission reductions (JRC, 2016). The numerous co-benefits of climate and energy measures have motivated thousands of local and regional authorities across Europe to take ambitious actions in the building and transport sectors. These local actions have led to more livable cities with less noise and air pollution, more comfortable, affordable and healthier homes and a better quality of life for millions of urban residents. The EU is currently finalising the implementation of its 2030 climate and energy framework, including a legislative proposal for the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) for the 2021-2030 period. The Effort Sharing Regulation sets national climate targets for the transport, building, agriculture and waste sectors and is a centerpiece of Europe's efforts to implement the Paris climate goals. A strong Effort Sharing Regulation – without loopholes – can support and incentivise the uptake, replication and upscaling of local climate and energy actions.

Local and regional authorities are also key actors in Europe's clean energy transformation: it is in cities where electro-mobility could be deployed, where new energy technologies can foster the decentralisation of the energy system and where a renovated building stock can drive down emissions significantly (CE, 2017). The 7,500+ signatory cities of the Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy have a crucial role to play in supporting the EU in achieving its energy and climate objectives. They have already developed over 6,000 local energy and climate action plans (SECAPs), in which they voluntarily commit to fulfill European climate and energy targets by reducing their GHG emissions through energy efficiency and renewable energy measures.

Three networks have emerged in the area of climate change policy in Europe since the early 1990s: the *Climate Alliance*, *Cities for Climate Protection and Energie-Cités*. They represent an opportunity for dissemination of knowledge and development skills across stakeholder groups, providing the opportunity for collective or synergistic actions, or the mobilization or representation of agendas common. For example, together with the EU, Italy has taken on ambitious commitments to attain GHG emissions reduced by 40% in 2030 and 80% in 2050, respectively. This requires a rapid shift from a linear economy into a circular economy characterised by balanced carbon emission and absorption levels. On 16 June 2015, Italy adopted the "National Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change", aimed at: minimising risks; protecting people's health, welfare and assets; preserving the Country's natural and cultural heritage; and maintaining or improving natural, social and economic systems' resilience and adaptability. In line with the Paris Agreement guidelines, Italy's is now designing national and local adaptation plans. A "National Observatory" composed of regional and local representatives is expected to be established in order to identify priorities and monitor implementation of adaptation actions. Furthermore, a "permanent forum" is expected to be activated to promote information and training, and foster citizens and stakeholders' decision-making skills. The TMNs could be the way to implement at local level the actions to achieve the general aim. For example, to reduce vehicular traffic congestion and favour sustainable mobility development allowed devising, the TMNs could be the vehicle to suggest multiple types of interventions capable not only of limiting the environmental impacts of the transport sector but also improving the quality of life and living conditions in urban environments, shifting the focus from cars to persons, with special attention devoted to most vulnerable people such as children, the elderly and the disabled. In particular, interventions have allowed munic-

ipalities to implement urban mobility policies identified within local land management plans, contributing to the reduction of pollutants and GHG emissions, and the spreading of a more conscious sustainable mobility culture.

The complexity of mitigating and adapting to climate change has stimulated a wide range of experiments in communities around the world. Many ports and port cities, as well as other stakeholders, have joined or have formed networks focusing on climate change and/or related issues, such as sustainable development (i.e. EcoPorts). Since 2011, in collaboration with ANCI – (National Association of Italian Municipalities) for efficient and effective monitoring of co-financed interventions, has been develop an ad-hoc *app* to evaluate the environmental effectiveness of sustainable mobility actions – i.e. the GIMS (Gestione degli Interventi di Mobilità Sostenibile/ Management of Sustainable Mobility Interventions) web platform (aimed at managing sustainable mobility operations)

Interventionist strategies are difficult to implement because TMNs lack the authority to force their members to participate in benchmarking or certification exercises and to impose sanctions on their members if necessary. Thus, certification is still confined to the most active cities which have already launched many local initiatives in the area of climate change policy and want to demonstrate their progress. For the most active members of the network, the costs outweigh the benefits from a positive image associated with certification.

Recognition, benchmarking and certification entail more interventionist approaches to internal governing which may be able to reach beyond the network core. Strategies of recognition involve offering various types of rewards for performance, including the listing of a municipality as an example of good practice or creation of a competition for specific awards. The Climate Alliance has developed the 'Climate Star' award for municipalities across Europe and, in 2004, of a total of 203 entries of local authorities from 17 countries, 22 municipalities received recognition for their efforts in the area of renewable energy (Climate Alliance, 2005, p. 27). Within the international climate change regime, climate change networks have been granted observer status and hold side events to publicize the achievements of their members and the possibilities for taking action at the annual Conference of the Parties. Through these activities the networks, in particular the Cities for Climate Protection and the Climate Alliance, seek to persuade the international community to take a more proactive stance on addressing the climate.

To achieve the goal, it could be useful to integrate climate change action (shared) in the territorial and integrate plans (energy, transport, environmental, etc) towards the institutionalisation of climate change policy at the local level. Empirical evidence suggests that the responsibility for climate change policy is usually located in the environmental policy agency (for example, in approximately two-thirds of German cities; Kern *et al.*, 2005: 38). This may lead to co-ordination and integration problems if the environmental agencies do not have the capacity to implement comprehensive concepts and are in the same position as the environmental ministries within national governments.

Anyway, the TMNs involve different municipalities and different stakeholders at national, regional and local level, with which they try to establish a vertical and horizontal coordination: involve the stakeholder and the shareholder could be a way to a stronger pressure on the policymaking. The city's sphere of influence is local by nature. By further concentrating on the local sourcing of goods and energy as part of climate policy, cities can boost their resilience to crises and add value to their own economies: Each town, city and district is unique. Making optimal use of the differences means that individual climate solutions and their implementation will vary from place to place (Climate Alliance, 2017).

Conclusions

Concerning the impact of European integration on cities, the TMNs are one of the main actors in the EUropeinazation process. In particular they bring on the territory the vision, goal and suggestion of European Union, after that the Member States defined the limits and condition to achieve looking at commune targets. To be a member of a TMNs made the territories closer Europe: the TMNs have not a formal institution: to join in a network is a voluntary act done by formal institution (municipality). For this reason the flexible structures of the network make it more suitable to discuss with regard the territorial needs and problems to implementation of activities.

To participate at a network, helps to build a closer European union: find partners, attend conference, involve residents, to find financing opportunities, to have a voice heard in important EU decisions, is the real added value to be part of the network and it helps in the EUropeanisation process.

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PIETRO ELISEI¹

A PHASE OF DISSONANT EUROPEANISATION IN SPATIAL POLICIES

1. Reasoning about dissonance

Dissonance is the lack of harmony, which in terms of spatial planning can be interpreted as the malfunctioning of those mechanisms that should regulate complex and multi-level processes of territorial governance: in other words, the so-called “vertical subsidiarity”, which has many points of weakness and instability.

The basic question is whether we have had in the last thirty years, in the context of the “EU geographical space”, moments of greater consonance and harmony in the interpretation and application of urban and territorial policies promoted by the Community actor. For sure, this relation has been characterized by alternating moments where consonance periods followed periods of discordance.

When/How is mismatch becoming dissonance or, even more, a “dialogue between a mute and a deaf”?

Which are the topics where the dissonance makes itself evident in urban and territorial policy?

This relationship between local and central or supra-national institutions has been oscillating over time in terms of:

- effectiveness in impact of EU spatial policies,
- objectives sharing,
- capability of involving “horizontal governance” actors working at urban/territorial scale.

The current perception is that the gap between the needs of local levels and proposals coming from the Community level is expanding.

To answer the above questions in the space of an article is impossible, but it is reasonable to highlight some critical points generated by experience, which can provide an idea of contemporary issues in the implementation of EU spatial policy at local level.

Additionally, it is to notice that the consensus around the EU cohesion policy is not related to an increase in visibility measured through the per capita amount of spent funds: the pure amount of funds does not lead to a higher consensus around the Cohesion Policy. The consensus calls for a higher matching between EU actions and perceived needs. In other words, the probability for individuals to be more satisfied is higher when EU actions take place in fields where perceived needs are felt by individuals (Capello, Perucca, 2016).

Currently, looking at European territorial policies under the lens of those working daily working city institutions, and thus starting from pragmatic experiences related to the implementation of territorial policies, one can notice that the dialogue between European instrumental proposals for territorial development and local practices is too often hermetic and extremely formal. Above all, it remains hermetic to the citizens and to local institutions, which are the key beneficiaries of EU actions.

In this article, I report three experiences where I have been directly involved as planner:

1. The STATUS project, in the role of project designer and content manager;²
2. the Strategic plan for Cluj (SIDU, Strategia Integrată de Dezvoltare Urbană), as main project co-

¹ Urbasofia Managing Director and Founder, Bucharest, Romania.

² More at: <http://statusproject.eu/>.

ordinator/designer;³

3. the programme: Regeneration, through integrated approach, of small towns affected by the 1991-1995 war, launched and promoted by the Croatian Ministries for Regional Development and Labour, in which I was team leading a group of experts⁴.

2. The STATUS Project: Strategic Territorial Agendas for "Small and Middle-Sized Towns" Urban Systems

The project has been a test-bed to observe how communities' actions at urban scale in SEE (South Eastern European) states, many of them post-socialist and still operating through centralistic- top down decision making, can interact with governance contexts not used to devolve and share strategic territorial and urban decisions.

Three macro areas, or macro regions, define the realms of action of STATUS: The proper *Mitteleuropa* (Austria and Slovenia), the post-socialist nations (Serbia, Montenegro and Romania) and the oriental Mediterranean Sea (Italy and Greece). From a strictly geographical viewpoint, STATUS involves the *Alpine area*, the whole Balkan extent and the *south-east Mediterranean basin*. In terms of planning traditions and cities involved, operating a draconian simplification, things can be reduced to two different systems:

- A decentralised one enriched by policies and additional strategic instrument, accustomed to participatory planning approaches (Schwechat (Wien), Regione Abruzzo, Provincia di Foggia).
- A centralist one mainly based on an obsolete set of normative plans and not used to involve stakeholders in decision-making planning processes (Alba Iulia, Baia Mare, Balti, Drama, Herceg Novi, Kavala, Temerin and Satu Mare).

STATUS was tackling the problem of incoherent urban and regional development in South Eastern European countries by jointly developing an approach which could help SMSCs (Small and Medium Sized Cities) in designing integrated and sustainable urban agendas: place-based strategies by practice of participatory planning tools.

The project STATUS bet on a fundamental assumption: the revival of the European economies is based on a renewed dynamism of the cities and on socially innovative processes related to a new way of planning. STATUS promotes an urbanism which struggles to find the right solution to operationalize the concept of integrated territorial approach, but which conjugates this effort with the implementation of participatory processes at the local level that are able to redesign the ways in which decisions are made (looking for strategic planning tools harmonizing vertical and horizontal/local governance actors).

The main result of this project, in every partner city or region, was the design of a strategic agenda.

The results of the STATUS project represent the basic platform for territorial development in the partners' areas for the future. All territorial partners are better prepared for the use of structural funds in the period 2014 – 2020 and further into the future, when an important role will be played by the established Urban Task Forces (UTF). Their collaboration and activities represent a key factor leading toward a better implementation of projects. Urban Centers, as one of the results of the project, should be used as a participatory tool, as a physical space for exchanging the ideas and possible solutions, as

³ More at: <https://urbasofia.eu/ro/proiecte/planificare-strategica/plan-strategic-integrat-pentru-zona-metropolitana-cluj-napoca/>.

⁴ More at: <http://www.strukturnifondovi.hr/vukovar-beli-manastir-knin-benkovac-petrinja-i-darda-u-programu-integrirane-fizicke-gospodarske-i-socijalne-regeneracije-pilot-područja-malih-gradova-na-ratom-pogodjenim-područjima>.

well as for the promotion of proper sustainable development in the future.

Lessons learned in the STATUS Project:

- Strong collaboration among scientific partners and territorial partners and above all within the whole consortium of the STATUS project was crucial for the project results.
- Clear methodology with clear guidelines and best practices are essential for territorial partners to progress in the formulation of their own territorial development objectives and methodologies/tools to achieve them.
- Supporting territorial partners through revision of reports, providing comments and additional guidelines from the beginning till the end of the process proved to be an important asset.
- Attracting stakeholders to participate and engaging people through the whole process of the STATUS project is a constant and intense step by step process.
- Territorial partners have an opportunity to learn from each other in European projects through having an insight into other territorial partner's cases and through networking and communicating with each other in order to solve similar issues. That contributes to a true trans-national approach of which the STATUS project is a prime example.

3. CLUJ: the strategic plan preparing for the use of 2014-2020 EU structural funds and instruments

During the last ten years, the Romanian investment in urban regeneration was one of the most considerable all over Europe. The first programming period for Romania (2007-2013) launched a relevant investment in regeneration of the cities (around 1.4 bln of euros). A number of cities have been identified as "growth poles", a second level has been named as "development poles", while the other cities were identified as "minor centers". Despite the fact that there were several studies on national and regional development strategies for Romania, maybe partially considered, the division of the cities in these three categories has been mainly a political, or better said, a political party-dominated decision. However, the structural investments were capable to put cities in movement through the design of "planning instruments" call PIDU (Plan Integrat de Dezvoltare Urbana/An Integrated Development Plan). Very few of these instruments had a strategic asset, most of them were a wish-list of projects preceded by a simple socio-economic analysis of the reference city. Basically, these PIDUs worked on primary infrastructures (needed interventions, but with very low strategic impact on development) with several initiatives taken on business and social environment. This premise is necessary to introduce the evolution that occurred in the second programming period (2014-2020): the SIDU (Strategia Integrată de Dezvoltare Urbană/Strategic Integrated Development Plan). The introduction of the strategic component has been a major step forward, but the previous system of categorization has been again changed. The number of cities eligible to design a SIDU has increased, but, in this way, the fundraising philosophy of the "rain fall distribution" methodology appreciated by political parties is even more evident, at the expense of the competitive and strategic component in the use of funds for territorial cohesion. However, some cities apparently took the challenge of the SIDUs seriously, and Cluj-Napoca is one of these cities. In Cluj-Napoca and the Cluj Metropolitan Area, the planning process has been based on a methodology that gave relevance to stakeholders, both public and private. Of course, it was not possible to involve the entire range of local actors, but the planning process had a high degree of inclusiveness. A number of thematic workshops have been held on specific crucial planning topics for the city after a first analytical phase investigating classic socio-economic and demographic indicators trends⁵. Planning domains considered to better respond to needs in Cluj (see fig.1).

⁵ Planning process information available at: <https://urbasofia.eu/en/strategic-planning-2/integrated-strategic-plan-for-the-cluj-napoca-metropolitan-area/>.



Figure 1.

A number of nine sectorial strategic objectives are based on the themes approached in the participatory workshops. A governance pact was considered to be at the center (the core) of the strategic plan. The theme of governance has been central from the very beginning of the process, and the idea was to have the experience of Cluj as an example on how to design effective governance schemes.

Schemes not based on the attitude of the command and control method (promoting a sterile dialogue between central level and the dominating municipality of the Metropolitan Areas, with MAs and Functional Regions playing the role of being detachment of the central level and not an autonomous governance layer), but giving more room, in terms of competences and decision making, to the local levels (Regions, MAs and the cities in the MA).

The Cluj Strategic Plan governance scheme, designed along the participatory planning process and aiming at reducing the distance between decision makers, citizens, stakeholders and local institutions, in other words bringing decision closer to real needs and to MA issues, worked just in the design phase. In the following implementation phase, there will be a top down approach, valid all over Romania, where the Urban Authority is not the expression of the local actors and institutions, but a sort of "urban issues prefecture" located in the main municipality of the MA, taking care of procedures and not animating the debate on the local development. The figure 2 illustrate the idea for a local pact proposed and partially experimented in Cluj.




Figure 2.

The idea of having a local governance scheme trying to optimize both dialogue towards vertical and horizontal subsidiarity got success at local level, especially among the many actors that succeeded to contribute to design the conceptual pillars and the key-projects of the plan, it was never considered in terms of the vertical one. Moreover, the SIDU in Cluj, tried really to be strategic and not being a collection of projects, this idea is expressed by the “backbone scheme” of the Strategic plan, see figure 3.




Figure 3.

Planners and stakeholders agreed on having a reduced number of flagship projects and a number of soft actions as overarching “leading tools” both in terms of continuous strategic thinking (keeping planning and keeping alive the social capital de-fragmented and made synergic thank to the SIDU workshops). By contrast, the reality of the official delivered/approved document is that of a list of countless non-prioritized projects reported in the SIDU, to be ranked by the Urban Authority as a separate process. The ongoing challenge is for the local administration to be coherent with the planning process and try to operate a tangible change and being really Cluj the innovator city in Romania.

The post SIDU delivery in Cluj is currently characterized by lights and shadows. An important light is the creation of an Urban Center, or a very similar local instrument, (one of the soft actions envisaged during the SIDU planning process) called: Centrul de Inovare si Imaginatie Civica (CIIC), that is Center for Innovation and Civic Immagination. Shadows are in all the rest, as the other key actions envisaged for data management (an Atlas to launch data based urban services) and for the concrete regeneration and relaunch of one of the most important historical centers in Europe (a proper plan focusing on cultural heritage material and immaterial issues in Cluj and a plan for housing at metropolitan scale to contrast the evident sprawl seem not to be a priority anymore). The big risk is to consider the entire planning process as just a compulsory step to access to use of Cohesion Policy Funds (Axis 4/ROP 2014-20) and not as the start of constant and advanced exercise of strategic planning to be done in order to avoid repeating the unremarkable results of the 2007-2013 programming period. Finally, a good legacy of the SIDU's preparation has to be found in the international projects participated to by both the MA and the Municipality. They are now part of important and relevant H2020 projects facing issues on valorisation of cultural heritage and smart cities services⁶, while not less relevant is the participation of Cluj in the URBACT network, involved on local experimentation and support of temporary uses⁷.

4. CROATIA: Regeneration, through integrated approach, of small towns affected by the 1991-1995 war.

The Programme of integrated physical, economic and social regeneration of small towns in the war-affected areas is a scheme has been managed by the Croatian Ministry of Regional Development and EU Funds (MRDEUF, responsible for use of ERDF), in cooperation with the Croatian Ministry of Labour and Pension System (responsible for use of ESF). It involved, among other, integrated urban regeneration of five pilot cities, by means of so-called intervention plans (IP) to be prepared in each selected towns (pilot areas). Pilot areas were selected by the MRRFEU on the basis of an index of multiple deprivation and include small-sized towns (population 10.000 to 35.000) that were occupied during the war: Vukovar, Beli Manastir, Petrinja, Benkovac and Knin. The pilot area of Beli Manastir is extended to municipality Darda due to the presence of a Roma minority settlement.

The main aim of this project was to develop in each one of the involved cities an efficient and effective Integrated intervention Plan (IP) that should coordinate the use of the joined structural investment (around 100 mil. Euros of ERDF and ca 20 mil. Euros of ESF). The starting point in the involved cities was very problematic. In fact, the involved cities were not used to think and plan in terms of integrating resources. The silos approach/mentality was dominant, and moreover, local administrations were not used to share decisions in the light of a participative approach that could involve all local actors and available planning instruments were just normative and obsolete: no predisposition towards

⁶ Cluj is partner of the H2020 project named ROCK (cultural heritage): <https://www.rockproject.eu/>, and STARDUST (smart cities): http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/141797_en.html.

⁷ Cluj is partner of the URBACT, RE-FILL project: <http://urbact.eu/Refill>.

the definition of a strategic vision for the use of the funds and a common behaviour to wait for indications and approval from central institutions.

In order to achieve the realization of the IPs, it was necessary to work on several key points:

- a sound territorial analysis (to define together with local actors the real needs to face in the towns);
- a methodology for design the IP and the creation of local partnership;
- the definition of criteria to select and prioritize the first projects to launch in respect of principle of coherent and sustainable development.

The definition of the territorial analysis has been a precursor for the IPs integration and efficiency, and not just a descriptive output of the local needs and incipiently built up territorial issues. Hence, the purpose of Territorial Analysis was to define, textually and visually (spatially), development issues that will be the subject of interventions formulated in the Intervention plan document. The process of territorial analysis also had the purpose to establish good participatory planning practices that have to be pursued throughout the whole planning process and evidenced in the document Territorial Analysis. At the same time, The IP was also *the mechanism* to provide the cities with extremely large funds available exclusively for development initiatives, and this means that IP effectively becomes the main instrument for steering the development. Consequently, territorial analysis served as strategic document which will point towards the most relevant needs and the most effective solutions that need to be tackled through the IP.

The figure 4 resumes the first crucial phase of the applied planning process leading to the IP definition, that is the identification of the problems to solve at urban and territorial scale.

The structure of each local partnership has been tailored to suit the specific context and circumstances, and there is no “one size fits all” solution. General principle, however, was that local partnerships need to be as much as possible inclusive. The less inclusive the partnership, the more advanced is the risk to have obstacles in the planning process.

Classic elements of a partnership have been expressed as the following:

- different departments within the local administration;
- elected bodies responsible for the different policy areas connected to the challenge being addressed;
- direct beneficiaries of project (e.g. young people, the elderly, migrants, SMEs, citizens);
- third sector, NGOs, social enterprises, especially those that represent the interests of specific groups or deliver public services;
- different tiers of government in the relevant policy area (neighbourhood, city, metropolitan area, region), but even local development agencies;
- the private sector, business community, employers, public service providers.

The local municipality involved in the project had to be helped even in operationally grasping the concept of sustainable development. The approach has been proposed, as in the table below, as a function of multiple variables. It is impossible to reduce the complexity of the sustainability in a table, but this action was really necessary in order to help the local groups make sustainable choices. Of course, they have been instructed on the fact that this operational table has to be considered just as a starting point for animating the local dialogue in order to assess alternative development pathways.




Figure 4.

Finally, the entire planning processes leading the local communities to design their intervention plan has been structured around these 3 key steps:

	ECONOMIC DIMENSION	SOCIAL/EQUITY DIMENSION	ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION	GOVERNANCE DIMENSION	LOGISTICS DIMENSION
SUSTAINABLE PLANNING CHOICES	COSTS BENEFITS ECONOMIC RETURN OF PROJECTS STABLE JOBS CREATED TEMPORARY JOBS CREATED	STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED GUARANTEED EQUITABLE ACCESS TO BENEFITS LOCAL DIVERSITY UNDERSTOOD AND CONSIDERED INDIVIDUAL/COMMUNITIES EMPOWERMENT IS PURSUED INCLUSIVE ACTIONS ARE PROMOTED QUALITY OF LIFE	NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON ENVIRONMENT ARE AVOIDED OR MITIGATED PROJECTS FAVORS THE USE OF RENEWABLE SOURCES/RESOURCES PROJECTS ARE CONFORM TO EU DIRECTIVE ON: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • WASTE MANAGEMENT • WATER MANAGEMENT • SOIL CONSUMPTION • AIR POLLUTION • NOISE POLLUTION 	LOCAL CLARIFICATION: ALL COMPETENT ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES SUPPORT THE SOLUTION AND DEFINE THEIR ROLE IN FACILITATING THE IMPLEMENTATION POLICY TOOLS ARE AVAILABLE TO MANAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS PROJECTS ARE CONFORM TO TECHNICAL NORMS AND NORMATIVE PLANNING TOOLS	BUDGETARY SUPPORT TO THE PROJECTS INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT TO THE PROJECTS RIGHT SCALE OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS (PROJECTS CAN BE MANAGED AT THE SCALE OF THE TOWN AND OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES)

Table 1.

- a preparation phase (to create at local scale a group of stakeholders working together with the local public administration);
- the analytical phase (identification and spatialization of real local problems);
- the design phase (preparing and assessing alternative scenarios in order to prepare a plan on the selected one).

The tables 1 and 2 illustrate the phases linking them to responsibilities and expected outputs.

	PLANNING STAGES	RESPONSIBLE ENTITIES	INVOLVED ENTITIES	OUTPUTS
PREPARATION	Setting up of the Operational Unit	Mayor	Mayor, or the Planning Councillor (VM responsible for urban/territorial issues in the town)	An Operational Unit is set up in the towns
	Setting up of the Partnership	Operational Unit	Operational Unit	Every town has a working Partnership
ANALYSIS	Identification of Planning Domains	Operational Unit and Experts		A set of planning domains id identified and used to conceptually classify the urban/territorial needs
	The Status Quo Analysis	Operational Unit and Experts	Operational Unit, Experts and Partnership	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Report on territorial analysis Territorial atlas
DESIGN	The Scenarios' Definition	Operational Unit and Experts	Operational Unit, Experts and Partnership	Three scenarios are identified in every town (each of them defines a set of different development objectives)
	The Scenario's Selection	Operational Unit and Experts	Operational Unit, Experts and Partnership	One out of the three scenarios is identified as the development pathway to follow
	The preparation of the Intervention Plan	Operational Unit and Experts	Operational Unit and Experts	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> A project portfolio is defined The projects are classified as flagship, soft and complementary A timeline for the projects' implementation is provided

Table 2.

Conclusions

The three examples reported within this article relate to the direct and indirect use of EU funds as driver of local development in South-East European countries. These experiences have some common points:

- they consider cities and region in south-eastern Europe;
- many of these territories are post-socialist countries;
- considered territorial realities are generally classifiable as small and medium sized cities;
- all these initiated planning experiences define operational pathways for use of EU structural funds;
- a participatory approach strongly involving local level actors is common to these experiences.

They evidence the difficulty of the cities/towns to design proper strategic tools for effective and efficient use of the structural funds and integrate even other public or private investments towards co-ordinated projects and shared development vision, but at the same time, they make manifest the clear will of the local communities to be protagonists in shaping the development narratives about their future development.

The dissonance is more evident in the line of the vertical subsidiarity. The instruments proposed by the EU, especially in this current programming period (2014-2020) have a great potential to trigger development at local and regional level. The main issue is that these instruments are lost in translation. The "bug" in the translation is the absence, in many member states, of a clear definition of competences in the framework of the vertical governance. The landscape of the EU matrix of plans, programmes and policies, when imported in the context of the member states, naturally faces local deformations and interpretations.

This mismatch is more evident where the governance framework is weak, as it is in former socialist countries. The ruling classes of these countries have not yet fully developed the pathways of devolution of urban and territorial competencies towards local governance levels. These local levels have progressed a lot in the use of the EU funds, but they still look at the strategic planning instruments as compulsory bureaucratic documents to deliver in order to get the funds and not as an opportunity of being responsible players for their sustainable development. Lastly, the lack of innovative planning instruments, less normative but more related to promote the local interaction and to sustain actions building and valorising trust between local communities and all range of stakeholders that could help to bring cities and citizens, especially the small and medium sized towns, out of hopeless and permanent transitional phases.

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